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During my studies I had the opportunity to discover various fields in the area of 
economics and to develop a particular interest for the relationships between social and 
psychological factors and economic behavior in a series of important domains.  
This doctoral thesis is a collection of three empirical essays dealing with key topics 
addressed in the last years within the broad Behavioral Economics research area. A common 
feature of the studies illustrated in the following chapters is the focus on the key role played by 
psychological and social factors in shaping economic decision-making processes.  In particular, 
we focus our attention on the role of one’s personality traits and the influence of her peers as 
factors that could drive and alter individual choices as well as her perception of objective reality 
in economically relevant decision contexts.  
The first chapter, titled “Objective and subjective status: the role of personality bias” is 
joint work with my supervisor Luca Zarri and professor Alessandro Bucciol. In this essay, 
analyzing survey data from the 2006-2012 waves of the US Health and Retirement Study, we 
explore the factors which influence the relationship between objective and subjective measures 
of individual status with regard to two key domains: health status and social status. Our data 
suggest that the two indicators of health status are highly positively correlated; similarly, also 
the subjective and objective measures of social status are strongly positively linked. In addition, 
their correlations with personality traits are not negligible. Then, we estimate a bivariate model 
including basic demographic variables and we find that the two objective indexes of health and 
social status have a positive and significant effect on their subjective counterparts. Adding 
individual characteristics, we show that all the “Big Five” personality traits strongly influence 
both subjective measures. Even more interestingly, both the sign and the significance of the 
effects of four personality variables are the same for the two subjective measures under study. 
Our findings indicate that more open, conscientious and extraverted individuals report higher 
health and social status levels, while more agreeable and neurotic persons declare lower health 
and social status levels. These results are also confirmed when the other subjective measure is 
included in the regression specification, highlighting the relevant role of personality. Then 
these evidences suggest that there is a persistent gap between objective and subjective 
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measures that holds across partially unrelated domains and that is likely due to “personality 
bias”. 
The second chapter illustrates an incentivized pen and paper experiment run at a 
primary school in Italy, involving 301 students aged 9 to 12 years. The title of this work is “Loss 
aversion and risk attitude among children: “self-other” differences in decision making”. By 
studying risk preferences and loss aversion in children, this essay allows us to draw some broad 
comparisons with prior work focusing on adults’ decision making in these domains. Moreover, 
we investigate whether, other things being equal, decision making differs when individuals 
have to decide for themselves (“self”) and when they have to make choices that will have 
consequences on other subjects (“other”). We discover that children who choose for others are 
more risk seeking than those who decide for themselves. A self-other treatment effect emerges 
also by counting the number of inconsistent answers, as it is significantly higher for children 
who decide for others (revealing a careless attitude in this decision context). Furthermore, we 
noted that some children expose others to an extremely high risk, leading them to losses. 
Analyzing their risk preferences, we find neutral behavior towards losses that shifts to a more 
risk averse behavior for the same options presented as winnings. Moreover, we investigate 
whether children’s loss aversion changes over time, considering three different time horizons 
(i.e., “now”, “after a week”, “after a month”) and we observe that its level increases over time. 
Carrying out an ordered logit analysis, we document that the degree of risk aversion in the 
frame of winnings is significantly greater for foreign children and for those who spend little 
time with their parents, while we observe a strong gender effect in the frame of losses. Finally, 
our findings indicate that children who are more impatient display lower loss aversion for 
losses in near future. 
The third chapter reports a laboratory experiment on Dictator Game, focusing on the 
potential role of different kinds of “similarity” in affecting giving choices. Its title is “Preference 
for giving: the influence of similar and dissimilar dictators”. By collecting experimental data 
among students at VELE, the Experimental Economics Lab of the Department of Economics of 
the University of Verona, we investigate whether subjects’ (incentivized) giving choices in a 
Dictator Game are affected by information over the allocation of a similar Dictator in terms of 
demographic characteristics, hobbies and beliefs. We use a between-subjects design and 
introduce three treatments which differ in the way information about allocations and 
characteristics of other Dictators is provided. When participants receive the desired Dictator 
information and pay for it, they tend to choose a fair sharing, while when participants receive 
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group information and cannot choose it, they tend to act selfishly. Our data indicate also that, 
when a cost has to be incurred, only about 50% of Dictators choose to receive information, 
while, when information is costless, about 90% of individuals decide to receive it. Even more 
interestingly, our results highlight little importance for hobbies’ information and a clear 
preference for information over beliefs. Carrying out an OLS regression, we show that feeling 
similar to other individuals leads to behave in line with them. Moreover, our findings indicate 
that Dictators who search for approval and others’ appreciation, who are more easily 
influenced and more agreeable tend to align their choices with others. We also observe that 
those who receive random information focus their attention on the allocation distribution, 
while those who receive desired information give more importance to it. Finally, we find that 
social variables regarding one’s peers (such as others’ approval and others’ appreciation) have 
a stronger effect in explaining the conformism measure rather than the pro-sociality measure, 
while personality variables have a more relevant impact on pro-sociality rather than on 
conformity. Indeed, we observe that Dictators who are more open and agreeable are more pro-













Objective and Subjective Status:  





Analyzing survey data from the 2006-2012 waves of the US Health and Retirement Study, we 
seek to shed light on the factors underlying the relationship between objective and subjective 
measures of health and social status. We estimate a bivariate model including basic 
demographic variables and we find that the two objective indexes of health and social status 
have a positive and significant effect on their subjective counterparts. Adding individual 
characteristics, we show that all the “Big Five” personality traits strongly influence both 
subjective measures. Even more interestingly, both the sign and the significance of the effects 
of four personality variables are the same for the two subjective measures under study. Our 
findings indicate that more open, conscientious and extraverted individuals report higher 
health and social status levels, while more agreeable and neurotic persons declare lower health 
and social status levels. These results are also confirmed when the other subjective measure is 
included in the regression specification, highlighting the relevant role of personality. On the 
whole, this evidence suggests that there is a persistent gap between objective and subjective 





1. Introduction  
What drives human perception of objective reality? Why is it the case that our subjective 
judgments often depart from actual data? And why do individuals often differ from one another 
in their evaluations of the same phenomena? Over the centuries, these intriguing but 
challenging questions have attracted the interest of philosophers, who argued for long over the 
meaning of subjectivity and objectivity as well as the relationships between the individual self, 
her mental categories and her knowledge of the external world (Ladkin, 2005). 
In this study, we empirically address a question related to the subjectivity of human 
evaluations by conjecturing that non-cognitive factors such as our personality traits may 
significantly alter our self-evaluations of reality with regard to relevant life domains. More 
specifically, we test the hypothesis that a “personality bias” is at work by distorting our 
subjective perception of our own objective condition and that the same personality traits play 
a similar role across different and only partially related domains such as social status and health 
status. 
Prior work indicated that personality traits affect the individual’s perception of her own 
position in the social ladder (Bucciol et al., 2015), even after controlling for the relationship 
between subjective and objective social status. In this work, we aim to take a step further as we 
conjecture that a personality bias manifests itself as a more general phenomenon and, 
therefore, might help us significantly account for the gap between objective and subjective 
status with regard to multiple life domains. In particular, we decided to include the health 
domain into the analysis, as previous studies have shown that individuals tend to misperceive 
their actual health conditions (Booth-Kewley and Vickers, 1994; Costa and McCrae, 1984; Rodin 
and Salovey, 1989). While many studies investigate the link between health and personality by 
considering either objective or subjective health status, our dataset lends itself to the analysis 
of both objective and subjective health status and, therefore, we seek to understand whether, 
how and to what extent individuals’ personality characteristics may distort the perception of 
their health conditions. 
Therefore, through our empirical analysis we wonder whether, when we estimate a 
bivariate model that incorporates both social status and health status, the effects of personality 
traits on subjective status are similar (in terms of both sign and significance levels), after 
controlling for the relationship between subjective and objective status. To assess personality, 
we have recourse to the established “Big Five” model (Costa and McCrae, 1991) developed 
within the so-called personality psychology.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review on health status, on the link between objective and subjective measures, and on 
personality traits. In Section 3 we present the data we use to explore this topic. Section 4 
contains the main findings of our analysis and Section 5 concludes. Appendices A.1 and A.2 
provide details on the construction of some key variables, and Appendix A.3 describes the 
empirical methodology.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Objective and Subjective Health Status 
The simple word “health” in fact hides various meanings: health indeed can be 
subjectively interpreted as being (person without illness), as having (person with a reserve), 
and as doing (person without disability). As Wright (1985) points out, “investigators have 
rarely, if ever, provided definitions of health for their subjects. Subjects have been left to use 
their own interpretation”. D’Houtand and Field (1984) studied a French sample in order to 
determine how people themselves perceive the meaning of health. They found that lower class 
respondents view health primarily in instrumental (e.g. ability to perform social roles) and 
negative (absence of illness) terms, whereas higher class subjects interpret health in a more 
positive and self-oriented fashion. Krause and Jay (1994) showed that respondents do not use 
the same frame of reference in rating their overall health as excellent, good, fair, or poor. More 
specifically, data suggest that younger people tend to adopt more often healthy behaviors, such 
as doing physical activity, eating a balanced diet, not smoking, whereas those who are older are 
more inclined to think in terms of health problems. With regard to race, it seems that non-
whites may think about health problems when asked to rate their overall health, whereas 
whites may be more likely to use general physical functioning as a frame of reference. Next, 
available evidence also indicates that respondents with lower levels of educational attainment 
may be more inclined to use health behaviors1 as a frame of reference.  
There is today a large empirical literature dealing with the application and 
interpretation of self-assessed health. One strand of literature emphasized problems with 
measures of self-reported health with regard to income inequality, labor supply and retirement 
                                                          
1 Conner and Norman (1996) define health behaviors as any activity undertaken for the purpose of preventing or 




decisions. Another area of work focuses on questions concerning data analysis and solutions to 
heterogeneity problems. More recently, a variety of authors have opted for the use of more 
objective indicators of health status, such as responses to questions about specific health 
conditions or limitations, doctors' reports or information on mortality. A possible limitation, 
however, for instance in retirement models, is that objective indicators like these measure 
health rather than work capacity: information from physical exams does not control for the 
specific demands of a person’s job environment or the interaction between a person’s skills and 
his health limitations. On the other hand, the use of self-reported indicators only in these 
models could lead to overestimate the importance of health status: for example, a person who 
identifies herself as incapable of work or in poor health, could make retirement decision 
limiting the effect of other economic variables. Therefore, it is important to incorporate 
information from both self-reported and objective measure of health. 
A number of studies have investigated the correlation between the level of income 
inequality in a population and health outcomes, showing that the average health among people 
living in high inequality areas appears to be lower than among people living in low-inequality 
areas. A statistically significant relationship has been reported in studies using aggregate data 
both across countries (Rodgers, 1979; Wilkinson, 1992) and across regions within countries 
(Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Lynch et al., 1998). Authors typically suggested that inequality 
has an effect on health either because it is a source of psychosocial stress, or because it fosters 
the development of environments hazardous to public health. Hildebrand (2009) found 
consistent evidence that income inequality is negatively related to self-rated health status in 
the European Union for both men and women, particularly when measured at national level. 
However, despite its statistical significance, the magnitude of the impact of inequality on health 
is very small. Moreover, Fernandez Mayoralas et al. (2012) showed that differences between 
men and women in perceived health status become more pronounced with age, reflecting a 
worse situation among women. Compared to the unmarried, the married may not report poorer 
health until developing more severe health problems. These findings suggest the married tend 
to overestimate their health status. With regard to life satisfaction, Gwozdz and Sousa-Poza 
(2010) confirmed that a rapid decline in life satisfaction is primarily attributable to low levels 
of perceived health. However, despite major exposure to serious health problems like heart 
attacks, strokes, diabetes, arthritis, Parkinson's, and cataracts, life satisfaction among the oldest 
does not generally depend on their objective health status. 
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Many other studies investigate the relation between objective and subjective health 
status. For example, Bound (1991) documents that labor supply models are sensitive to the 
measures of health used. When self-reported measures are used, health seems to play a larger 
role and economic factors a smaller one than when more objective measures are used. Bennett 
(2005), instead, examines the relationship between subjective and objective health and social 
engagement in survivors from the Nottingham Longitudinal Study of Activity and Ageing 
(NLSAA). He finds that social engagement is a useful predictor of subjective physical health. 
However, objective health is not predicted by social engagement. This suggests that social 
engagement may act on subjective health through a psychosocial pathway which may be absent 
in its relationship with objective health. 
On the whole, then, existing works in this literature indicate that several factors 
influence subjective and objective health status and likely mediate the relationship between the 
two health dimensions. 
 
2.2. Objective and Subjective Status 
It is plausible that self-perceived (i.e. subjectively filtered) measures do not correspond 
necessarily to objective measures. For instance, one’s subjective socio-economic status may 
differ from her actual position in the social ladder, one’s perceived health status might not 
coincide with his actual psychophysical difficulties and individuals’ fear of crime in their 
neighbourhood and actual crime figures may well be substantially misaligned. The discrepancy 
between the two measures could change a lot depending on the context as well as on personal 
knowledge, experiences and other characteristics of the individuals. Objective and subjective 
assessments could affect each other, but anyway they remain different measures because the 
subjective one is filtered by personal knowledge, experiences and characteristics.  
Past research has shed light on the relationships between objective and subjective 
measures within several economic and non-economic domains, including housing, career 
success, employee performance. Nygren et al. (2007) examine the link between objective and 
perceived housing in old age (see on this also Oswald and Wahl, 2004). They find that very old 
people living in more accessible homes perceive their housing as more useful and meaningful 
with respect to their daily activities, and they are less dependent on external control in relation 
to their housing. Other work focuses on the relationship between objective and subjective 
career success. Both are associated to a wide range of predictors, but in a different way. Ng et 
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al. (2005) consider four categories of predictors of objective and subjective career success: 
human capital, sociodemographic status, organizational sponsorship and stable individual 
differences. They find that the first two factors are strongly related to objective career success 
while the latter two categories are more associated with subjective career success. Nabi (1999) 
instead finds that the highest objective career success is reported by employees with a high 
level of education, who work in larger organizations with well-structured progression ladders 
and invest a great deal of effort in their work role. On the other hand, the highest subjective 
career success is declared by employees who are high in work centrality, who work in 
organizations with well-structured progression ladders and employment security. Other 
studies analyse the directions of influence between objective and subjective career success. 
Some view objective success as the basis for the subjective evaluation of success (Judge et al., 
1995; Ng et al., 2005), whereas others consider the subjective perception of success as a by-
product of objective success (Nicholson and De Waal-Andrews, 2005). Abele and Spurk (2009) 
study the inter-relation between the two dimensions of success over time analysing ten years 
and considering changes in objective success (income, hierarchical position) and subjective 
success both as comparison with a reference group (other-referent subjective success) and in 
terms of own job satisfaction. They find that objective success affects both the initial level and 
the growth of other-referent subjective success, but it does not influence job satisfaction. 
Furthermore, they show that both measures of subjective success as well as initial levels and 
their changes have strong effects on the growth of objective success.  
Another context in which objective and subjective measures may significantly differ 
concerns performances. For example, Harris (2001) analyses the link between market 
orientation and performance studying a UK industry. His results suggest that market 
orientation is positively associated with company performance in certain environmental 
conditions when subjective measures of performance are taken into account and in a more 
limited range of environmental conditions when objective measures of performance are 
considered. With regard to employee performance, instead, there is not a common 
interpretation of the relationship between objective and subjective measures of it. Some 
researchers treat different performance measures synonymously (Fried, 1991; Williams and 
Livingstone, 1994). Nathan and Alexander (1988) detect a difference between objective and 
subjective measures in only one of the seven relationships examined and conclude that the 
objective-subjective distinction may be more illusory than real. Other scholars, instead, agree 
that objective and subjective performances should not be viewed as interchangeable (Murphy 
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and Cleveland, 1991; Heneman, 1986). These results are confirmed in the meta-analysis of 
Bommer et al. (1995). In their study, objective and subjective ratings of employee performance 
have a correlation equal to 0.389, indicating that the two measures should not be used 
interchangeably. However, despite the limited sample, their meta-analysis suggests that 
objective and subjective measures of the same construct at the same level may be 
interchangeable. The link between objective and subjective measures of performance is also 
studied considering urban services. In this context subjective measures are indicators 
constructed from citizens’ responses about their experiences, perceptions and evaluations of 
services received. The objective measures, instead, take into account the records of the service 
agencies themselves. Many authors agree on the low congruence and, then, the discrepancy 
between the two indicators. For example, Stipak (1979) studying Los Angeles metropolitan 
area, finds that objective indicators of police services and park and recreation services are at 
most only weakly related to citizens’ evaluation of those services. He argues that large 
improvements in objective performance generally appear to have negligible effects on citizens’ 
subjective evaluations. Brown and Coulter (1983) support this position and, analysing data 
from Tuscaloosa, Alabama, argue that satisfaction levels and services levels appear to be 
independent. In contrast, Carroll (1978) reports a significant relationship between citizens’ 
perceptions and objective measures considering street conditions. 
A well-known discrepancy studied among economists and psychologists is related to 
subjective well-being and wealth. Some works analyse the relation between income and life 
satisfaction. Schyns (2002), for instance, examines whether income at individual level and 
wealth at the national level affect the life satisfaction of a population. He finds that poor people 
living in poor countries are less satisfied with their lives than poor people living in affluent 
countries and that poor individuals change more in their life satisfaction than rich individuals. 
O’ Connell (2004) also shows that there exists a stronger relation between satisfaction and 
equality of income distribution rather than between satisfaction and size of income. Other 
researches also try to explain the well-known “happiness paradox”. Beyond the positional and 
the hedonic treadmills, which describe how people’ concern about status and rising aspirations 
keep happiness from rising along with income, Binswanger (2006) proposes two additional 
treadmills: the multi-option treadmill that describes how the constantly increasing number of 
options to spend money and time leads people to feel unable to make the right decisions and to 
actually enjoy the chosen option, and the time-saving treadmill that highlights how time-saving 
innovations tend to intensify the use of leisure time instead of mitigating the time pressure. 
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Lora and Fajardo (2013) explore the factors behind the discrepancies between objective 
and subjective social-class identification. Their empirical results show that, for 16 Latin 
American countries, the distance between perception and objective social ranking is large, and 
that perceived social ranking is associated not just with income, but with all forms of wealth, 
personal capabilities, interpersonal relations, financial and material assets, and perceptions of 
economic insecurity. For instance, having at least complete secondary education helps to 
explain why some people who are objectively poor classify themselves as middle class. Not 
having kids makes some poor individuals see themselves as middle class and, in contrast, 
having kids makes some wealthy individuals see themselves as middle class. Among the 
material conditions of life, owning a car or a washing machine, or access to finance make some 
objectively poor people self-assess themselves as middle class whereas lack of those things 
induces some objectively wealthy people to consider themselves as middle class. Sosnaud et al. 
(2013) evaluate the extent and the origin of the differences between subjective class 
identifications and objective social class positions and study their relationship with vote choice 
in American presidential elections. They find that there are considerable differences between 
Americans’ subjective and objective social class: over two-thirds of the upper-middle class have 
“deflated perceptions”, that is subjective status is lower than objective status, half of the middle 
class have concordant perceptions, and more than a third of the working class have “inflated 
perceptions”, that is subjective status is higher than objective status. They also show that this 
discrepancy depends on sociodemographic factors, in particular race and education. In 
addition, the analysis reveals that class perceptions are more likely to vote Republican; 
however, this relationship is not significant when they control for race and income. 
Another context which presents a gap between objective and subjective measures is 
crime. The British Crime Survey (BCS) identifies widespread public ignorance about crime and 
criminal justice, and it also recognises a discrepancy between subjective fear and objective risk. 
For example, the 2000 BCS reports a fall between 1997 and 1999 in almost all offence 
categories. However, despite this reduction and a previous one between 1995 and 1997, the 
level of worrying about crime has remained relatively stable (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1998). 
Kershaw et al. (2000), in an attempt to understand whether people are indeed more worried 
about crime than they should be, suggest that the increased discrepancy between perceived 
crime and real crime, in particular at the national level, may be related to media 
representations. Moreover, the BCS also notes that perceptions are associated with actual levels 
of risk: people living in high-risk areas are more likely to predict their victimisation than those 
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living in low-risk areas. In addition, the 1998 BCS finds that also the knowledge about juvenile 
crime is poor; only a minority (16%) of respondents correctly identified that most known 
offenders are adults and not juveniles.  
One topic of interest in pricing research regards the effect of price on quality 
perceptions. Also in this context the relationship between subjective and objective evaluations 
of the price-quality may display a discrepancy between the two measures. For instance, 
Lichtenstein and Burton (1989) conduct four studies to assess the accuracy with which 
consumers perceive objective price-quality relationships. Their results suggest that the price-
quality perceptions are more accurate for nondurable products than for durable ones.  
Moreover, some recent works regard the gap between perceived and actual inflation 
and, in particular, the idea that the introduction of euro has increased individuals’ 
misperception of prices. Aucremanne et al.’s (2007) study provides support to this hypothesis; 
they also find that the break in the relationship between perceived and measured inflation is 
fairly homogenous across individuals with different socio-demographic characteristics and that 
the results do not change when national CPIs instead of HICPs are used as benchmarks. Dziuda 
and Mastrobuoni (2006) show that consumers who still convert prices to their old currency 
have higher inflation perceptions. In particular, they observe a persistent overestimation of 
inflation as time passes, at least in an environment of positive inflation. Their results also 
suggest that inflation perceptions are higher for older consumers and less educated people. 
Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) highlight the importance of psychological factors, and especially 
the role of a priori expectations, and provide experimental evidence of a systematic bias related 
to participants’ perceptions of price increases. 
Other studies concern the link between objective and subjective social status and the 
role played by other variables in this relationship. In particular, several studies in the last years 
have focused on the subjective-objective distinction with regard to the two domains 
investigated in this study, i.e. social status and health. Chen and Fan (2015) analyse the 
divergence between subjective and objective social status in contemporary China finding that 
more than half of urban residents underestimate their social position and that, in contrast, more 
than half of rural residents overestimate it. They also show that status discordance is negatively 
affected by family income, education, and occupational prestige and positively correlated with 
the perceived upward social mobility. Moreover, the effects of objective indicators and 
perceived mobility are different between urban and rural residents. Most of the works in this 
field focus the relationship between objective and subjective social status on various aspects of 
20 
 
perceived and actual health. The existence of a relevant relationship between these variables is 
well evident in the study of Kopp et al. (2010). Analysing the association of these measures with 
male and female middle-aged mortality, the authors show that the two social status indicators 
are highly significantly correlated with self-rated health, both among men and women. Sakurai 
et al. (2010) analyse the impact of subjective and objective social status on mental health. They 
find that, in the Japanese community, subjective social status seems to be a stronger predictor 
of psychological distress among both men and women than traditional measures of objective 
status such as education, income and occupation. Adler et al. (2000) examine both objective 
and subjective social status in relation to psychological and physiological functioning in a group 
of healthy white women. They show that subjective social status is more consistently and 
strongly associated to psychological functioning and other health-related factors (self-rated 
health, heart rate, sleep latency, body fat distribution, and cortisol habituation to repeated 
stress) than objective social status. This result is also confirmed by the study of Macleod et al. 
(2005). Indeed, studying 5232 Scottish men for 25 years, they observe that subjective social 
status is a stronger determinant of psychosocial health and stress level than objective social 
position. In addition, they find that both subjective and objective measures of lower social 
position are associated with poorer health. Also Nobles at al. (2013) find that, among 
Indonesians aged 35 and older, perceived status decreases with declining health. Moreover, 
they show a reverse causality between subjective status and health measures and that these 
relationships persist in the presence of controls for unobserved traits, such as family 
background and aspects of personality. Marmot (1998) instead examines the contributions of 
psychosocial factors to socioeconomic differences in health and disease and in order to 
demonstrate the extent of the association between socioeconomic status and health he 
considers three variables: self-reported physical health, waist-hip ratio and psychological well-
being and their interactions with other factors that theory or previous empirical works suggest 
should be related to these measures. He finds that a combination of aspects - social, 
environmental and individual- is important as determinant of the health of populations, and 
then that not only the single psychological factor explains differentials in health. In addition, 
the results of Operario et al. (2004) highlight the positive and significant correlation of 
subjective social status with health measures, and show a slightly stronger association of self-
rated health with subjective social status than with income or education. Their OLS regression 
confirms these evidences: subjective social status has the largest impact on subjective health 
status even after controlling for other socio-economic indicators and after including negative 
21 
 
affect variables. Also the study of Singh-Manoux et al. (2005) examines whether subjective 
socioeconomic status predicts health status and change in health status over time better than 
objective socioeconomic status. Their results reveal that both measures of social status are 
significantly related to health outcomes and to a decline in health status over time. However, 
when the two measures of social status enter simultaneously in the model, only the subjective 
measure continues to be significantly associated with health and change in health. The role of 
subjective social status as mediator between objective social status and health is also 
investigated by Demakakos et al. (2008). Using data of 3368 men and 4065 women aged 52 
years or older from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, they find that subjective social 
status mediates fully or partially the associations of education and occupational class with self-
reported and clinical health measures. In addition, it mediates the link between wealth and self-
reported health measures. Franzini et al.’ (2006) study highlights the complexity of the 
interactions between objective and subjective social status, acculturation, and health in a 
Mexican-origin individuals sample. Their results indicate that sociocultural factors, in 
particular social support, personal opportunity, and trust, explain differences between 
subjective and objective social status. Moreover, they find that subjective social status is 
associated with self-rated health even when adjusting for objective social status. In addition, 
sociocultural characteristics, specially perceived victimization, appear to mediate the effects of 
subjective social status on mental and physical health. Cohen et al. (2008), instead, study the 
relationship between socioeconomic status measures and the susceptibility to common cold 
exposing 193 healthy men and women ages 21-55 years to a rhinovirus or influenza virus. They 
find that an increasing subjective socioeconomic status is associated with a decreasing risk for 
developing a cold for both viruses. They also show that this link is independent of objective 
socioeconomic status and of cognitive, affective and social disposition that might provide 
alternative explanations for this connection. Ritterman et al. (2009) analyse the influence of 
Mexican adolescents’ social status on substance use.  Their results reveal that adolescents who 
perceive themselves as higher in social status in reference to their local community report more 
smoking and drinking. These findings are similar when objective social status is considered. On 
the other hand, adolescents who perceive themselves as higher in social standing in reference 
to Mexican society as a whole declare substance use with less probability. Moreover, Leu et al. 
(2008) examine the association between subjective social status and mental health among 
Asian immigrants and investigate whether age at immigration is a potential moderator in the 
previous relationship. They find that higher ratings of subjective social status are associated 
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with lower change of mood dysfunction, a composite of anxiety and affective disorder 
symptoms. They obtain similar results, even if with lower effects, when consider as subjective 
social status a measure that compares participants with others in the community that are more 
important to them. They also show that, in both cases, neither education nor household income 
is a significant predictor of mental health. Many other works reveal significant effects of social 
status on health status; it seems, instead, that only few studies analyse the influence of health 
aspects on social status measures. Singh-Manoux et al. (2003), in addition to find that subjective 
social status is a strong predictor of ill-health, try to determine the most important variables 
which explain the subjective social status. Among the 16 predictor variables, they also consider 
psychological well-being measures (hopelessness, control at work, general life control, mental 
health, vigilance, hostility, and optimism). Despite their high and significant correlations with 
subjective social status, they do not result important determinants of social position. This study, 
indeed, shows that occupational position, education, household income, satisfaction with 
standard of living, and feeling of financial security regarding the future are the five most 
relevant predictors of subjective social status. 
On the whole, then, existing empirical works dealing with the distinction between 
subjective and objective measures along various dimensions indicate that in many situations 
there are important factors at work that, by differentially shaping objective and subjective 
measures, drive a wedge between the two. 
 
2.3. Personality Traits  
Roberts (2009) famously defines personality traits as “the relatively enduring patterns 
of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under 
certain circumstances”. A growing number of studies sheds light on the importance of 
personality traits in a wide range of economic domains, including corporate financial policies 
(Malmendier et al., 2011), household financial behavior (Nyhus and Webley, 2001; Brown and 
Taylor, 2014; Gherzi et al., 2014; Bucciol and Zarri, 2015), academic achievement (Goldberg et 
al., 1998; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Cunha et al., 2010), 
job performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Hogan and Holland, 2003; Roberts et al., 2007), 
career success (Boudreau et al., 2001; Caliendo et al., 2014), Body Mass Index and smoking 
habit (Rustichini et al., 2012).  
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In the last 20 years there has been a growing consensus in the psychology literature over 
the idea that there are five basic or primary personality traits which are invariant across age 
groups and cultures (Costa and McCrae, 1991). These so called “Big Five” traits are generally 
denoted with the terms Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. In Table 1 we report a general definition of these five factors 
taken from the APA Dictionary of Psychology together with the personality facets associated 
with them in our dataset.  
Table 1. The “Big Five” personality traits 
Personality Trait Definition from 




“The tendency to be open to new 













“The tendency to be organized, 










“An orientation of one’s interests and 
energies toward the outer world of 
people and things rather than the inner 
world of subjective experience; 





















“A chronic level of emotional instability 
and proneness to psychological distress. 
Emotional stability is predictability and 
consistency in emotional reactions, with 










Many empirical studies suggest that personality traits, along with other psychosocial 
variables, may have a strong link with health in old age, in terms of reporting physical 
symptoms, satisfaction with health, general well-being and healthy behavior (Booth-Kewley 
and Vickers, 1994; Costa and McCrae, 1984; Rodin and Salovey, 1989). Chapman et al. (2006) 
examine the association of personality traits with different aspects of health. They used the 
Medical Outcomes Survey Short Form-36 (SF-36), instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADLs), and the physical self-maintenance scale to assess different aspects of Health-Related 
Quality of Life (HRQOL). They discovered that a higher neuroticism level is associated with 
lower functioning on the IADLs and the physical self-maintenance scale, and worse HRQOL on 
the Social Functioning and Role Emotional subscales of the SF-36. Higher conscientiousness is 
associated with better HRQOL on the SF-36 Role Physical scale and better IADL function. In 
exploratory moderation analyses, a higher openness level diminishes the effect of medical 
burden on IADL impairment. Dubayova et el. (2009) explored whether neuroticism and 
extraversion contribute also to the variance in Quality of Life in patients with Parkinson's 
disease when controlling for age, functional status and disease duration. Their results for 
neuroticism are in line with studies focusing on other patient groups, including patients with 
cognitive impairments, chronic pain and depression. A high level of neuroticism predicts the 
use of ineffective passive coping strategies, and those patients reported worse perception of 
their health problems (Beekman et al., 1996; Hazebroek-Kampschreur et al., 2003; Goodwin 
and Gotlib, 2004). A higher score in extraversion, instead, is significantly associated with better 
emotional well-being in males, but surprisingly, with worse emotional well-being in females. 
Other studies analyzed the association of both physical and mental health with 
personality. For example, Campbell et al. (2012) found that individuals report both better 
physical and mental health if they are extraverted, but less conscientious and less neurotic. This 
finding is generally consistent with previous research with the NEO Five-Factor Inventory, a 
short version of NEO Personality Inventory, that indicated that neuroticism is negatively 
associated with positive health (Debruin, 2006; Endemann and Zimmermann, 2009; Jerant et 
al., 2008; Lockenhoff et al., 2009). A growing body of work shows that personality traits also 
predict longevity. In particular, traits related to Conscientiousness, Openness and 
Agreeableness are associated with longer lifespans while those related to Neuroticism are 




Some studies document that Conscientiousness is linked to health-protective behaviors, 
including exercise, abstention from tobacco and lower levels of alcohol abuse and risky driving 
(Bogg and Roberts, 2004), and consumption of a lower fat diet (Goldberg and Strycker, 2002). 
Hong and Paunonen (2009) examined the relation between the “Big Five” personality traits and 
health-risk behaviors among university students, in order to predict tobacco and alcohol 
consumption, and speeding in the car. Their findings revealed that low Conscientiousness and 
low Agreeableness are associated with these potentially health damaging behaviors. 
Extraversion is additionally connected with alcohol use. Interaction effects are found between 
Conscientiousness and Agreeableness on smoking and, only for men, drinking. Korotkov 
(2008), using hierarchical multiple regression, also found that Openness, Extraversion, and 
Neuroticism moderate the relationship between stress and health behavior, and that, under 
high stress, conscientious individuals tend to engage in more health behaviors. Moreover, 
Hampson and Goldberg (2006), exploring the influence of childhood personality traits on some 
health behaviors in midlife, found that childhood Conscientiousness is associated with less 
adult smoking and better adult self-rated health. Moreover, both the initial level and the growth 
in hostility, a facet of Neuroticism, during elementary school predict cigarette, alcohol and 
marijuana use in high school, while sociability, a facet of Extraversion, predicts drinking but not 
smoking (Hampson et al., 2010). Other research confirmed the association of the “Big Five” 
traits with some self-reported health behaviors and health outcomes among adults (Booth-
Kewly and Vickers, 1994; Ingledew and Brunning, 1999). In particular, Conscientiousness is 
associated with less tobacco use (Clark and Watson, 1999; Tucker et al., 1995), reduced 
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (Hampson et al., 2000), and less alcohol 
consumption (Tucker et al., 1995). Extraversion, instead, is associated with higher levels of 
smoking and physical exercise (Gilbert, 1995; Courneya and Rhodes, 2003). 
Previous empirical studies examined also the relationship between the Big Five model 
and other economic variables and life outcomes. Goldberg et al. (1998) find that traits such as 
Openness and Conscientiousness are particularly important in determining how many total 
years of education individuals complete in their lifetimes. Several papers have shown that 
facets of Conscientiousness (self-control and attention) and traits related to Neuroticism 
(internal locus of control and self-esteem) predict successful graduation from high school 
(Bowman and Matthews, 1960; Hathaway et al., 1969; Janosz et al., 1997; Heckman et al., 2006; 
Cunha et al., 2010). Recent evidence indicates also that Neuroticism, defined as a chronic level 
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of emotional instability and proneness to psychological distress, negatively impacts educational 
attainment (Almlund et al., 2011).  
A growing number of works shows that personality is associated with labor market 
outcomes. Conscientiousness is linked to job performance and wage (Nyhus and Pons, 2005; 
Salgado, 1997; Hogan and Holland, 2003) and its importance does not vary much with job 
complexity (Barrick and Mount, 1991). Facets related to Emotional Stability, the opposite of 
Neuroticism, are also important for labour market success (Gottschalk, 2005; Almlund et al., 
2011). Previous research has provided some support also to the relation between personality 
and the duration of unemployment. Gallo et al. (2003) find that an internal locus of control is 
associated with a higher probability of reemployment. Similarly, the studies of Caliendo et al. 
(2010) and McGee (2010) support the previous result underlining the marginal benefit of a 
higher locus of control while Rustichini et al. (2012) detect a strong positive effect of Openness 
on job persistence. Moreover, personality traits affect occupational choice. Conscientiousness, 
locus of control and self-esteem predict sorting into occupations (Barrick and Mount, 1991; 
Ham et al., 2009; Heckman et al., 2006). Analysing eighteen occupational categories, Cobb-Clark 
and Tan (2011) report that for, men, an increase in Agreeableness is associated with a decrease 
in the probability of being a manager and a business professional; in contrast, for women, an 
increase in Openness is associated with an increase in being a manager. Furthermore, Boudreau 
et al. (2001) find that Extraversion and Neuroticism influence career success respectively with 
a positive and a negative effect, while Conscientiousness and Agreeableness have a negative 
impact on job remuneration. Similar results are obtained by Caliendo et al. (2014) on a sample 
of German households. They show that Openness and Extraversion significantly affect entry 
into self-employment in contrast to the influence of Agreeableness. Next, they document that 
the explanatory power of personality variables is comparable to that of education, which is one 
of the key determinants of entrepreneurship.  
Several articles focus on the relationship between personality traits and earnings. For 
instance, Drago (2011) shows that individuals’ self-esteem, defined as the perception that 
individuals have about their own ability, has a large impact on their earnings. Similarly, Proto 
and Rustichini’s (2015) results reveal that personality traits such as Openness, 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion significantly increase income. Mueller and Plug (2006) 
explore how individual characteristics affect the earnings of a large group of men and women 
who graduated from Wisconsin high school in 1957 and were re-interviewed in 1992. They find 
that, among men, greater levels of earnings are associated with antagonism, related to 
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Agreeableness, emotional stability, related to Neuroticism, and Openness while, among women, 
they are associated with Conscientiousness and Openness.  
Previous works also focus on the impact of personality traits on financial behaviour. 
Nyhus and Webley (2001) report that more emotionally stable and introverted individuals save 
more and borrow less, whereas more agreeable persons do the opposite. Gherzi et al. (2014) 
show that personality and market returns influence investors’ portfolio monitoring behaviour. 
Indeed, investors behave like hyper-vigilant meerkats increasing their portfolio monitoring 
following both positive and daily negative market returns. Moreover, they find that Neuroticism 
moderates the pattern of portfolio monitoring. Harrison et al.’s (2015) cross-national study 
reveals, instead, that factors such as Anxiety, Utility-for-Lifestyle, Utility-for-Investment and 
Awareness account for a lot of the variation in students’ attitudes to their debt incurred while 
studying. Brown and Taylor (2014) investigate the link between household finances and 
personality traits, detecting a relevant effect for Extraversion. Also Bucciol and Zarri (2015) 
deal with personality traits and individual portfolio decisions: they show that lower 
Agreeableness and higher Cynical Hostility predict higher willingness to take risks. Other 
studies, instead, document that Neuroticism affects attitude to risk, decreasing the propensity 
to take risks (Hirsh et al., 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012). 
Moreover, results in Dohmen et al. (2010) indicate a significant relationship among risk 
preferences, Openness and Agreeableness while Becker et al.’s (2012) findings suggest a 
positive link between risk attitude and Extraversion. 
Rustichini et al. (2012) focus on the relationship between personality traits and 
economic preferences, and find that Extraversion modulates the aversion to ambiguity, 
reducing the specific aversion to options where the probability of outcomes is not well-defined. 
A possible interpretation is that Extraversion is associated with a more optimistic view which 
leads individuals to expect the more favourable option because of a greater sensitivity to wins 
(Sharpe et al., 2011). With regard to time preferences, instead, several studies suggest positive 
correlations between delay discounting and questionnaire measures of impulsiveness, which 
is considered the opposite of Conscientiousness (Hinson et al., 2003; Ostaszewski, 1996; 
Richards et al., 1999; Swann et al., 2002). Other findings also suggest positive correlations 
between delay discounting and Extraversion (Hirsh et al., 2008; Ostaszewski, 1996). Almlund 
et al. (2011), instead, report that time preference is significantly correlated only to 
Agreeableness; this finding is confirmed by Anderson et al.’s (2011) study concerning delay 
acceptance in a truck-driver sample. Evidence on the link between social preferences and 
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personality is stronger. Dohmen et al. (2008) show that trust is related positively to 
Agreeableness and Openness, and negatively to Conscientiousness and Neuroticism; positive 
reciprocity is, instead, positively associated with all five personality traits while negative 
reciprocity is linked negatively to Conscientiousness and Extraversion, and positively to 
Neuroticism. In addition, Ben-Ner and Kramer (2010) shed light on different links between 
Extraversion and behavior in the dictator game, which can be interpreted as a measure of 
altruism, depending on the type of relationship between subjects examined.  
Few studies, instead, investigate the relationship between social status and 
psychological factors. Anderson et al. (2001), considering three different social groups 
(fraternity, sorority, and dormitory), find that high Extraversion predicts greater social status 
for both genders while high Neuroticism predicts lower social status for men. The link of 
personality traits with social status is clear in Bucciol et al.’s (2015) study. The authors compare 
two measures of social status (one subjective and one objective), finding high correlation 
between them and a relevant relationship with all the Big Five traits. Then, as many works 
show, personality traits are associated to several economically relevant variables. The 
following analysis aims to shed light the role of personality traits in explaining the gap between 
objective and subjective measures of health and social status. In the next sections we illustrate 
our data and analysis on the relationships between personality characteristics and objective 




We use data from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biannual panel survey on 
a representative national sample of the American population aged 50 or more. HRS was 
designed to obtain detailed information regarding the dynamics of retirement and how 
retirement interacts with health, health insurance, and economic well-being. The survey 
provides comprehensive and detailed information on a wide range of domains such as 
demographics, health status, housing, family structure, employment history, disability and net 
worth, creating a bio-socioeconomic picture of the cohort under study. The number of 
individuals and households interviewed increase over the years as more people become eligible 
and the ones that are already in the survey are followed in time. 
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HRS is characterized by a core part available and stable since the introduction of the 
survey (1992), plus further sections added over time. For the aim of this study we focus our 
attention on the “psychosocial and lifestyle” section. This module was introduced in 2004, 
including personality variables since 2006. For this reason, the analysis presented in the 
following sections considers only individuals interviewed in the years 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
2012. Moreover, as a sample restriction we exclude from the analysis individuals aged more 
than 80, for two reasons: the older elderly are deliberately oversampled in the HRS design, and 
we are concerned they could find it difficult to understand the questions and report the correct 
answers. Therefore, we focus on individuals with full information on all the variables under 
investigation and in the 50-80 age range, which is important also because individuals in this 
age group have been shown to have stable personality traits (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012; 
Terracciano et al., 2006). Considering these restrictions, we end up having 16,558 observations 
on 10,107 households. 
 
3.1. Summary Statistics 
The main variables for this study concern objective and the subjective status. In 
particular, based on available data, we focus our attention on health and social status. 
Therefore, the four target variables for our analysis are Subjective Health Status (SHS), Objective 
Health Status (OHS), Subjective Social Status (SSS), and Objective Social Status (OSS). 
The first one regards the subjective perception of an individual’s health status. This 
variable is related to the following question: 
 
“Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” 
 
Therefore, the variable SHS takes five values, from 1 to 5, where the greatest corresponds to 
the best health status. In order to compare this subjective evaluation with a reliable objective 
measure of health status, the variable OHS is also considered. Objective Health Status is an index 
created from a factor analysis with polychoric correlation, obtained considering information 
about some chronic diseases and some physical difficulties. This index is built following Poterba 
et al. (2013), who used the same HRS data. The variables taken into account to make this index 
are all dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent has the specific health problem or 




Table 2. Questions for building objective health index 
Question in HRS 
G001: difficulty with walking several blocks 
G004: difficulty with sitting for about two hours 
G005: difficulty with getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods 
G006: difficulty with climbing several flights of stairs without resting 
G008: difficulty with stooping, kneeling, or crouching 
G009: difficulty with reaching or extending your arms above shoulder level 
G010: difficulty with pulling or pushing large objects 
G011: difficulty with lifting or carrying weights 
G012: difficulty with picking up a dime from a table 
G014: difficulty with dressing 
G016: difficulty with walking across a room 
G021: difficulty with bathing or showering 
G023: difficulty with eating 
G025: difficulty with getting in or out of bed 
G030: difficulty with using the toilet 
M002: health problems limit work 
C002: with respect to the previous period, now health is worse 
C018: ever experienced cancer 
C005: ever experienced high blood pressure 
C010: ever experienced diabetes 
C030: ever experienced chronic lung disease 
C036: ever experienced heart problems 
C053: ever experienced stroke 
C065: ever experienced emotional, nervous, or psychiatric problems 
C070: ever experienced arthritis 
N099: ever experienced hospital stay in the last two year 
N114: ever experienced nursing home stay in the last two years 
  
The variable Subjective Social Status (SSS), instead, refers to the subjective evaluation of 
an individual’s own position on the social ladder. This variable originates from the following 
question:  
 
“Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in our society. At the top of the ladder 
are the people who are the best off - those who have the most money, most education, and best 
jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst off - who have the least money, least 
education, and the worst jobs or no jobs. The higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are 





The answer has to be provided by drawing a cross on one of the ten rungs in a picture of a 
ladder, giving the individuals a simple, intuitive and clear way to immediately understand what 
the question asks, by somehow visualizing the entire society and her own position at the same 
time. The question underlines three objective dimensions – money, education and jobs – that 
we have considered as our natural departure point to build an objective measure of socio-
economic status, the Objective Social Status (OSS). As OHS, this index is drawn from a factor 
analysis with polychoric correlation, created considering the degree of education (college, high 
school, lower), and the logs of income, financial and real wealth2. Moreover, we rescaled the SSS 
to have the same range (1-5) as SHS, and the two objective indexes OHS and OSS to have the 
same corresponding average as the two subjective variables.  
Other important variables for our aim are those related to the personality traits. The Big 
Five personality traits are built as five indexes (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism) from the answers to a question asking to report how well each 
of 26 adjectives fits the respondent. This procedure is taken from Smith et al. (2013). For details 
see Appendix A.2. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the variables used in this analysis. We divide the 
explanatory variables in two groups: control and personality variables. The first one includes, 
in addition to basic demographic information, also experienced past traumas because we 
believe that negative life events may bias both health and social subjective status. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics (15,781 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
     
Control variables      
     
Age/10 6.674 0.758 5 8 
Female 0.593 0.491 0 1 
Non-white 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Immigrate 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Married 0.682 0.466 0 1 
Employee 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Self-employed 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Life trauma 0.170 0.169 0 1 
Early life trauma 0.130 0.212 0 1 
                                                          
2 To be precise, the HRS question on the social ladder refers to ‘‘the most money, most education, and best jobs” 
and ‘‘the least money, least education, and the worst jobs or no jobs”. While it is easy to create a ranking for 
education and money, the definition of ‘‘best jobs” is highly subjective. For this reason, we decided to build the OSS 
index disregarding information on jobs. 
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Year 2006 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Year 2008 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Year 2010 0.249 0.432 0 1 
Year 2012 0.208 0.406 0 1 
     
Personality variables     
     
Openness 0.651 0.182 0 1 
Conscientiousness 0.690 0.132 0 1 
Extraversion 0.735 0.184 0 1 
Agreeableness 0.845 0.158 0 1 
Neuroticism 0.444 0.157 0 1 
     
Objective and subjective variables 
  
   
Objective Health Status (OHS) 3.304 0.637 1.218 4.012 
Subjective Health Status (SHS) 3.304 1.047 1 5 
Objective Social Status (OSS) 3.445 0.841 0.152 5.571 
Subjective Social Status (SSS) 3.445 0.760 1 5 
     
 
 
Table 4 shows the polychoric correlation of each variable with the subjective and the 
objective indexes. We can observe that the two measures of health status are highly positively 






Table 4. Correlations with objective and subjective indexes 
Variable Correlation with 
 OHS SHS OSS SSS 
     
Control variables      
     
Age/10 -0.146 -0.077 0.058 0.066 
Female -0.144 0.009 -0.120 -0.098 
Non-white -0.123 -0.226 -0.408 -0.161 
Immigrate 0.025 -0.144 -0.200 -0.072 
Married 0.164 0.155 0.387 0.207 
Employee 0.336 0.224 0.029 0.019 
Self-employed 0.252 0.213 0.216 0.156 
Life trauma -0.198 -0.149 -0.083 -0.081 
Early life trauma -0.130 -0.128 -0.129 -0.154 
Year 2006 0.064 0.072 0.062 0.052 
Year 2008 -0.001 -0.042 0.030 -0.020 
Year 2010 -0.016 0.028 -0.012 0.007 
Year 2012 -0.054 -0.068 -0.087 -0.047 
     
Personality variables     
     
Openness 0.148 0.224 0.144 0.283 
Conscientiousness 0.188 0.240 0.161 0.200 
Extraversion 0.164 0.247 0.071 0.235 
Agreeableness 0.020 0.112 0.018 0.095 
Neuroticism -0.183 -0.204 -0.130 -0.174 
     





Objective Health Status (OHS) 1 0.614 0.310 0.260 
Subjective Health Status (SHS) 0.614 1 0.355 0.310 
Objective Social Status (OSS) 0.310 0.355 1 0.394 
Subjective Social Status (SSE) 0.260 0.310 0.394 1 
     
 
 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the subjective and objective health indexes. We can 
immediately see that in both cases the modal value is 4; for OHS this value represents the 
maximum value while for SHS we observe also extremely high self-perceived health status with 
the maximum in 5. Similarly, Figure 2 shows the distribution of the subjective and the objective 
social status highlighting the larger skewness of OSS with respect to SSS. Finally, Figure 3 
displays the relation between the objective and the subjective indexes, for both health and 












Figure 3. Linear relation between objective and subjective indexes





4. Empirical Analysis 
In order to better understand the intertwined net of relations between the various 
dimensions that we have seen in Section 2 and both objective and subjective measures, we have 
estimated some regression models with different specifications. In Section 4.1, we focus our 
attention on subjective health status; we study first the connection of SHS with basic 
demographic information, then its relationship with the objective index OHS, and finally its link 
with personality traits. Therefore, our complete model is the following:  
𝑆𝐻𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
The other aim of this analysis is to study together subjective and objective health and 
subjective and objective social status and analyse effects and interactions between them and 
personality traits. For this purpose, in Section 4.2 we study the relationship between the 
subjective and the objective indexes estimating a bivariate model, carrying out both an OLS 
regression and an IV regression. Similarly, in Section 4.3 we carry out the same previous 
regressions adding personality variables. Therefore, our complete bivariate model has SHS and 




𝑆𝐻𝑆 = 𝛼𝐻 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑂𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑋𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑋𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝐻
𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑋𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑋𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀𝑆
 
 
Finally, in Section 4.4, we add among the explanatory variables also the other subjective 
measure and we carry out an IV regression adjusting the possible endogeneity of both objective 
and subjective variables. 
 
Although our dataset presents a panel structure, we have just one or two observations 
per household. This limited number of repeated observations creates small variability within 
the same household, and consequently it prevents us from using specific models for panel data. 
For this reason, we carry out a cross-sectional analysis with standard errors clustered at the 





4.1. Subjective Health Status 
As we have seen in Section 2, an individual’s health status is known to be associated to 
many variables. The objective measure is a plausible predictor of the subjective health 
perception; this natural dimension as starting point to measure health status might be 
significantly altered by own characteristics. Indeed, individuals could react positively or 
negatively to the same disease or have an optimistic or pessimistic view of the reality; therefore, 
personality could significantly modify the individuals’ perception of their own health status. In 
Table 5, we report the results of OLS and IV regressions considering as dependent variable SHS. 
It is plausible, indeed, that there exists reverse causality between objective and subjective 
measures. Moreover, it is not possible to rule out that there are omitted variables which 
influence both health status measures. Therefore, the results of the OLS regression in Column 
2 may suffer from a bias due to the endogeneity of the OHS variable. For this reason in Columns 
3 and 4 we report the IV estimates based on the approach of Lewbel (2012). This technique 
allows to artificially create instruments for the first stage equation, and it is useful when the IV 
model otherwise does not meet the order condition for identification – that is, as in our case, 
when there are no valid instruments available. For details about this method, see Appendix A.3. 
 
We first consider only the control variables. We can observe from Column 1 that most 
variables are strongly correlated with SHS. Better educated and richer individuals, females, 
employees and self-employed workers declare very good health, while non-white and 
immigrated individuals and those who suffered from some sort of trauma during life report a 
worse health status. In Column 2, Table 5, we add the objective measure of health status and 
we find that it has a positive and strong effect on SHS. The other variables have similar influence 
to the previous specification. In Column 3, Table 5, we report the results of an IV regression 
carried out considering the specification in Column 2; as we can observe, most of the results 
are confirmed. Finally, in Column 4, Table 5, we add personality variables to the prior 
specification. As we can observe, the results about the variables already used in Column 3 are 
similar to the previous ones, for both the size and the significance of the effects. More 
interestingly, we find that all personality variables are strongly correlated with the subjective 
health status. In particular, individuals who are more open, conscientious and extraverted 
declare a higher health status while those who are more agreeable and neurotic report lower 




Table 5. Objective and subjective health status 











     
OHS  0.880*** 0.781*** 0.666*** 
  (0.012) (0.033) (0.033) 
Openness    0.186*** 
    (0.051) 
Conscientiousness    0.519*** 
    (0.066) 
Extraversion    0.609*** 
    (0.053) 
Agreeableness    -0.109* 
    (0.058) 
Neuroticism    -0.657*** 
    (0.051) 
Age/10 0.004 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Female 0.112*** 0.203*** 0.193*** 0.174*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Non-white -0.135*** -0.118*** -0.120*** -0.167*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Immigrate -0.141*** -0.239*** -0.228*** -0.179*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Married 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Employee 0.361*** 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
Self-employed 0.389*** 0.155*** 0.182*** 0.153*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) 
High School 0.191*** 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.101*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
College 0.279*** 0.171*** 0.183*** 0.150*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln (income) 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln (financial wealth) 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln (real wealth) 0.034*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Life trauma -0.601*** -0.128*** -0.181*** -0.237*** 
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) 
Early life trauma -0.224*** -0.058* -0.077** -0.050 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Year 2008 -0.085*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.081*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Year 2010 0.005 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
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Year 2012 -0.055** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.046** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant 1.785*** -0.803*** -0.512*** -0.376** 
 (0.134) (0.114) (0.144) (0.152) 
     
Observations 15,781 15,781 15,781 15,781 
R-squared 0.182 0.410 0.407 0.430 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2. Link between Objective and Subjective Status 
As we have seen in Section 2, the relation between the subjective and the objective status 
is known to be associated to many characteristics with regard to multiple domains. In the 
following analysis we focus on health and social status indexes and their link with basic 
demographic information. 
In Table 6 we report our results: in Columns 1 and 2 we consider an OLS regression 
while in Columns 3 and 4 we carry out an IV regression based on the previously illustrated 
approach suggested by Lewbel (2012). Indeed, because of the estimation of a bivariate model, 
both subjective variables could be affected by both objective indexes. Moreover, as before, it is 
not possible to rule out that there are omitted variables which influence both objective and 
subjective measures. Therefore, the results of OLS regressions in Columns 1 and 2 may suffer 
from a bias due to the endogeneity of the OHS and OSS variables.  
 
Table 6. Objective and subjective indexes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable SSS SHS SSS SHS 
Method OLS OLS IV IV 
     
OHS 0.178*** 0.885*** 0.221*** 0.805*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.030) (0.034) 
OSS 0.287*** 0.192*** 0.114*** 0.204*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.028) 
Age/10 0.079*** 0.038*** 0.101*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Female -0.028** 0.195*** -0.028** 0.187*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Non-white 0.033** -0.116*** -0.061*** -0.119*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) 
Immigrate -0.013 -0.240*** -0.066*** -0.232*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) 
Married 0.070*** 0.014 0.151*** 0.016 
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 (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) 
Employee 0.014 0.122*** 0.025 0.147*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) 
Self-employed 0.086*** 0.175*** 0.123*** 0.198*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
Life trauma -0.059* -0.109*** -0.082** -0.153*** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043) 
Early life trauma -0.246*** -0.076** -0.298*** -0.094*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.033) 
Year 2008 -0.052*** -0.086*** -0.051*** -0.087*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
Year 2010 -0.021 0.021 -0.033** 0.020 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
Year 2012 -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.077*** -0.059*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Constant 1.369*** -0.618*** 1.655*** -0.365*** 
 (0.070) (0.082) (0.117) (0.136) 
     
Observations 15,781 15,781 15,781 15,781 
R-squared 0.190 0.407 0.163 0.405 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Column 1 in Table 6, both objective indexes, OHS and OSS, have 
a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable SSS; the effect is greater for OSS, as 
expected. Moreover, most control variables are significant: older and married individuals, non-
white persons and self-employed workers report themselves higher in the ladder. On the 
contrary, females and those who suffered from some sort of trauma during life, in particular 
during childhood or adolescence, reveal lower SSS. Similarly, in Column 2 of Table 6 we have 
the estimates of the same model considering SHS instead of SSS as dependent variable. Also in 
this case both objective indexes are positive and significant; in particular, we can observe that 
the effect of OHS on SHS is greater than the effect of OSS on SSS, as previous correlation already 
revealed. With regard to the control variables, older individuals, females, employees and self-
employed workers declare very good health, while non-white and immigrated individuals 
report a worse health status. Moreover, past life traumas have a negative effect on the 
individual perception of health status; we can note that this influence is smaller than its effect 
on the subjective evaluation on the social ladder. In both models the year of the survey is also 
relevant and has a negative effect on both subjective variables. 
Most of these results are confirmed also when we carry out the IV regression. As we can 
see in Columns 3 and 4, Table 6, both objective indexes have positive and significant effects on 
both subjective health and social status. In addition, both the sign and the significance of the 
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effects of control variables are similar to OLS regressions, with two exceptions: when we 
consider the social status model the variable Non-white changes sign while the variable 
Immigrate becomes significant. 
 
4.3. The Role of Personality Traits 
It is plausible that some characteristics of personality could affect both subjective health 
and social status. For example, Jerram and Coleman (1999) found that Neuroticism is 
associated with a number of reported medical problems, negatively perceived health status and 
frequency of visits to the general practitioner; Extraversion is linked with positive health 
behaviours and Openness to experience and Agreeableness are connected with positive health 
perceptions. Other studies, instead, showed that personality traits could influence both actual 
and perceived social status. For instance, more open people may be more active and successful 
when searching for a job (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Boudreau et al., 2001) while more 
conscientious individuals may be more committed to their studies, allowing them to obtain 
higher education (Noftle and Robins, 2007) and achieve academic and vocational success 
(Jensen, 1998).  
Taking into account these evidences, we add personality variables to the prior 
specification. Similarly to the previous table, in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 we consider an OLS 
regression while in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 we carry out an IV regression. In addition to the 
previous reasons, it is plausible to use instrumental variables also because both objective and 
subjective status could be affected by personality traits as the study of Bucciol et al. (2015) 
about social status and personality traits suggests. 
 
Table 7. Subjective status and personality traits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable SSS SHS SSS SHS 
Method OLS OLS IV IV 
     
OHS 0.110*** 0.814*** 0.141*** 0.682*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.028) (0.034) 
OSS 0.254*** 0.165*** 0.085*** 0.174*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.022) (0.027) 
Openness 0.733*** 0.244*** 0.818*** 0.252*** 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.039) (0.046) 
Conscientiousness 0.166*** 0.445*** 0.265*** 0.526*** 
 (0.048) (0.058) (0.053) (0.063) 
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Extraversion 0.437*** 0.518*** 0.404*** 0.576*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.041) (0.049) 
Agreeableness -0.189*** -0.079 -0.221*** -0.121** 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.045) (0.053) 
Neuroticism -0.454*** -0.580*** -0.526*** -0.665*** 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.040) (0.048) 
Age/10 0.072*** 0.018* 0.092*** 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Female -0.028** 0.183*** -0.025** 0.171*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Non-white -0.016 -0.158*** -0.109*** -0.173*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) 
Immigrate 0.021 -0.199*** -0.025 -0.184*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) 
Married 0.083*** 0.020 0.162*** 0.027 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
Employee 0.006 0.111*** 0.016 0.149*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
Self-employed 0.029 0.134*** 0.061*** 0.168*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) 
Life trauma -0.150*** -0.154*** -0.184*** -0.225*** 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.036) (0.042) 
Early life trauma -0.209*** -0.042 -0.254*** -0.067** 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) 
Year 2008 -0.052*** -0.086*** -0.051*** -0.087*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
Year 2010 -0.023 0.021 -0.035** 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) 
Year 2012 -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.069*** -0.051*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) 
Constant 1.217*** -0.667*** 1.494*** -0.233* 
 (0.076) (0.092) (0.118) (0.140) 
     
Observations 15,781 15,781 15,781 15,781 
R-squared 0.255 0.434 0.230 0.429 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe in Column 1 of Table 7, both objective indexes still have positive and 
significant effects on SSS although their influence is smaller than what we observe in the 
previous specification in Column 1, Table 6. We also find that all personality variables are 
strongly correlated with the subjective social status. In particular, individuals who are more 
open, conscientious and extraverted declare a higher social status while those who are more 
agreeable and neurotic report lower social status. Moreover, the level of SSS increases with age 
and is higher for married individuals, while it falls for females and those who suffer from life 
traumas. In Column 2 in Table 7 we consider, instead, SHS as dependent variable. We can 
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observe that both objective indexes increase significantly the individual perception of health 
status. Also in this case, as expected, we find that the personality of an individual is important 
to characterise her own status evaluation. The subjective health status, indeed, is positively 
correlated with such personality traits as openness, conscientiousness and extraversion and 
negatively correlated with neuroticism. In addition, we find that older individuals, females, 
employees and self-employed workers declare very good health, while non-white and 
immigrated persons report worse health status. 
As we can see in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, most of the previous results are confirmed 
when we carry out the IV regression. In both models all personality variables are strongly 
linked to the subjective indexes. In particular, these variables have the same sign but greater 
effects with respect to the OLS regression. The correlation of the remaining characteristics is 
similar to the previous regressions with the exception of Age that is now insignificant for SHS 
and Early life trauma that has now a negative and significant effect on SHS. Moreover, we can 
observe that, in comparison with the results in Columns 1 and 2, the effect of OHS increases for 
SSS and decreases for SHS; on the contrary, the effect of OSS decreases for SSS and increases for 
SHS.  
Our study focuses on two distinct domains, that is health and social status; in both cases 
we find that the effects of personality traits are very strong. In particular, both the sign and the 
significance of the effects of four personality variables are the same for the two subjective 
measures of health and social status. Moreover, it seems that the effects of Openness and 
Agreeableness are greater for SSS while the effects of Conscientiousness, Extraversion and 
Neuroticism are stronger for SHS. In order to evaluate whether the influence of personality 
traits changes significantly between health status and social status, we run a test on coefficients 
of our bivariate model. We find that Openness and Agreeableness have stronger effects on SSS 
(F=76.95 with p-value=0.000 and F=2.83 with p-value=0.092, respectively) while 
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism have greater effects on SHS (F=14.64 with p-value=0.000 
and F=5.57 with p-value=0.018, respectively). 
 
These results provide further evidence that personality and objective and subjective 
measures are strongly intertwined, so that omitting one of them risks introducing a significant 




4.4. The Influence of Subjective Components 
As we have seen in Section 2, health and social status are closely related each other; in 
particular, subjective social status influences self-rated health, similarly subjective health 
status could affect social perceptions. Then, each subjective component might play an 
important role in explaining the other subjective measure. For this reason, we add in our 
bivariate model the subjective measures and we carry out an IV regression adjusting the 
possible endogeneity of both objective and subjective variables. Moreover, this alternative 
specification could partially solve the problem of omitted variables; indeed, the subjective 
component, included among the explanatory variables, could capture the same omitted 
variables which might affect the dependent variable, subjective too. Finally, this model could 
verify whether personality has still strong effects, despite the presence of the subjective 
measure, likewise affected by individual characteristics. In Table 8 we report our results. 
 
Table 8. Influence of subjective measures 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable SSS SHS 
Method IV IV 
   
OHS 0.068* 0.678*** 
 (0.039) (0.034) 
OSS 0.067*** 0.165*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
SHS 0.111***  
 (0.043)  
SSS  0.091** 
  (0.038) 
Openness 0.789*** 0.177*** 
 (0.040) (0.057) 
Conscientiousness 0.203*** 0.497*** 
 (0.057) (0.063) 
Extraversion 0.338*** 0.536*** 
 (0.048) (0.051) 
Agreeableness -0.206*** -0.098* 
 (0.045) (0.054) 
Neuroticism -0.449*** -0.612*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) 
Age/10 0.091*** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Female -0.044*** 0.174*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Non-white -0.088*** -0.162*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
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Immigrate -0.004 -0.183*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) 
Married 0.158*** 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
Employee -0.002 0.145*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Self-employed 0.041* 0.160*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) 
Life trauma -0.156*** -0.204*** 
 (0.037) (0.043) 
Early life trauma -0.245*** -0.043 
 (0.027) (0.033) 
Year 2008 -0.042*** -0.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) 
Year 2010 -0.037** 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.018) 
Year 2012 -0.063*** -0.045** 
 (0.016) (0.019) 
Constant 1.507*** -0.396*** 
 (0.117) (0.151) 
   
Observations 15,781 15,781 
R-squared 0.232 0.432 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 8, in both cases the subjective measures erode to a small 
extent the effects of the other variables. Indeed, the two objective indexes still have a positive 
and a significant influence on both dependent variables, and all personality traits still play an 
important role on the own status evaluations. However, we can note that the effects of both 
objective indexes are smaller than those in Column 3 and 4, Table 7, resulting without including 
subjective measures in the model. Moreover, with respect to the previous results, unlike OSS, 
OHS loses significance on the model with SSS as dependent variable, while both objective 
measures have the same significance in the model with SHS as dependent variable. In addition, 
SHS has a stronger positive effect on SSS than SSS on SHS, as expected since the objective 
counterpart has a smaller influence in the first case and a greater impact in the second one. 
With regard to personality variables, we find that all effects slightly decrease, but have the same 
significance and the same sign as the previous results, with the exception of the variable 
Agreeableness which loses significance in the model with SHS as dependent variable. Finally, 
the effects of control variables are similar to the previous regression. Then, despite the 
presence of the subjective component, these results underline further the relevant role of 
personality traits and the importance of individual characteristics to explain the gap between 
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objective and subjective measures.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior research has found that, in various situations, there exists a persistent gap between 
objective and subjective measures. Moreover, previous works have highlighted the importance 
of personality in a wide range of economic domains. Using data from the US Health and 
Retirement Study, this essay aimed to investigate whether personality characteristics affect the 
relationship between the objective and the subjective measures of health and social status.  
Our data suggest that the objective and the subjective measures of health status are 
highly positively correlated; similarly, also the two indicators of social status are strongly 
positively linked. In addition, their correlations with personality traits are not negligible. First 
we studied the link between health status and personality traits and we found that more open, 
conscientious and extraverted individuals report higher level of health status, while more 
agreeable and neurotic persons reveal lower health levels. As a further step, we included social 
status into the analysis and, by estimating a bivariate model which includes basic demographic 
characteristics, we showed that the two objective indexes of health and social status have a 
positive and significant effect on both subjective counterparts. Then, we added personality 
variables in the regression: we showed that both objective indexes still have positive and 
significant effects on the two subjective status even if their influence is smaller than the 
previously detected one, and, more importantly, we found that all personality traits have strong 
effects on SSS and SHS. In particular, individuals who are more open, conscientious and 
extraverted declare higher health and social status, while those who are more agreeable and 
neurotic report lower health and social status. Moreover, both the sign and the significance of 
the effects of four personality variables are the same for the two subjective measures under 
study.  
Since there could exist reverse causality between the objective and the subjective status, 
and personality traits influence both of these measures and, therefore, a problem of 
endogeneity could emerge, we carried out IV regressions based on the approach of Lewbel 
(2012). Most of the previous results are confirmed even with this specification. Finally, to solve 
the possible problem of omitted variables, we added the two subjective components among the 
explanatory variables of our bivariate model. We found that each subjective measure has a 
positive and significant effect on the other subjective variable. However, although all effects 
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slightly decrease, the two objective indexes still are positively correlated with both dependent 
variables and all personality traits play an important role on both status evaluations.  
Our results highlight the importance of personality traits in explaining the persistent gap 
between objective and subjective measures of health and social status. Even though we 
considered two specific domains which are also related to each other, this discrepancy could 
hold across partially unrelated domains and could still be due to personality bias. Therefore, a 
next step in this research area could be to seek to understand whether we can generalize our 
results in other contexts different from health and social status. In particular, an interesting 
avenue for future research would be to compare effects, signs and significances of personality 
traits considering subjective judgments of situations outside the individual sphere rather than 
self-evaluations of situations that directly involve individuals. For instance, the results could be 
different when we analyze the satisfaction of own job-career and when we study subjective 
evaluations of crime or the quality of some products.  
Moreover, these evidences suggest that both measures provide key information about 
people’s level of well-being: the objective one indicates the real situation of individuals’ life, 
while the subjective one reveals how individuals perceive themselves and, therefore, might be 
linked with individuals’ happiness. Then, as the recent literature has revealed, also this study 
confirms that subjective measures contain relevant and independent information and that it is 
important for future research to consider both indicators. Also policy makers could take into 
account both measures in their proposals because of distorted individuals’ perceptions of 
reality due to different personality characteristics. As to individuals themselves, another 
general implication that can be drawn from our analysis is that they should become more aware 
about their actual situations in order to make sound economic decisions.  
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Loss Aversion and Risk Attitude among 
Children: “Self-Other” Differences  





By means of an experiment run in a primary school in Italy, we study risk preferences and loss 
aversion among children aged 9 to 12 years old and we investigate whether decision making 
differs when individuals have to decide for themselves (“self”) and when they have to make 
choices that will have consequences on other subjects (“other”). We find that children who 
choose for others are more risk seeking than those who decide for themselves. A self-other 
treatment effect emerges also by counting the number of inconsistent answers, as it is 
significantly higher for children who decide for others (suggesting a careless attitude in this 
decision context). Moreover, we noted that some children expose others to an extremely high 
risk, leading them to losses. Analyzing their risk preferences, we find neutral behavior towards 
losses that shifts to a more risk averse behavior for the same options presented as winnings. 
Furthermore, we consider three time horizons for the measure of loss aversion (i.e., “now”, 
“after a week”, “after a month”) and we observe that its level increases over time. Carrying out 
an ordered logit analysis, we find that the degree of risk aversion in the frame of winnings is 
significantly greater for foreign children and those who stay little time with parents while we 
observe a strong gender effect in the frame of losses. Finally, our findings indicate that children 




1. Introduction  
Deviations from standard economic predictions often occur when individuals have to 
make risky decisions. People often turn out to reverse their preferences under ambiguity 
(Maafi, 2011), weight probabilities non-linearly (Abdellaoui, 2000) and take too little risk in 
investments involving losses (Fellner and Sutter, 2009). These evidences have been found for 
the general population (Booij et al., 2010) as well as in a variety of countries (Akay et al., 2011).  
Not surprisingly, the majority of research in decision making has been conducted with 
adults rather than children, one of the key reasons being that adults are better able to 
understand instructions and tasks, as well as to master the underlying concepts such as risk 
and probability. However, recent works demonstrate that children are capable of 
understanding probabilities and intuitively use multiplication to figure expected values for 
simple prospects (Schlottmann and Anderson, 1994; Rice, 1995; Schlottmann, 2001; Harbaugh 
et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Schlottmann and Wilkening, 2011). The present work aims 
to study risk preferences and loss aversion in children aged between 9 and 12 years. We seek 
to contribute to our understanding of whether their behavior is similar to that of adults, which 
is well-known in the literature, or whether risk aversion and loss aversion, that are observable 
in adults, develop over the years. Moreover, we investigate whether loss aversion changes over 
time, considering different time horizons (present, after a week, after a month). Finally, since 
the recent literature has detected a relevant difference in decision making “for others” rather 
than “for oneself”, we consider two treatments: a “Self” Treatment, in which children choose for 
themselves, and an “Other” Treatment, in which they are informed that they have to decide for 
another child, attending a different class and being the same age. In other words, in the latter 
treatment they have to decide by knowing that the actual consequences of their decisions will 
not regard themselves but another child attending the same school (without knowing his/her 
identity). 
Since children are typically more courageous, impulsive, spontaneous, optimistic and 
less forward-looking than adults, we conjecture that they are more risk seeking and less loss 
averse, in particular if the losses are projected into the future. In addition, loss aversion could 
diminish when children choose for another child because of greater distance of the risk from 
themselves or, on the other hand, the risk tolerance could decrease because of children’ concern 
that the other child receives a sure amount. Probably, the direction of their behavior depends 
on how much children identify themselves with the other.  
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Analysing our data, we document a clear treatment effect: children who choose for 
others are more risk seeking than those who decide for themselves. We observe a higher 
number of inconsistent answers for children who decide for others, suggesting a careless 
attitude in this decision context. Further, it seems that some children expose others to an 
exaggerate risk, making them lose. Studying their risk preferences, we find neutral behavior 
towards losses that shifts to a more risk averse behavior for the same options presented as 
winnings. Moreover, we observe that the level of loss aversion increases over time. Comparing 
our results to those highlighted in literature on these topics, it seems clear that children are 
more risk seeking than adults, suggesting that risk and loss aversion develop with age and with 
an increasing influence of external conditioning.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review on risk attitude and loss aversion in children and on self-other behavior. In Section 3 we 
present the design of the experiment while Section 4 describes the data we collected. Section 5 
contains the main findings of our analysis and Section 6 concludes. Appendices provide details 
on instructions and questionnaires and describe the construction of some of the variables we 
used.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Risk Preferences and Loss Aversion in Children 
In their transition from childhood to adulthood, children and adolescents experience an 
increasing number of decisions involving uncertainty and long-term consequences. Despite the 
limited empirical evidence, the existing literature on children’s risk attitude, loss aversion and 
time preferences suggests that children are relatively more risk seeking and delay averse than 
adults (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Levin et al., 
2007). In their experimental study, Sutter et al. (2013) find that on average children and 
adolescents, aged ten to eighteen years, are risk averse, ambiguity averse and impatient. They 
also observe a strong gender difference (such that girls are more risk averse than boys) and a 
clear relation between high-ability students and high level of patience. Moreover, they find a 
significant link between risk aversion and time preferences, with more risk-averse subjects 
being more patient. Involving children aged five to six years, Levin and Hart (2003) instead 
study their risky decision making and compare their behavior with that of the parents. They 
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develop a method that permits them to compare risky choices for gains and losses by simple 
counting procedures. Across their experiments, they find that most children and adults prefer 
risky choices in the domain of losses than in domain of gains, concluding that this tendency 
develops at an early age and is consistent with the well-known value function of prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, the propensity to take more risk in losses 
than in gains seems to be a characteristic of children with greater shyness and impulsivity, but 
less sadness. Following these children for three years, Levin et al. (2007) observe the same 
pattern of means across time periods. Their results evidence that children use both probability 
and outcome information in risky decision choices. Moreover, the findings confirm the 
tendency to be more risk seeking to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain of equal magnitude and 
reveal a greater willingness to take risks on the part of children, compared to their parents. Also 
Harbaugh et al. (2002) investigate how risk attitude varies with age. They find that children and 
youths significantly underweight low probability events and also that, in situations with a small 
probability of a large loss, they are more likely to take the risky than the safe option. They detect 
this behavior also for older individuals, unlike most of experimental work on adults. Though, 
their weighting function over losses underweights low probability events and overweighs high 
probability ones to a lesser extent than children do.  
Studying neural behavior, Barklet-Levenson et al. (2013) examine the impact of 
potential losses as well as gains on adolescents and adults. They find that adolescents and adults 
are similarly loss averse when considering mixed gambles. Across age groups, loss amounts are 
shown to have a greater impact on choice than gain amounts, consistently with the idea that 
adolescents and adults do not differ in risk perception (Steinberg, 2004). However, they 
observe that, while adolescents and adults used similar neural network accepting gambles, they 
exhibit different neural responses to the process of rejecting gambles. Moreover, Van 
Leijenhorst et al. (2010) studying the neurocognitive development of reward and control 
regions in participants from four age groups (pre-pubertal children, early adolescents, older 
adolescents and young adults) show that brain regions implicated in decisions making under 
risk follow distinct developmental trajectories. Reward-related regions show an increased 
sensitivity to rewards in adolescence and follow an inverted U-shaped developmental pattern, 
whereas cognitive control-related regions mature slowly and follow a linear development.  
Schlottmann and Tring (2005) analyse how positive and negative framing of decisions 
affects children’s EV judgements and choices. The results show that children, aged six to nine 
years, choose the sure thing in 89% of gain and 46% of loss trials. Indeed, they find strong risk 
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aversion for gains that shifts towards risk seeking for the same options presented as losses. 
This evidence is in line with the results of Levin and Hart (2003), but partially in contrast with 
Reyna and Ellis (1994), who observe risk-seeking choices, consistent across frames, for pre-
school children. According to fuzzy-trace theory, Reyna and Ellis (1994) find that younger 
children focus on quantitative differences between outcomes and do not exhibit framing effects 
while older children, assimilated these quantitative differences, display the standard framing 
pattern showing greater risk seeking for losses than for gains. Instead, for the intermediate age 
group, they observe a clear interaction between frame and risk level, and at the highest level of 
risk a reverse framing emerges: greater risk seeking for gains than for losses.  
 
2.2. “Self-Other” Decision Making 
In many daily situations people make decisions for others. It is thus important to 
understand the similarities and differences involved in taking decisions for another person 
versus for oneself. Kray and Gonzalez (1999), conducting three studies, find that when 
individuals give advice, they are more inclined to focus on the most important aspect of the 
decision while they give more uniform weight to all relevant aspects when they decide for 
themselves. The researchers argue that this differential weighting could help explaining why 
the proper decision appears to be obvious from an outside perspective, but it is not so clear to 
the person involved, who has to consider more aspects of the decision problem. Lu et al. (2012) 
analyse instead the different weights that people attach to desirability and feasibility. Based on 
construal level theory, they find that, compared to self-decision makers, those who decide for 
others give more importance to desirability attributes and less weight to feasibility aspects. By 
running five experiments, they show that decision behaviors are determined by the decision 
target (i.e. for whom such decisions are made). 
One area that has received considerable attention in the decision-making literature is 
related to people’s risk-taking behavior. A relevant question is whether there exist systematic 
differences in behavior when people decide for others. Individuals could arguably assume that 
the other person has a different level of risk attitude than they have or could make decisions to 
achieve different goals under the two circumstances. Hsee and Weber (1997) find that there is 
no difference between self and other perceived risk attitude whether the other person is 
concrete (i.e. vivid to the individual) while, whether the other is abstract (i.e., somebody 
described generically as being somewhere in the USA) participants associate higher risk 
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seeking to others than to themselves. Larrick (1993) suggests that, when making decisions, the 
individual tries to maximize the expected outcome of the decision situation and to protect her 
self-image. Following this hypothesis, Stone et al. (2002) examine the role of regret and of the 
evaluation by others as factors that could modify individual behavior when one is deciding for 
another person. They find that regret concerns lead to greater risk avoidance both when 
participants make decisions for others as well as when they take choices for themselves. 
Probably this result is due to a large extent to the framing of their study: they ask participants 
to think the other as a friend similar to themselves. Moreover, in their second experiment, they 
test whether skill tasks would lead to a difference in self-other risk attitude, but they do not find 
a support for this hypothesis. In addition, they discover that neither the size of the probability 
level affects self-other differences. However, they observe that men are more risk seeking than 
women and that this gender difference is more pronounced when making decisions for other 
people. Pahlke et al. (2012) analyse risky choices affecting in a parallel way the payoffs of the 
decision-maker and the recipient and find that adding a justification requirement of their 
choices significantly reduces loss aversion. Other researches confirm the influence of an 
accountability mechanism: Charness and Jackson (2009), by studying the stag hunt game, find 
that, for one third of their subjects, a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others leads them 
to play a less risky strategy more often. Further, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) observe myopic 
loss aversion in decisions of salaried agents for their principals.  
Polman (2012a), instead, conducting eight studies with undergraduate students, tests 
the hypothesis that making decisions for others involves less loss aversion than making 
decisions for oneself. Indeed, as he states in another research (2012b), people who choose for 
others are relatively “promotion” focused, whereas people who choose for themselves are 
relatively “prevention” focused. From his experiments it is clear that loss aversion significantly 
decreases among individuals choosing for others in contexts describing riskless choices, 
gambling and some social aspects of life. Indeed, considering five variables associated to loss 
aversion, that have been documented to vary between choices for others and choices for self 
(Polman, 2010, 2012a; Polman and Emich, 2011; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2006), he finds that loss 
aversion is moderated when factors such as decision makers’ construal level, regulatory focus, 
degree of information seeking, omission bias and power are taken into account. Also Sascha et 
al. (2017) study loss aversion and design three treatments: making risky decisions for oneself, 
for another subject, and for the decision maker and another person combined. They find clear 
evidence that loss aversion is lower when making decisions for others than making decisions 
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for themselves. However, they show that this is true when making decision for others only, and 
not when making decisions for both. Few studies examine self-other differences in risky choices 
considering other domains. With regard to the monetary domain, Stone et al. (2002) find that 
effects occurring in personal monetary decisions, in particular concerns with regret and greater 
risk taking for men than for women, hold equivalently when the decisions are made for another 
person. In contrast to these results, Beisswanger et al. (2003) discover large self-other 
differences when people are asked to make choices about relationship (i.e. introducing oneself 
or asking to dance); in particular, they find that individuals who decide for their friends 
typically make riskier choices than individuals do for themselves. Stone and Allgaier (2008) 
analyse self-other differences considering situations involving social values. In their 
experiments they show that low-impact relationship situations produce self-other differences, 
but high-impact relationship and monetary situations do not. They find that people make 
riskier decisions for others when risk taking is valued but not when risk is not valued. 
Moreover, they show that self-other differences occur even when there are no predictions for 
them and also for decisions made for a typical student as well as for a friend, confirming that 
decision making for others depends mostly on the perceived value placed on risk.  
As we anticipated above, with our own experimental work, by considering choices 
involving risk attitude and loss aversion, we aim to investigate whether self-other differences 
exist among children when the other is an unknown child who has the same age as the decision 
maker. 
 
3. Experimental Design  
We run the experiment at five primary schools of the province of Vicenza3, involving 301 
students attending the forth and the fifth year4. In 12 classes children decide for themselves 
(“Self” Treatment) while in 4 classes students make choices for another, randomly chosen child, 
who attends another class and is the same age (“Other” Treatment). The different numerosity 
in the two treatments is due to a greater interest in research questions addressed through the 
“Self” Treatment. Before running the experiment, we made a pilot study in three classes of a 
                                                          
3 All primary schools involved in the experiment belongs to the educational institute “Istituto Comprensivo Statale 
G. Ciscato”, Malo, Vicenza. 
4 The Italian school system includes 5 years at primary school (6-11 years), three years at middle school (11-14 
years) and five years at high school (14-19 years). The compulsory schooling is provided for up to 16 years. 
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primary school of Verona5, that allowed us to test the understanding of the tasks and the timing 
of the entire activity. 
The experiment consists of three parts and a final questionnaire. At the beginning of the 
experiment each child has 10 tokens and, by participating in the activity, she could win or lose 
further amounts. With the tokens she has at the end of the experiment she chooses some prizes 
among those available, shown from the beginning by the experimenter. Each part of the activity 
is described independently and after the explanation children make the task. Children do not 
receive paper instructions because they might have been a source of distraction; all rules are 
explained aloud and various examples are shown on an interactive whiteboard. After verifying 
the comprehension of the task, children receive the paper where they make their decisions. 
Then, papers are collected and a new part gets started. The order of the three parts is randomly 
chosen for each class. At the end of all tasks students fill out a final questionnaire and one 
decision is drawn for the calculation of final tokens. For more details about treatments, 
instructions and questionnaire see Appendices B.1, B.2, B.3. 
One task of this experiment concerns intertemporal choices: this data is not analysed in 
this work. Another task is related to risk attitude: children have to choose between a sure gain 
and a positive expected gamble and between a sure loss and a negative expected gamble. The 
third task refers to loss aversion: children have to decide whether to accept or refuse the 
possibility to win or lose, by tossing a coin. Because of the possible difficulty of an immediate 
understanding of the tasks, teachers, before the experiment, explained and did exercises on 
probability concept. 
We elicit the measure of attitude risk adapting standard choice list tasks, well-
established and widely used in the economics literature (Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005). Besides 
writing the number of tokens won or lost and the corresponding percentage, we represent the 
faces of the die with which one wins or loses and a pie graph where the coloured area describes 
the percentage of winning or losing. This part consists of five decisions in a frame of gain and 
five in a frame of loss; the two frames are explained and carried out separately. 
After illustrating some examples, children are asked various questions to verify their 
understanding of the task (i.e. “If you choose this option, what will happen? If the face of the die 
is 6, what happens?”) and the die is rolled a few times to discuss some possible situations by 
reviewing the concept of probability and the rules of the task. Two examples of this task are 
displayed in the following figures (Figures 1 and 2): 
                                                          
5 The pilot study was run at primary school “Betteloni”, Montorio, Verona.  
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Figure 1. Risk Attitude Task: Winnings 
 
 
Figure 2. Risk Attitude Task: Losses 
 
  
The activity is arranged such that only the probability of winning or losing tokens 
changes. The order of the choices they have to make varies: in some classes the probability 
increases, whereas in others it decreases. Table 1 reports the ten decisions children make and 




Table 1. Risk Attitude 
Frame  Gamble EV Gamble EV Sure Option 
Win 0.10 prob of winning 10 
0.90 prob of winning none 
1 5 
Win 0.30 prob of winning 10 
0.70 prob of winning none 
3 5 
Win 0.50 prob of winning 10 
0.50 prob of winning none 
5 5 
Win 0.70 prob of winning 10 
0.30 prob of winning none 
7 5 
Win 0.90 prob of winning 10 
0.10 prob of winning none 
9 5 
Loss 0.10 prob of losing 10 
0.90 prob of losing none 
-1 -5 
Loss 0.30 prob of losing 10 
0.70 prob of losing none 
-3 -5 
Loss 0.50 prob of losing 10 
0.50 prob of losing none 
-5 -5 
Loss 0.70 prob of losing 10 
0.30 prob of losing none 
-7 -5 
Loss 0.90 prob of losing 10 
0.10 prob of losing none 
-9 -5 
 
In order to measure loss aversion in risky choices, we adapt a lottery choice task from 
Fehr and Goette (2007), used also in Gächter et al. (2010). In this decision task children have to 
choose for each of six lotteries whether to accept (that is playing it), or refuse it (receiving 
nothing). In each lottery the winning price is set at 6 and only the losing price changes, between 
2 and 7. In order to simplify the understanding, in the paper sheet for each decision, besides 
writing the number of tokens won or lost, we draw a coin illustrating the various possible 
outcomes that may emerge. We repeat this task modifying the time horizon of the losses or the 
winnings; we consider (i) the present, (ii) a near future time (a week from the day of the 
experiment) and (iii) a relatively distant future time (a month from that day). In the first case 
the final prizes are given immediately while in the other two cases children have to respect the 
timing: if they win tokens, they have to wait for a week or a month; if they lose tokens, they 
receive the corresponding prizes immediately, but after a week or a month they have to give 
back the prizes they received.  
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This task is divided in three parts, one for each time horizon; each part is explained and 
carried out separately. As for the risk attitude task, the number of lost tokens is increasing in 
some classes and decreasing in others; the choice of the classes is random. 
After doing some examples, children are asked various questions to verify their 
understanding of the task (i.e. “If you choose not to toss the coin, what will happen? If tossing 
the coin comes out cross, what happens?”) and the coin is tossed a few times to discuss some 
possible situations. Some examples of this task are illustrated in the following figures (Figures 
3, 4 and 5): 
 
Figure 3. Loss Aversion Task: now 
 
 
Figure 4. Loss Aversion Task: after a week 
 
 






As Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Wakker (2005), Köbberling and Wakker 
(2005) and Fehr and Goette (2007) suggest, this kind of task is aimed at measuring loss 
aversion, rather than risk attitude. Rabin (2000), for instance, argues that risk aversion cannot 
plausibly explain choice behavior in small-stake risky gambles like those in this work. Risk 
aversion (i.e., a concave utility function) indeed, in such small-stake lotteries, would imply an 
absurdly high level of risk aversion in high-stake gambles. Therefore, Rabin claims that, under 
expected utility, people in small-stakes gambles should be risk neutral. Then, considering our 
choices, children should accept losses until six tokens because it guarantees a positive expected 
value. If nevertheless children reject low-stakes gambles with a positive expected value, this 
might indicate loss aversion rather than risk aversion.  
 
4. Data on Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We run the experiment in 16 classes at primary school: 8 with children attending the 
fourth year and 8 their fifth (and last) year. Our sample of 301 observations is, on average, 10 
years old; 47% of children are females and 93% are Italian. In Table 2 we report summary 
statistics related to some characteristics of children, collected through the post-experiment 
questionnaire. Beyond the control variables, we consider some social variables to take into 
account the kind of relation that children have with others. The ability variables are used, 
instead, to take into account a possible correlation between the ability to do the tasks, their 
understanding and the collected answers. In Appendix B.4 we report how these variables are 
built and the reference questions. 
Table 2. Summary statistics (301 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
     
Control variables      
Age (in months) 123.61 7.44 112 149 
Female 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Italian 0.93 0.25 0 1 
Italian Parents 1.30 0.65 1 3 
Brothers 0.83 0.37 0 1 




Social variables     
Long Time with Parents 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Play with Friends 0.99 0.12 0 1 
Homework with Friends 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Work in group 2.76 0.49 1 3 
Loan Material 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Activity or Sports 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Give Helping 0.87 0.34 0 1 
     
Ability variables     
Math Mark 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Mean Mark 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Play cards 2.24 0.61 1 3 
Pocket Money 1.88 0.82 1 3 
Impatience 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Mobile Phone 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Free Internet 0.66 0.47 0 1 
 
In the following we analyse all decisions made by children in each task. Figure 6 shows 
how many children decide to play the lottery rather than to win or lose 5 tokens with certainty, 
in both treatments. In particular, the first part of graph is related to the winnings gambles and 
the second to losses gambles. Each column represents the percentage of children who choose 
to risk in each decision; the probabilities of winning or losing 10 tokens versus 0 tokens are 
10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90%, displayed in X axis.  
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We can immediately observe a difference between the two treatments: children in the 
“Other” Treatment are more risk loving than those in the “Self” Treatment in both win and loss 
frames. Children who choose for others risk even when the probability of a favourable event is 
very low. We can see also that the evolution of their decisions does not display a clear increasing 
or decreasing pattern; this behavior is more evident in losses. With regard to “Self” Treatment, 
we note a more coherent growth in winnings and drop in losses, consistent with increasing and 
decreasing probabilities of winning. The graph shows that more than 50% of children in “Self” 
Treatment are risk neutral in the frame of winnings and that risk aversion decreases in the 
frame of losses. 
Figure 7 shows how many children decide to accept the risk of winning or losing some 
tokens rather than to reject it by keeping unchanged the initial amount, in both treatments. In 
particular, the first histogram is related to a present risk, the other two to a future risk. Each 
column represents the percentage of children who choose to risk; the number of tokens that 
children could lose in each decision are displayed in the horizontal axis.  
 
Figure 7. Distribution of answers in the Loss Aversion task 
 
 
As we can observe from Figure 7, also in this task, there exists a difference between the 
two treatments. The behavior in “Self” Treatment seems to be coherent among decisions and 
over time. From the graph is clear that loss aversion increases: the number of children who risk 
decreases in the future, at the same probability of loss. In contrast, in “Other” Treatment we do 
not observe a common trend over time and the answers seems inconsistent with a fully rational, 
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point in the choice of accepting or refusing the risk). Moreover, we note that the number of 
children who accept the risk is significantly high when the number of possible tokens lost is 7 
versus those won that is 6. 
From the previous results it seems that behavior depends on the treatment. In order to 
test whether there is a treatment effect, we run the classic non-parametric test of Mann-
Whitney by considering each decision task. We run the test also on the variables related to the 
characteristics of children to verify that all characteristics are uniformity distributed and, 
therefore, that children’s treatment assignment could be considered random. Hence, the 
hypothesis that we test is the following:  
H0: variable (“Other” Treatment) = variable (“Self” Treatment) 
H1: variable (“Other” Treatment) ≠ variable (“Self” Treatment) 
The results are reported in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Mann-Whitney Test: Treatment Effect 
Variable Treatment 
R.A. winnings 10% 0,00*** 
R.A. winnings 30% 0,00*** 
R.A. winnings 50% 0,97 
R.A. winnings 70% 0,02** 
R.A. winnings 90% 0,00*** 
  
R.A. losses 10% 0,00*** 
R.A. losses 30% 0,00*** 
R.A. losses 50% 0,68 
R.A. losses 70% 0,07* 
R.A. losses 90% 0,00*** 
  
L.A. now 2 0,00*** 
L.A. now 3 0,00*** 
L.A. now 4 0,36 
L.A. now 5 0,18 
L.A. now 6 0,00*** 
L.A. now 7 0,00*** 
  
L.A. week 2 0,08* 
L.A. week 3 0,15 
L.A. week 4 0,29 
L.A. week 5 0,09* 
L.A. week 6 0,02** 
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L.A. week 7 0,00*** 
  
L.A. month 2 0,14 
L.A. month 3 0,20 
L.A. month 4 0,32 
L.A. month 5 0,28 
L.A. month 6 0,07* 
L.A. month 7 0,00*** 
  
Class 0,41 
Gender  0,12 
Age 0,43 
Italian 0,56 
Italian Parent 0,65 
Brothers 0,74 
Time with parents 0,37 
Play with friends 0,85 
Homework with friends 0,05* 
Work in group 0,20 
Loan material 0,17 
Activity or Sports 0,88 
Give Helping 0,89 
Math Mark 0,87 
Mean Mark 0,22 
Play Cards 0,31 
Pocket Money 0,06* 
Impatience 0,03* 
Mobile Phone 0,84 
Free Internet 0,01*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: R.A. means risk attitude; L.A. means loss aversion 
 
As it is known in literature, inconsistent answers often occur among children. However, 
in our experiment their number is high and significantly different between treatments, as we 
can note from Table 3.  The results show a treatment effect in particular for the decisions which 
are characterized by extremely probabilities. In contrast, we can observe a similar behavior 
among children for the intermediate choices that correspond to the neutrality situations. 
Regarding loss aversion tasks, the results evidence a similar tendency between treatments as 
time horizon widens. This could suggest that loss aversion increases regardless of the choice 
being made for oneself or others. An additional confirmation of the treatment effect is given 
whether we consider only the coherent answers: running the Mann-Whitney test we find that 
treatment has not a significant effect on neither task. 
75 
 
Moreover, the results reported in Table 3 confirm that children have on average the 
same characteristics in each treatment. We note a difference for some aspects, plausibly due to 
a class effect. For instance, whether a child can use internet, others in the same class could be 
influenced and then they could start to use it.  
Therefore, it is clear that children behavior depends on treatment. It seems that 
children who choose for others do not care about them. More specifically, analysing the single 
choices, child by child, we find that some participants in “Other” Treatment behaved in an 
opposite way with respect to a more standard behavior observed in “Self” Treatment. It seems 
that some children expose others to an excessive risk or even aim at having the other incur a 
loss. We observe this behavior in both risk attitude and loss aversion tasks. 21.31% of children 
behave in an opposite way in the risk task in losses frame and 18.03% of children in risk task 
in winnings frame. Regarding loss aversion, instead, we observe a contrary behavior in 11.11% 
of children who risk losing in the present and in 6.67% of children who risk losing in the future. 
Moreover, analysing the single answers of these children, related to social variables, we can 
note that these students do not like doing homework with friends or loaning material. 
Nevertheless, because of the small number of observations, it is difficult to conclude that this 
difference is statistically significant. 
Table 4 and Figure 8 describe the distribution of the inconsistent answers in both 
treatments. We can see the strong difference both numerically and graphically. If we consider 
the coherent answers in all task simultaneously, those related to “Other” Treatment are half of 
those in “Self” Treatment. 
 
Table 4. Inconsistent Answers 
INCONSISTENT ANSWERS 
 OTHER SELF 
Risk Attitude 30.68% 8.45% 
Risk Attitude Winnings 13.64% 2.82% 
Risk Attitude Losses 9.09% 3.76% 
Loss Aversion 48.86% 21.60% 
Loss Aversion Now 26.14% 6.57% 
Loss Aversion Week 22.73% 5.63% 
Loss Aversion Month 26.14% 5.63% 





Figure 8. Inconsistent Answers 
 
 
In order to better understand which aspects beyond treatment could influence the 
consistency of the answers, we run the Mann-Whitney test between consistent and inconsistent 
answers considering all characteristics of children. Moreover, we run a probit regression in 
which the dependent variable takes value 1 if the answer is coherent and 0 otherwise. Table 5 
and Table 6 report the results for the first and the second case, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Mann-Whitney Test: Variables that influence coherent answers 
Variable Risk Loss Aversion All tasks 
Treatment 4,91*** 4,71*** 4,75*** 
Class 2,22** -0,19 1,18 
Gender 1,74* 1,95* 2,30** 
Age -2,12** 0,66 -1,38 
Italian -0,024 -3,12*** -2,15** 
Italian Parent 1,14 2,26** 3,30*** 
Brothers 1,14 2,51** 1,80* 
Time with parents 0,51 0,82 0,90 
Play with friends 0,83 1,29 1,70* 
Homework with friends -2,10** -0,54 -1,63 
Work in group -0,67 1,19 0,53 
Loan material -1,56 -0,80 -0,81 
Activity or Sports -0,29 -1,23 -1,02 
Give helping -0,15 0,52 0,44 
Math mark -2,17** -0,48 -0,04 













Play cards 0,93 0,54 0,65 
Pocket money 0,51* 0,95 0,59 
Impatience 1,18 0,11 -0,20 
Mobile phone 0,79 -0,31 -0,68 
Free internet -0,39 1,27 1,62 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6. Probit regression: marginal effects on coherent answers 







    
Treatment -0.222*** -0.299*** -0.344*** 
 (0.044) (0.063) (0.086) 
Gender -0.070** -0.196*** -0.202*** 
 (0.028) (0.054) (0.044) 
Age 0.008** -0.002 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Italian -0.006 0.363*** 0.257** 
 (0.082) (0.122) (0.123) 
Brothers 0.028 -0.162*** -0.092 
 (0.052) (0.058) (0.091) 
Math 0.101** -0.049 -0.047 
 (0.042) (0.072) (0.081) 
Pocket Money 0.012 -0.019 -0.011 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.053) 
Impatience -0.014 0.057 0.090 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.076) 
Phone -0.018 0.040 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.059) (0.061) 
Internet -0.010 -0.166** -0.209*** 
 (0.028) (0.067) (0.066) 
    
Observations 269 269 269 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results reported in Table 5 and Table 6 show that the consistency in risk tasks is 
greater in “Self” Treatment, for older boys and for children who have better grade in 
mathematics and receive pocket money. Also the consistency in loss aversion task is linked to 
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treatment and gender. Moreover, Italian children with Italian parents and those who have some 
brothers and cannot use Internet alone tend to answer in a more consistent way.  
All these considerations confirm a treatment effect: as we have seen in Section 2, 
differences in self-other decisions making have been observed in various domains (Lu et al., 
2012; Polman, 2012; Pahlke et al., 2011; Stone and Allgaier, 2008; Kray and Gonzalez, 1999; 
Hsee and Weber, 1997); our findings confirm that a difference in children preferences arises 
when the decision context is related to risk attitude and loss aversion. Further, by observing 
how they made choices, we can think that this behavior is associated with a careless attitude 
when the recipient of the decision is the other and not herself.  
 
4.1. Risk Attitude Measure 
Another aim of this analysis is to study the degree of risk attitude and loss aversion in 
children aged between 9 and 12 years old, so that it will be possible to broadly compare their 
choices with the behavior of adults as shown by the existing literature on the theme. In order 
to do it we consider only the coherent answers in the two tasks. We eliminate also the answers 
of those who show an opposite behavior with respect to the standard, rational one; in this case, 
indeed, the switch point between risk and riskless situations does not indicate a measure of risk 
attitude or loss aversion because of the aim of children to make others lose. Therefore, we end 
up having 256 observations for risk attitude and 212 for loss aversion.  
The next graphs are related to consistent answers only. Figure 9 shows how many 
children decide to play the lottery rather than to win or lose 5 tokens with certainty, in both 






Figure 9. Risk Attitude with coherent answers 
 
 
WINNINGS SELF OTHER  LOSSES SELF OTHER 
10% 3.59% 4.17%  10% 98.46% 90.00% 
30% 11.28% 8.33%  30% 96.92% 86.00% 
50% 55.90% 58.33%  50% 73.85% 78.00% 
70% 84.62% 91.67%  70% 32.31% 26.00% 
90% 96.92% 93.75%  90% 9.23% 14.00% 
 
 
From Figure 9, we can immediately see that, eliminating inconsistent answers, the 
difference in treatment is not more evident as it is in Figure 6. These results confirm a risk- 
neutral behavior in winnings and a more risk-loving tendency in losses. 
Analysing our data, we find also that some children choose for each decision to behave 
in the same way (6.67% in “Self” Treatment and 8.20% in “Other” Treatment with a frame of 
winnings; 10.77% in “Self” Treatment and 19.67% in “Other” Treatment with a frame of losses). 
In particular in “Self” Treatment these children risk more when they could win rather than lose 
while in “Other” Treatment the number of children who always refuse or always accept is 
similar in both situations of risk.    
Considering the subgroup of observations coherent in both risk frames and consistent 
with each other, we could find the index of attitude risk r in winnings and in losses and, 







10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%




the utility function CRRA6. We find six ranges of r, one for each possible switch point in the 
decision tasks: r equal to zero corresponds to neutrality, greater values to risk aversion and 
smaller values to risk love. For instance, if r is between -2.32 and 0.74 in win frame means that 
the child accepts to risk since the probability of winning 10 tokens is equal to 30% while if we 
consider the loss frame it means that the child accepts to risk until the probability of losing 10 
tokens is equal to 70%. Figure 10 shows the risk attitude level in “Self” Treatment while Figure 
11 shows that in “Other” Treatment. 
 
Figure 10. Risk Attitude Index in the “Self” Treatment
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Figure 11. Risk Attitude Index in the “Other” Treatment
 
 
As we can observe from Figure 10 and Figure 11, 50% of children participating in 
“Other” Treatment show a neutral behavior towards risk in both winnings and losses frames. 
Our data evidence also that they are more risk loving in frame of losses with respect to 
winnings. With regard to behavior in “Self” Treatment, we note that our sample is equally 
allocated around the neutrality (-0.737 ≤ r ≤ 0) in the frame of losses while most switch points 
in the frame of winnings are near the neutrality, but towards risk aversion (-0.737 ≤ r ≤ 0.485) 
and a significantly smaller number of children is risk lover. This different behavior in winnings 
and losses frames is confirmed by running the Chi-square test (X2 = 73.20 with p-value = 0.00 
for “Self” Treatment; X2 = 45.69 with p-value = 0.01 for “Other” Treatment).  
Moreover, comparing the two treatments, we can observe a similar behavior when they 
could win whereas a different distribution when they could lose. Indeed, we note a more normal 
trend for “Self” Treatment while a greater concentration in neutrality and in the two extremes 
for “Other” Treatment. A particular result is related to the group of children who refuse most 
times the risk of throwing the die: from the graphs it is clear that risk aversion is prevalent in 
“Other” Treatment in the frame of losses and in “Self” Treatment in the frame of winnings. 
Despite these observations, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the hypothesis of 
similarity of the distributions in the two treatments (K-S = 0.07 with p-value = 0.98 for 
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Previous considerations are confirmed considering the difference between winnings 
and losses. As we can note in Figure 12, most children are risk neutral in both frames, children 
who participate in “Other” Treatment tend to be more risk loving and those who participate in 
“Self” Treatment more risk averse.   
 
Figure 12. Risk Attitude Difference 
 
 
4.2. Loss Aversion Measure 
The next graphs are related to the loss aversion measure, considering consistent 
answers only. Figure 13 shows how many children decide to accept the risk of winning or losing 
some tokens rather than to reject it keeping unchanged the initial situation, in both treatments. 
As in Figure 7, the first histogram is related to a present risk, the other two to a future risk. Each 
column represents the percentage of children who choose to risk; the number of tokens that 
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As we can note from Figure 13, children who decide for others are more risk loving than 
those who decide for themselves in all three time frames. Moreover, as we found previously, 
loss aversion increases over time in both treatments and this tendency is more evident in “Self” 
Treatment. In addition, analysing our data, we find a group of children that always choose to 
refuse the risk to lose, clearer in “Self” Treatment and for future losses. When the possible loss, 
instead, is a present risk, the rate of children totally risk averse is similar between the two 
treatments.  
As we calculated the level of risk attitude for each child, we can find the loss aversion 
index for each time frame. We determine it by applying cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992): an individual is indifferent between accepting or refusing a gamble if 
w+(0.5) u(G) = w -(0.5) λ u(L) where L denotes the loss and G the gain; u(x) is the utility of the 
outcome x Є {G, L}, λ indicates the coefficient of loss aversion and w+ (0.5) and w – (0.5) denote 
the probability weights for the 0.5-chance of gaining G or losing L, respectively. If we assume 







-2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
LOSS AVERSION OVER TIME: NOW, WEEK, MONTH
SELF OTHER
NOW 
 SELF OTHER 
-2 95.81% 82.22% 
-3 82.04% 71.11% 
-4 52.69% 53.33% 
-5 31.74% 35.56% 
-6 13.17% 20.00% 
-7 2.99% 13.33% 
WEEK 
 SELF OTHER 
-2 78.44% 73.30% 
-3 65.87% 64.44% 
-4 38.92% 51.11% 
-5 17.37% 26.67% 
-6 6.59% 8.89% 
-7 3.59% 6.67% 
MONTH 
 SELF OTHER 
-2 70.66% 64.44% 
-3 58.68% 57.78% 
-4 36.53% 44.44% 
-5 18.56% 22.22% 
-6 10.18% 8.89% 
-7 5.99% 8.89% 
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(1998), only the ratio u(G) / u(L) = λ defines an implied measure of loss aversion. Moreover, for 
small amounts, a frequent assumption on u(x) is linearity, u(x) = x, which gives us a very simple 
measure of loss aversion: λ = G / L.  
Figure 14 shows the level of loss aversion in “Self” Treatment while Figure 15 shows that 
in “Other” Treatment. 
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From Figure 14 it is clear that loss aversion increases over time. About 30% of children 
have a measure of loss aversion equal to 2 (the gain is twice the loss) for losses in short time 
and greater than 3 (losses are refused) for losses in long time. This confirms that there exists a 
significant difference between immediate and future losses.  
Observing Figure 15 we note that children who decide for others accept greater losses 
in the present than those who choose for themselves. Most children have an index of loss 
aversion smaller than 2 for present losses and greater than 1.5 for future losses. Also in this 
treatment we find an evident divergence between immediate and future losses. 
Although we can note some differences between Self and Other choices, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the hypothesis of similarity of distributions in all time 
frames (K-S = 0.097 with p-value = 0.83 for loss aversion now, K-S = 0.081 with p-value = 0.91 
for loss aversion in a week, K-S = 0.10 with p-value = 0.79 for loss aversion in a month). The 
different behavior over time, instead, is confirmed for both treatments running the Chi-square 
test (X2 = 220.97 with p-value = 0.00 comparing loss aversion now and in a week; X2 = 149.46 
with p-value = 0.00 comparing loss aversion now and in a month; X2 = 546.55 with p-value = 
0.00 comparing loss aversion in a week and in a month). 
In order to study how each child changes loss aversion over time we consider the 
difference between the possibility to lose now and to lose in a week. We observe that, for “Self” 
Treatment, 48.96% of children prefer to lose now while 12.38% in a week and the remaining 
38.66% do not change level of loss aversion in short time. With regard to “Other” Treatment, 
instead, we find that 39.62% prefer to risk more now whereas 18.87% in a week and the 
remaining 41.51% do not modify the degree of loss aversion in a short time. Analysing the 
difference of loss aversion in a longer time, we observe, in “Self” and “Other” Treatments 
respectively, similar results: 48.45% and 38.00% prefer to risk more now, 16.50% and 20.00% 
in a month, 35.05% and 42.00% do not modify loss aversion in long time.  
 
From this first descriptive analysis we can conclude not only that there is a difference in 
making decisions for oneself or for others, but also (more generally) – even though we have no 
data about adults in our experiment – that the behavior related to risk attitude and loss aversion 
seems to be different comparing children and adults. As we have seen in Section 2, the literature 
on these topics confirms that children are more risk seeking than adults. We can speculatively 
argue that this tendency develops with age and with an increasing influence of external 
conditioning.   
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Next regressions aim to analyse which factors affect the greater or lower risk attitude 
and loss aversion in children. In order to do it we divide the possible risk levels in 4 categories 
and the possible loss aversion degree in 3 ranks. 
 
5.  Empirical Analysis 
5.1.  Risk Attitude Analysis 
In order to study the variables that influence the measure of risk attitude, we consider 
three dependent variables: one related to risk in a frame of winnings, one in a frame of losses 
and the other built as difference between winnings and losses. All are category variables; in 
particular we divide the level of risk attitude in 4 categories that take values between 1 and 4, 
where the greater value corresponds to a higher risk aversion. In Table 7 we report the 
frequency of each category, for both frames of winnings and losses. It is evident that children 
tend to be more risk lovers with a frame of losses and more risk averse with a frame of winnings. 
Considering our subdivision in categories, the mean of the risk attitude level in a frame of 
winnings is 2.48 for “Self” Treatment and 2.42 for “Other” Treatment while the mean in a frame 
of losses is 1.97 and 2.1 respectively.  
 
 Table 7. Risk Attitude: Frequency 
Categories 
Frequency in Winnings 
Frame 
Frequency in Losses 
Frame 
1: Risk Love (r ≤ -0.74) 10.70%   31.02% 
2: Risk Neutrality (-0.74 < r ≤ 0) 45.68% 43.67% 
3: Low Risk Aversion (0 < r ≤ 0.49) 29.63% 20.00% 
4: High Risk Aversion (r > 0.49) 13.99% 5.31% 
 
 
We carry out an ordered logit analysis with standard errors clustered at the class level 
to take into account possible correlations across observations from the same group class. Table 





Table 8. Risk Attitude: Logit Coefficients 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable 
Method 
Risk Attitude: Winnings 
Ordered Logit 
Risk Attitude: Losses 
Ordered Logit 
   
Treatment -0.0751 -0.0117 
 (0.218) (0.315) 
Age -0.0343* 0.0305 
 (0.0200) (0.0202) 
Female -0.151 0.677*** 
 (0.258) (0.147) 
Italian -1.323* -0.137 
 (0.782) (0.581) 
Brothers -0.395 -0.261 
 (0.301) (0.413) 
Long Time with Parents -0.539** -0.367 
 (0.239) (0.256) 
High Math Grade 0.274 0.658** 
 (0.234) (0.261) 
cut 1 -8.458*** 3.093 
 (2.865) (2.645) 
cut 2 -5.937** 5.117* 
 (2.792) (2.648) 
cut 3 -4.257 7.070*** 
 (2.719) (2.650) 
   
Observations 225 225 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Column 1 in Table 8, the risk aversion in the frame of winnings 
increases significantly in foreign children and in those who stay little time with parents. It 
seems that also age has a small effect in the measure of risk attitude even if the range of age 
considered is limited. We note also that the subdivisions across those who are risk lover, risk 
neutral and low risk adverse have an evident relevance while it seems that there is not a 
significant difference between children that have low and high risk aversion. From Column 2, 
Table 8, we can see the variables that influence risk attitude in a frame of losses. It is evident a 
gender effect: females are more risk averse than males. Moreover, risk aversion increases also 
for children who are better in math; probably, these children have a deeper understanding of 
the numbers and their significance, could be more rational and then give a different value to 
numbers and losses. In this frame it seems that there is not a relevant division between the 
categories of risk lover and risk neutral, probably because most children show a measure of 
risk attitude intermediate between these two levels. 
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In order to better understand and measure the effects of these variables on the risk 
attitude, we calculate the marginal effects on each category. The results related to the frame of 
winnings are reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Risk Attitude Winnings: Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
     
Treatment 0.006 0.013 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.029) (0.026) 
Age 0.003* 0.006 -0.005 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female 0.012 0.025 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.021) (0.043) (0.034) (0.031) 
Italian 0.107* 0.220 -0.175 -0.152* 
 (0.058) (0.141) (0.115) (0.084) 
Brothers 0.032 0.066 -0.052 -0.045 
 (0.027) (0.050) (0.041) (0.035) 
Long Time with Parents 0.044** 0.090** -0.071** -0.062** 
 (0.018) (0.044) (0.033) (0.029) 
High Math Grade -0.022 -0.046 0.036 0.032 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.033) (0.025) 
     
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 9, Italian children are 10.70% more likely to be risk lovers 
and 15.2% less likely to be risk averse than foreign students, probably because of a different 
culture. We note also that for children who stay with parents for long time during the day the 
probability of being risk lover increases by 4.40% and of being risk neutral raises by 9.00% 
while the probability to be low and high risk averse decreases by 7.10% and 6.20% 
respectively. We might think that a meaningful presence of the parents makes children feel a 
greater sense of protection, care and self-confidence that allows them to risk more because in 
case of difficulties they are sure to find a secure-base in their parents.  
 
In Table 10 we report the predicted probability of each specific level of risk attitude, 
given all independent variables at their mean values. We can observe that the probability to be 
risk lover is equal to 8.90% and that to be risk neutral is equal to 46.00% while the likelihood 
of low risk aversion is equal to 31.80% and high risk aversion is equal to 13.30%. 
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Table 10. Risk Attitude Winnings: Predicted Probabilities 
 Predict Probability 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.089 [0.051 , 0.127] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.460 [0.354 , 0.566] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.318 [0.234 , 0.402] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.133 [0.084 , 0.182] 
 
Table 11 shows the difference of predicted probabilities for the four risk attitude 
categories considering the change of one variable at a time. We observe the main divergence 
between Italian and non-Italian children, between those who are attending the fourth and the 
last year of primary school and between children that stay long and short time with their 
parents. For the other groups the differences are not so evident, as we can see from Table 12. 
 
Table 11. Risk Attitude Winnings: Differences in Probability 
 “Self” Treatment “Other” Treatment Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.088 0.094 -0.006 [-0.030 , 0.042] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.456 0.470 -0.014 [-0.058 , 0.083] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.320 0.310 0.010 [-0.068 , 0.048] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.136 0.126 0.010 [-0.057 , 0.040] 
 Fourth year Fifth year Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.069 0.117 -0.048 [-0.092 , -0.005] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.411 0.506 -0.095 [-0.201 , 0.010] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.347 0.272 0.075 [-0.003 , 0.153] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.173 0.105 0.068 [-0.004 , 0.141] 
 Female Male Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.096 0.084 0.012 [-0.029 , 0.054] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.473 0.448 0.025 [-0.059 , 0.109] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.307 0.327 -0.020 [-0.086 , 0.046] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.124 0.141 -0.017 [-0.077 , 0.042] 
 Italian Non-Italian Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.095 0.027 0.068 [0.026 , 0.110] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.472 0.231 0.241 [-0.026 , 0.507] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.308 0.393 -0.085 [-0.149 , -0.020] 




 No brother Brothers Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.066 0.095 -0.029 [-0.014 , 0.072] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.401 0.471 -0.070 [-0.037 , 0.176] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.358 0.309 0.049 [-0.116 , 0.019] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.175 0.125 0.050 [-0.133 , 0.032] 
 
Long time with 
Parents 
Little time with 
Parents 
Change 
95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.104 0.064 0.040 [0.010 , 0.071] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.488 0.395 0.093 [0.003 , 0.183] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.294 0.361 -0.067 [-0.123 , -0.011] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.114 0.180 -0.066 [-0.132 , -0.001] 
 Math Mark > 8 Math Mark ≤ 8 Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.079 0.102 -0.023 [-0.061 , 0.016] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.438 0.483 -0.045 [-0.121 , 0.031] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.334 0.298 0.036 [-0.029 , 0.101] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.149 0.117 0.032 [-0.018 , 0.081] 
 
In Table 12 we report the marginal effects on each category considering the frame of the 
losses.  
 
Table 12. Risk Attitude Losses: Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
     
Treatment 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.068) (0.014) (0.043) (0.012) 
Age -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Female -0.147*** 0.030 0.092*** 0.025** 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) 
Italian 0.030 -0.006 -0.019 -0.005 
 (0.125) (0.025) (0.079) (0.022) 
Brothers 0.056 -0.011 -0.035 -0.010 
 (0.091) (0.022) (0.057) (0.013) 
Long Time with Parents 0.079 -0.016 -0.050 -0.014 
 (0.054) (0.014) (0.036) (0.011) 
High Math Grade -0.142** 0.029 0.089** 0.025** 
 (0.060) (0.026) (0.038) (0.010) 
     
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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From Table 12 it is clear that gender has a relevant effect on the choices in case of losses, 
as other researches has found (Stone et al., 2002; Gächter et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013). 
Females are 14.70% less likely to be risk lovers while they are respectively 9.20% and 2.50% 
more likely to be low and high risk averse than males. We can note also an influence of the 
ability in math: children who have a higher grade in math are 14.20% less likely to be risk lovers 
while they are 8.90% and 2.50% more likely to be low and high risk averse. Finally, we observe 
that all variables do not have any effects on being risk neutral, probably because in this domain 
there is no clear distinction between those who we classified as risk lovers and those who are 
risk neutrals, showing then a similar behavior. 
 
In Table 13 we report the predicted probability for each category of risk attitude, 
considering all explanatory variables at their mean values. We can observe that the probability 
of being risk lover is equal to 31.70% and the likelihood of being risk neutral is equal to 46.10%. 
The probabilities to be low and high risk averse are much lower: they are 18.30% and 3.90% 
respectively.  
Table 13. Risk Attitude Winnings: Predicted Probabilities 
 Predict Probability 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.317 [0.227 , 0.407] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.461 [0.388 , 0.535] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.183 [0.122 , 0.244] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.039 [0.011 , 0.067] 
 
Table 14 shows the difference of predicted probabilities for the four risk attitude 
categories considering the change of one variable at a time. We observe the main divergence 
between females and males, between those who are attending the fourth and the last year of 
primary school and between children that stay long and short time with their parents. For the 
other groups the differences are not so evident, as we can see from Table 15. 
 
Table 14. Risk Attitude Losses: Differences in Probability 




95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.317 0.318 -0.001 [-0.132 , 0.137] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.461 0.461 0.000 [-0.028 , 0.027] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.183 0.182 0.001 [-0.085 , 0.082] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.039 0.039 0.000 [-0.023 , 0.022] 
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 Fourth year Fifth year Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.385 0.262 0.123 [-0.021 , 0.268] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.434 0.458 -0.024 [-0.063 , 0.016] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.147 0.222 -0.075 [-0.169 , 0.019] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.034 0.058 -0.024 [-0.059 , 0.010] 
 Female Male Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.245 0.390 -0.145 [-0.206 , -0.084] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.466 0.439 0.027 [-0.013 , 0.067] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.235 0.143 0.092 [0.046 , 0.138] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.054 0.028 0.026 [0.004 , 0.048] 
 Italian Non-Italian Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.311  0.259 0.052 [-0.146 , 0.250] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.453 0.456 -0.003 [-0.024 , 0.018] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.192 0.229 -0.037 [-0.194 , 0.120] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.044 0.056 -0.012 [-0.068 , 0.044] 
 No brother Brothers Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.272 0.326 -0.054 [-0.220 , 0.111] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.467 0.459 0.008 [-0.014 , 0.028] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.214 0.178 0.036 [-0.084 , 0.157] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.047 0.037 0.010 [-0.021 , 0.042] 
 
Long time with 
Parents 
Little time with 
Parents 
Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.344 0.266 0.078 [-0.178 , 0.023] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.455 0.467 -0.012 [-0.011 , 0.035] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.167 0.218 -0.051 [-0.022 , 0.124] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.034 0.049 -0.015 [-0.009 , 0.039] 
 Math Mark > 8 Math Mark ≤ 8 Change 95% Confidence Interval 
P(risk love|x) 0.255 0.398 -0.143 [0.025 , 0.261] 
P(risk neutrality|x) 0.466 0.435 0.031 [-0.083 , 0.021] 
P(low risk aversion|x) 0.226 0.139 0.087 [-0.159 , -0.016] 
P(high risk aversion|x) 0.053 0.028 0.025 [-0.044 , -0.005] 
 
In order to study the relationship between the behavior in the two frames, we consider 
a third measure of risk attitude, that is the difference between risk attitude in winnings and risk 
attitude in losses. Then, also this variable is a category variable; in particular, for our study we 
divide children’s behavior in three levels of preferences: greater risk aversion in losses, same 
degree of risk aversion in winnings and in losses, greater risk aversion in winnings. Analysing 
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our data, we find that 19.75% of children risk more in a frame of winnings than in a frame of 
losses, 32.92% show the same risk attitude in both frames and 47.33% are more risk lovers in 
losses than in winnings. Table 15 reports the logit coefficients and the marginal effects of this 
ordered logit regression.  
 
Table 15. Difference in Risk Attitude: Winnings - Losses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logit Coeff. Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
     
Treatment 0.205 -0.028 -0.023 0.051 
 (0.316) (0.045) (0.034) (0.079) 
Age -0.059*** 0.008*** 0.007** -0.015*** 
 (0.0228) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Female -0.803*** 0.111*** 0.089*** -0.201*** 
 (0.206) (0.031) (0.029) (0.052) 
Italian -0.290 0.040 0.032 -0.072 
 (0.569) (0.078) (0.065) (0.142) 
Brothers -0.197 0.027 0.022 -0.049 
 (0.364) (0.050) (0.041) (0.091) 
Long Time with Parents -0.243 0.034 0.027 -0.061 
 (0.236) (0.032) (0.028) (0.059) 
High Math Grade -0.166 0.023 0.019 -0.042 
 (0.251) (0.035) (0.028) (0.063) 
Cut 1 -9.924***    
 (3.031)    
Cut 2 -8.252***    
 (2.917)    
     
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Column 1 in Table 15, the difference in risk aversion is strongly 
related to gender and age. In particular, considering the marginal effects reporting in Columns 
2, 3, 4, we find that females are 11.10% more likely to be more risk lover in winnings than in 
losses, 8.90% more likely to maintain the same risk attitude and 20.10% less likely to be more 
risk lover in losses than in winnings with respect to males. These results show a gender 
difference on risk attitude, clear not only for adults as a wide literature has found (Byrnes et al., 
1999; Weber et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2004; Harris et al., 2006), but also for children. 
Moreover, for older children the probability of being more risk lovers in winnings than in losses 
increases by 0.80% and of being more risk lover in losses than in winnings decreases by 1.50% 
while the likelihood to show the same level of risk aversion raises by 0.70%. Although the age 
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range considered is limited, from these results it seems that children have a greater awareness 
of losses with age.  
Calculating the predicted probabilities for each category, we find that the likelihood of 
being more risk lover in winnings than in losses is equal to 16.59% while the likelihood of being 
more risk lover in losses than in winnings is equal to 48.57%. Instead, the probability to show 
the same behavior in both frames is equal to 34.84%.  
 
5.2.  Loss Aversion Analysis 
In order to study the measure of loss aversion over time, we consider three dependent 
variables related to the three different time frames: loss aversion at present moment, after a 
week and after a month. As for the risk attitude measure, all are category variables; in particular 
we divide the levels of loss aversion in 3 categories that take values between 1 and 3, where the 
greater value corresponds to a higher loss aversion and, therefore, a lower propensity to risk. 
We consider only three categories because of different tendencies of loss aversion in the three 
periods considered, as we can see from Figures 14 and 15. Indeed, the most evident changes of 
loss aversion in the three periods of time correspond to different levels of risk; those who are 
more marked are in correspondence with no risk of loss, risk up to a maximum loss of 4 and a 
gain of 6, high risk up to a maximum loss of 7 and a gain of 6.   
In Table 16 we report the frequency of each category, for all periods of time. It is evident 
that loss aversion increases over time. Indeed, the mean of loss aversion considering present 
losses is 1.71 while that considering future losses is 2.02 and 2.07, for a week and a month time 
distance respectively.  
 Table 16. Loss Aversion: Frequency 
Categories Now In a week In a month 
1: Low Loss Aversion (λ ≤ 1) 33.20% 20.15% 19.31% 
2: Medium Loss Aversion (1.2 ≤ λ ≤ 3) 62.89% 57.79% 54.83% 
3: High Loss Aversion (λ ≥ 3) 3.91% 22.05% 25.87% 
 
Also for this analysis, we carry out an ordered logit regression with standard errors 
clustered at the class level to take into account possible correlations across observations from 
the same group class. In the following analyses we include in the model also the two dependent 
variables related to the measures of risk attitude and, for future losses, a dummy variable 
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indicating whether children are impatient. The last variable is built considering the question 
number 19 in the post-experiment questionnaire. Table 17 reports the logit coefficients for 
each time periods. 
 
Table 17. Loss Aversion: Logit Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable 
Method 
Loss Aversion: Now 
Ordered Logit 
Loss Aversion: Week 
Ordered Logit 
Loss Aversion: Month 
Ordered Logit 
    
Treatment -0.292 -0.190 -0.044 
 (0.307) (0.281) (0.299) 
Age -0.023 -0.006 0.013 
 (0.0156) (0.0241) (0.0251) 
Female 0.114 0.232 -0.113 
 (0.387) (0.268) (0.303) 
Italian -0.079 0.544 0.515 
 (0.651) (0.350) (0.392) 
Brothers -0.088 0.252 0.423 
 (0.444) (0.354) (0.306) 
Long Time with Parents -0.563* -0.224 0.107 
 (0.334) (0.340) (0.296) 
High Math Grade 0.606** -0.209 -0.407* 
 (0.261) (0.338) (0.224) 
Risk Averse Winnings 0.697*** 0.664*** 0.614*** 
 (0.203) (0.194) (0.173) 
Risk Averse Losses 0.191 0.389** 0.027 
 (0.224) (0.190) (0.181) 
Impatience  -0.566** -0.401 
  (0.308) (0.290) 
cut 1 -1.697 0.539 2.290 
 (2.065) (3.101) (2.887) 
cut 2 2.804 3.587 4.850** 
 (2.201) (3.067) (2.860) 
    
Observations 211 211 211 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can note from Column 1 in Table 17, the measure of loss aversion at present time 
increases significantly for children who are more risk averse in a frame of winnings and are 
better in math while it decreases for those who stay long time with parents; all these results are 
coherent with previous findings. From Column 2, Table 17, we can observe the variables that 
influence loss aversion in a time distance of one week. It is evident a strong relation with risk 
attitude: children who are more risk averse, both in winnings and in losses, are more loss 
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averse. Moreover, children who are more impatient show a lower loss aversion for losses in 
near future. As we can see from Column 3 in Table 17, also for loss aversion in far future, it is 
clear the interconnection with risk attitude. In addition, it seems that children with higher grade 
in math are less loss averse, maybe because of the greater importance given to the time 
distance. 
It seems also that the subdivisions across the three levels of loss aversion are not 
significantly relevant, except for the time horizon of a month; in this case, indeed, we note a 
significant difference between the two categories corresponding to medium and high loss 
aversion. Children, indeed, imagine the month extremely far in time and they do not want to 
wait for winning the prize or to loss the prize after a month. Instead, for a shorter time horizon 
there probably exists a clear division only between the choices of “no losses” and “accept some 
losses”.  
In order to study the actual influence of these variables on the measure of loss aversion, 
we calculate the marginal effects on each category. Table 18 reports the results related to 
present losses while Table 19 and Table 20 those related to future losses. 
 
Table 18. Loss Aversion Now: Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
    
Treatment 0.062 -0.055 -0.007 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.007) 
Age 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Female -0.024 0.022 0.003 
 (0.083) (0.074) (0.009) 
Italian 0.017 -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.138) (0.123) (0.015) 
Brothers 0.019 -0.017 -0.002 
 (0.095) (0.084) (0.011) 
Long Time with Parents 0.120* -0.107 -0.013* 
 (0.073) (0.067) (0.007) 
High Math Grade -0.129** 0.115** 0.014* 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.008) 
Risk Averse Winnings -0.149*** 0.132*** 0.017*** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.006) 
Risk Averse Losses -0.041 0.036 0.005 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.006) 
    
Observations 211 211 211 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As we can note from Table 18, the level of risk aversion in a frame of winnings has a 
relevant effect on the measure of loss aversion. Children more risk averse are 14.90% less likely 
to show low loss aversion while they are 13.20% and 1.70% more likely to show medium and 
high loss aversion, respectively. Moreover, we observe an influence of the ability in math: 
children who have a higher grade in math are 12.90% less likely to have a low level of loss 
aversion while they are 11.50% and 1.40% more likely to have a medium level and a high level 
of loss aversion, respectively. Finally, we can see a weak significance of the variable 
representing the time spent with parents: as we found in risk aversion analysis, children who 
stay with their parents more time accept to risk showing a lower level of loss aversion than 
children who stay little with them.  
 
Table 19. Loss Aversion Week: Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
    
Treatment 0.028 -0.000 -0.028 
 (0.040) (0.007) (0.044) 
Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) 
Female -0.034 0.000 0.034 
 (0.039) (0.008) (0.039) 
Italian -0.080 0.000 0.080 
 (0.049) (0.020) (0.055) 
Brothers -0.037 0.000 0.037 
 (0.050) (0.009) (0.052) 
Long Time with Parents 0.033 -0.000 -0.033 
 (0.048) (0.008) (0.050) 
High Math Grade 0.031 -0.000 -0.031 
 (0.050) (0.008) (0.050) 
Risk Averse Winnings -0.098*** 0.000 0.097*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.037) 
Risk Averse Losses -0.057** 0.000 0.057** 
 (0.028) (0.014) (0.027) 
Impatience 0.083** -0.000 -0.083 
 (0.041) (0.021) (0.051) 
    
Observations 211 211 211 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 19, there are no significant effects for the medium level of 
loss aversion considering a short future time. For the other two categories we find a relevant 
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influence of the two measures of risk attitude, result coherent with the previous analysis. 
Indeed, children who are more risk averse in winnings are 9.80% less likely to show low loss 
aversion and those who are more risk averse in losses are 5.70% less likely to show low loss 
aversion. Moreover, it seems that children who are impatient are 8.30% more likely to reveal 
low loss aversion. This result could be explained remembering that, in the activity of the coin 
considering a future time, a loss implies to receive the prize immediately and to give back it 
after a week. Children who always accept to risk, play in a frame where the probability to lose 
is greater than the probability to win, and this means to receive a prize immediately with higher 
probability. This hypothesis is coherent also with the others results related to this variable: 
being impatient, indeed, is not more significant when the level of loss aversion is higher, and 
therefore when the probability of winning is greater than the probability of losing. In addition, 
during the activity, children were surprized and annoyed by having to wait one week; for them 
one week is a long time.  
 
Table 20. Loss Aversion Month: Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
    
Treatment 0.007 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.047) (0.009) (0.055) 
Age -0.002 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) 
Female 0.018 0.003 -0.021 
 (0.048) (0.009) (0.056) 
Italian -0.081 -0.013 0.094 
 (0.059) (0.023) (0.073) 
Brothers -0.067 -0.011 0.077 
 (0.048) (0.017) (0.055) 
Long Time with Parents -0.017 -0.003 0.020 
 (0.047) (0.007) (0.054) 
High Math Grade 0.064* 0.010 -0.074* 
 (0.037) (0.016) (0.043) 
Risk Averse Winnings -0.097*** -0.015 0.112*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.038) 
Risk Averse Losses -0.004 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.029) (0.005) (0.033) 
Impatience 0.063 0.010 -0.073 
 (0.042) (0.020) (0.058) 
    
Observations 211 211 211 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As we can observe from Table 20, children who are more risk averse are 9.70% less 
likely to show low loss aversion and 11.20% more likely to show high loss aversion. Moreover, 
we find a weak significance of the variable related to the ability in math: children who have a 
higher grade in math are 6.40% more likely to reveal low loss aversion and 7.40% less likely to 
show high loss aversion.  
Unlike the time period of a week, in this case children do not want to lose a prize in their 
possession for a month. The comments during the activity were “A month is a very long time! 
We do not want to give back a prize whether we have won it! Now it has become ours!” 
Therefore, it seems that, considering a longer future time, children give more importance to the 
sense of possession rather than impatience.  
In Tables 21, 22 and 23 we report the predicted probabilities for each category of loss 
aversion, in the different time horizons, considering all explanatory variables at their mean 
values. From Table 21 we can observe that the probabilities of showing low, medium and high 
loss aversion at the present time are equal to 30.80%, 66.80% and 2.40%, respectively. From 
Table 22 we can see that the likelihoods of revealing low, medium and high loss aversion in 
short future time are equal to 17.90%, 64.20% and 17.90%, respectively. Finally, from Table 
23, we note that the probabilities of showing low, medium and high loss aversion in long future 
time are equal to 19.60%, 56.30% and 24.10%, respectively. 
Table 21. Loss Aversion Now: Predicted Probabilities 
 Predict Probability 95% Confidence Interval 
P(low loss aversion|x) 0.308 [0.244 , 0.373] 
P(medium loss aversion|x) 0.668 [0.605 , 0.731] 
P(high loss aversion|x) 0.024 [0.011 , 0.038] 
 
Table 22. Loss Aversion Week: Predicted Probabilities 
 Predict Probability 95% Confidence Interval 
P(low loss aversion|x) 0.179 [0.133 , 0.225] 
P(medium loss aversion|x) 0.642 [0.558 , 0.727] 
P(high loss aversion|x) 0.179 [0.092 , 0.266] 
 
Table 23 Loss Aversion Month: Predicted Probabilities 
 Predict Probability 95% Confidence Interval 
P(low loss aversion|x) 0.196 [0.135 , 0.257] 
P(medium loss aversion|x) 0.563 [0.492 , 0.634] 





The present research aimed to study risk preferences and loss aversion in children by 
means of incentivized experiments. Even though our data only regarded children attending 
primary school, our study allows us to draw some broad comparisons with prior work focusing 
on adults’ decision making in these domains. We also investigated whether children’s loss 
aversion changes over time, considering different time horizons (present, after a week, after a 
month). Moreover, the experiment aimed to test whether there exists self-other decision-
making difference also when considering children’s risk-taking choices. To this aim, we 
introduced two treatments that differ with regard to the individual for which the participant 
takes decisions: in “Self” Treatment children chose for themselves while in “Other” Treatment 
they decided for another child who attends a different class and has the same age. 
We ran the experiment at five primary schools of the province of Vicenza, involving 301 
students attending the forth and the fifth year. The activity consisted of three parts and a final 
questionnaire; children were incentivized to participate in it by winning some prizes.  
Analysing our data, we clearly found a treatment effect, confirmed by running the non-
parametric test of Mann-Whitney: children participating in “Other” Treatment are more risk 
lovers than those who participated in “Self” Treatment. With regard to the task related to risk 
attitude, more than 50% of children in “Self” Treatment are risk neutral, considering the frame 
of winnings, while the degree of risk aversion decreases considering the frame of losses. 
Moreover, we found that their level of loss aversion increases over time: the number of children 
who risk by playing mixed gambles decreases considering future time horizons, at the same 
probability of loss. In contrast, in “Other” Treatment we did not observe a common trend over 
time and the number of inconsistent answers with respect to the standard, rational behavior is 
high and significantly different between treatments. Indeed, the number of inconsistent 
answers, considering all tasks simultaneously, results to be equal to 63.64% in “Other” 
Treatment and 33.80% in “Self” Treatment. Carrying out a probit regression, we found that 
consistency is significantly greater in “Self” Treatment, for older boys and for children who have 
better grade in maths and receive a pocket money. This evidence reveals that children who 
choose for others do not care about them. Further, it seems that some children expose others 
to an exaggerated risk, making them lose. Other studies suggest that other-regarding 
preferences develop with age: intentional fairness considerations emerge after 11 years old 
(Güroğlu et al., 2009), altruism increases with age and becomes more important in adolescence 
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(Fehr et al., 2013; Engel, 2011), trust grows almost linearly from early childhood to early 
adulthood (Sutter and Kocher, 2007). Then, the careless attitude that we observe could arise in 
children when the consequences of some choices involve others and could disappear with age. 
In the second part of our analysis, we considered only the coherent answers. We 
calculated the index of risk attitude using the utility function CRRA. We found that 50% of 
children participating in “Other” Treatment display a neutral behavior towards risk in both 
winnings and losses frames. With regard to behavior in “Self” Treatment, instead, we noted that 
our sample is equally allocated around the neutrality (-0.737 ≤ r ≤ 0) in the frame of losses 
whereas it is more risk averse (-0.737 ≤ r ≤ 0.485) in the frame of winnings. This different 
behavior in winnings and losses is confirmed by running the Chi-square test. We measured the 
index of loss aversion following Fehr and Goette (2007) and Gächter et al. (2010). Our data 
confirms that exists a significant difference between immediate and future losses, in both 
treatments. The mean of loss aversion considering present losses is 1.71 while considering 
future losses is 2.02 and 2.07, for a week and a month time distance respectively. In addition, 
from our results it seems clear that children are more risk seeking than adults, as the literature 
on these topics highlines. Then, we can presume that risk and loss aversion develop with age 
and with an increasing influence of external conditioning.   
In order to study the variables that influence the two measures, we carried out an 
ordered logit analysis building some categorical dependent variables. In particular, we divided 
the possible risk levels in 4 categories and the possible loss aversion degree in 3 ranks. Our data 
evidences that the degree of risk aversion in the frame of winnings is significantly higher for 
foreign children and for those who stay little time with parents while we observed a strong 
gender effect in the frame of losses: females, indeed, are more risk averse than males. 
Considering the dependent variable built as difference between winnings and losses, we found 
that 19.75% of children risk more in a frame of winnings than in a frame of losses, 32.92% show 
the same risk attitude in both frames and 47.33% are more risk lover in losses than in winnings. 
The results related to loss aversion analysis reveal that it increases significantly for children 
who are more risk averse and are better in maths while it decreases for those who stay long 
time with parents. Moreover, children who are more impatient show a lower loss aversion 
when losses are in near future while it seems that, considering a longer future time, children 
give more importance to the sense of possession rather than impatience, increasing their loss 
aversion. This result is coherent with the existing literature on children presented as delay-
averse (Sutter et al., 2013; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007). In our experiment, indeed, a loss 
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implies to receive the prize immediately and the greater is the probability to lose, the higher is 
the probability to obtain the prize without waiting a week. Furthermore, by making this choice, 
the loss is a future consequence confirming for children the importance of the present time and 
of an immediate gratification. 
 
This research could be improved extending the range of age of our participants. The 
results of the logit regression, indeed, reveal an age effect. Involving in our experiment younger 
and older children, we could strengthen our findings and better understand the relation and 
the evolution of risk and loss attitude at different stages of life. Moreover, it could be interesting 
to involve in the experiment also the parents of the children and study, in addition to their levels 
of risk attitude and loss aversion, their influence on children behavior. Indeed, as Levin and 
Hart (2003) found, risk proneness of parent might predict risk proneness of child. 
 
References 
Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-Free Elicitation of Utility and Probability Weighting 
Functions. Management Science, 46(11), 1497-1512. 
Akay, A., Martinsson, P., Medhin, H., & Trautmann, S.T. (2011). Attitudes toward 
uncertainty among the poor: an experiment in rural Ethiopia. Theory and Decision, 73 (3), 453-
464. 
Barkley-Levenson, E. E., Leijenhorst, L. V., & Galvan A. (2013). Behavioral and neural 
correlates of loss aversion and risk avoidance in adolescents and adults. Development Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 3, 72-83. 
Beisswanger, A. H., Stone, E. R., Hupp, J. M., & Allgaier, L. (2003). Risk taking in 
relationships: differences in deciding for oneself versus for a friend. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 25, 121-135. 
Bettinger, E., & Slonim, R. (2007). Patience among Children. Journal of Public Economics, 
91 (1–2), 343–63. 
Booij, A., Praag, B. van, & Kuilen, G. van de. (2010). A parametric analysis of prospect 
theory’s functionals for the general population. Theory and Decision, 68, 115-148. 
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: a 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 367–383. 
Charness, G., & Jackson, M.O. (2009). The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 69, 241-247. 
103 
 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator Game: a meta study. Experimental Economics, 14, 583-
610.Eriksen, K.W., & Kvaløy, O. (2010). Myopic Investment Management. Review of Finance, 14 
(3), 521-542. 
Fehr, E. & Goette, L. (2007). Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a 
randomized field experiment. American Economic Review, 97(1), 298-317. 
Fehr, E., Glätzle-Rützler, D., & Sutter, M. (2013). The development of egalitarianism, 
altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence. European Economic Review, 64, 
369-383. 
Fellner, G., & Sutter, M. (2009). Causes, consequences, and cures of myopic loss aversion 
- An experimental investigation. The Economic Journal, 119 (537), 900-916. 
Gächter, S., Johnson, E., & Herrmann, A. (2010). Individual-level loss aversion in riskless 
and risky choices. CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2010-20. 
Güroğlu, B., van den Bos, W., & Crone, E. A. (2009). Fairness considerations: increasing 
understanding of intentionality during adolescence. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
104, 398-409. 
Harbaugh, W. T., Krause, K., & Vesterlund, L. (2002). Risk Attitudes of Children and 
Adults: Choices over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses. Experimental Economics, 5 
(1), 53–84. 
Harris, C. R., Jenkins, M., & Glaser, D. (2006). Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: Why 
do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men? Judgment and Decision Making, 1 (1), 48–63. 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic 
Review, 92, 1644–1655. 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2005). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data Without 
Order Effects. American Economic Review, 95, 902–904. 
Hsee, C. H., & Weber, E. U. (1997). A fundamental prediction error: self-other 
discrepancies in risk preference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 45-53. 
Johnson, J. G., Wilke, A., & Weber, E. U. (2004). Beyond a trait view of risk-taking: A 
domain- specific scale measuring risk perceptions, expected benefits, and perceived-risk 
attitude in German-speaking populations. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 35, 153–172. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 
Köbberling, V. & Wakker, P.P. (2005). An index of loss aversion. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 122, 119-131. 
104 
 
Kray, L., & Gonzalez, R. (1999). Differential weighting in choice versus advice: I’ll do this, 
you do that. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 207-217. 
Larrick, R. P. (1993). Motivational factors in decision theories: The role of self-
protection. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 440-450. 
Levin, I. P., & Hart, S. S. (2003). Risk Preferences in Young Children: Early Evidence of 
Individual Differences in Reaction to Potential Gains and Losses. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 16 (5), 397–413. 
Levin, I. P., Hart, S. S., Weller, J. A., & Harshman, L. A. (2007). Stability of Choices in a Risky 
Decision-Making Task: A 3-Year Longitudinal Study with Children and Adults. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 20 (3), 241–52. 
Lu, J., Xie, X., & Xu, J. (2012). Desirability or feasibility: self-other decision-making 
differences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39 (2), 144-155. 
Maafi, H. (2011). Preference Reversals under Ambiguity. Management Science, 57 (11). 
Pahlke, J., Strasser, S., & Vieider, F. M. (2012). Risk-taking for others under accountability. 
Economics Letters, 114 (1), 102-105. 
Polman, E. (2010). Information distortion in self–other decision making. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 432–435. 
Polman, E. (2012a). Self-other decision making and loss aversion. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 119, 141-150. 
Polman, E. (2012b). Effects of self–other decision making on regulatory focus and choice 
overload. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102 (5), 980-993. 
Polman, E., & Emich, K. J. (2011). Decisions for others are more creative than decisions 
for the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 492–501. 
Prelec, D. (1998). The probability weighting function. Econometrica, 66, 497-527. 
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem. 
Econometrica, 68, 1281-1293. 
Rabin, M. & Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies – Risk aversion. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, 219-232. 
Reyna, V. F., & Ellis, S. C. (1994). Fuzzy trace theory and framing effects in children’s risky 
decision making. Psychological Science, 5 (5), 275-279. 
Rice, C. (1995). The effects of outcome attractiveness and framing on children’s risky 
decision making. Unpublished masters thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson. 
105 
 
Sascha, C. F., & Wolfgang, J. L. (2017). Decision making for others: the case of loss 
aversion. Economic Letters, 161, 154-156.  
Schlottmann, A., & Anderson, N. H. (1994). Children’s judgments of expected value. 
Development Psychology, 30, 56-66. 
Schlottmann, A. (2001). Children’s probability intuitions: understanding the expected 
value complex gambles. Child Development, 72, 103-122. 
Schlottmann, A., & Tring, J. (2005). How children reason about gains and losses: framing 
effects in judgement and choice. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 64 (3), 153-171. 
Schlottmann, A., & Wilkening, F. (2011). Judgment and decision making in young 
children. In: Dhami MK, Schlottmann A, Waldmann MR, editors. Judgment and decision making 
as a skill: Learning development and evolution. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 55–
83. 
Steinberg, L. (2004). Risk taking in adolescence: what changes, and why? Annals on the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1021, 51-58. 
Stone, E. R., Yates, A. J., & Caruthers, A. S. (2002). Risk taking in decision making for 
others versus the self. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32 (9), 1797-1824. 
Stone, E. R., & Allgaier, L. (2008). A social values analysis of self-other differences in 
decision making involving risk. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 30, 114-129. 
Sutter, M., & Kocher, M. G. (2007). Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 59 (2), 364-382. 
Sutter, M., Kocher, M. G., Glätzle-Rützler, D., & Trautmann, S. T. (2013). Impatience and 
uncertainty: experimental decisions predict adolescents’ field behavior. American Economic 
Review, 103 (1), 510-531. 
Van Leijenhorst, L., Gunther Moor, B., de Macks, Z. A., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., Westenberg, 
P. M., & Crone, E. A. (2010). Adolescent risky decision-making: neurocognitive development of 
reward and control regions. Neuroimage, 51, 345-355.   
Wakker, P. P. (2005). Formalizing reference dependence and initial wealth in Rabin’s 
calibration theorem. Mimeo, University of Rotterdam.  
Weber, E. U., Blais, A., & Betz, E. N. (2002). A domainspecific risk-attitude scale: 




Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Sarr, B., Fagerlin, A., & Ubel, P. A. (2006). A matter of perspective – 
Choosing for others differs from choosing for yourself in making treatment decisions. Journal 












Preference for Giving: the Influence  





By collecting data among students at the University of Verona, we investigate whether subjects’ 
giving choices in a Dictator Game are affected by information over the allocation of a similar 
Dictator in terms of demographic characteristics, hobbies and beliefs. We introduce three 
treatments which differ in the way information is provided. When participants receive the 
desired Dictator information and pay for it, they tend to choose a fair sharing, while when 
participants receive group information and cannot choose it, they tend to act selfishly. Our data 
indicate also that, when a cost has to be incurred, only 50% of Dictators choose to receive 
information, while when it is costless about 90% of individuals decide to receive it. More 
importantly, our results highlight little importance for hobbies’ information and a clear 
preference for beliefs’ information. Carrying out an OLS regression, we find that feeling similar 
to other individuals leads to behave in line with them. Moreover, our findings indicate that 
Dictators who search for approval and others’ appreciation, who are more easily influenced and 
more agreeable tend to align their choices with others. Finally, those who receive random 
information focus their attention on the allocation distribution while the individuals who 





1. Introduction  
The following experiment focuses on the link between giving in the Dictator Game 
(hereafter, DG) and the influence of both similar and dissimilar people. This hypothetical 
relationship arises from the idea that people love and search for similar persons in many 
situations.  
“Similarity begets friendship” (Plato, 1968). People generally have significant contact 
with others like themselves. This evidence has driven to coin the term homophily - literally, 
“love of the same”- to highlight the propensity to associate with similar people with respect to 
dissimilar ones. The result is that people’s personal networks are often homogeneous with 
regard to many sociodemographic, behavioural and other characteristics. Homophily in race 
and ethnicity creates the strongest differences in our personal environments, with age, religion, 
education, occupation, and gender following in roughly that order (McPherson et al., 2001; 
Kalmijn, 1998; Marsden, 1987; Ibarra, 1995). Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) draw a distinction 
between two types of homophily: status homophily which captures the observed tendency of 
people to associate with other people possessing similar characteristics (such as race, gender, 
and religion) and value homophily which reflects people's tendency to affiliate with those 
holding similar values, attitudes and beliefs (see on this also Golman et al., 2016). 
Considering this context there exists a strand of literature focusing on the preference for 
belief consonance and the consequence behavior and motivational mechanisms that underline 
it. There are many evidences that highlight people care about what others believe (Alford et al., 
2011; Huber and Malhotra, 2013; Kranton et al., 2013). The prevalent explanation is associated 
with the idea of group membership. As Golman et al. (2016) write “people join, and identify 
with, groups because of the material, and possibly psychological, benefits that group 
membership confers. The preference for belief consonance then stems from a desire to enhance 
one's connection to the group. A second reason why people might want others to have similar 
views is because they want to hold certain beliefs, and the presence of other people with 
different beliefs poses a threat to their own beliefs”.  
When others have discrepant beliefs, people could choose to change their beliefs and 
conform to them. This occurs mainly when an individual regularly has different beliefs than a 
large group of people who share common ideas and in particular when these people play an 
important role for the individual (Asch, 1951). Furthermore, Pool et al. (1998) find that 
whether the group is considered highly self-relevant, individuals change the interpretations of 
questions in order to follow the majority group or to distance from the minority group position. 
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In their studies they show also different effects on participants’ self-esteem: it decreases both 
when individuals who desire to align themselves with a particular group recognize to have 
different beliefs with respect to this group and when individuals who desire to differentiate 
themselves from a group discover to share common beliefs with it. Moreover, other studies 
point out that people who are more likely to be insecure about their identity and show an 
intermediate level of confidence in their beliefs, should have the strongest preference for belief 
consonance (Babad et al., 1987; Visser et al., 2003). Therefore, when a subject is exposed to 
socially relevant information that may lead her to revise her beliefs, her choice could change.  
As noted by Golman et al. (2016), the preference for belief consonance has received little 
attention from economists although its relevance for a wide range of implications in economic 
and noneconomic behaviors. By focusing our attention on giving, we choose to run the Dictator 
Game because of its simplicity and its clear and reliable experimental procedure in lab. DG, 
indeed, is the most well-known experimental game involving donations and many studies have 
been carried out on it (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Camerer, 2003; by explaining behavior in DG, more recent literature regards the difference 
between intrinsic moral motivation and extrinsic social motivation: Cappelen et al., 2017; Dana 
et al., 2006; Brobeng et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Lazear et al., 2012). This 
experiment aims to test the broad conjecture that information on behavior of similar and 
dissimilar people (with special regard to personal beliefs) could affect also one’s giving 
behavior and, in particular, may lead individuals to revise the amount given away in a DG in the 
lab. More specifically, since on the whole the existing literature focuses on different kinds of 
homophily, we aim to investigate whether subjects’ giving choices are affected by information 
over the allocation of a similar Dictator in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (gender, 
age, nationality), hobbies (musical preference, favourite sport, kind of movie) and beliefs 
(political, religious and moral values). Moreover, we wonder whether being informed about the 
allocation of a group of Dictators has the same, less or more importance compared to being 
informed about the decision of one single Dictator only. Beyond testing the relevance of a 
preference for homophily, this experiment, by also introducing a cost for obtaining others’ 
allocation, aims to study whether subjects search for this information. Through our design it is 
not possible to shed light on the motivations driving this behavior directly; we may 
speculatively argue that  this choice could be made in order to generate self-esteem and self-
approval in dictators. 
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Finally, this study differs from previous research concerning the DG not only for adding 
a cost to obtain information and then for capturing the willingness to pay for different type of 
information, but also for considering information related to the characteristics of Dictators, 
instead of Recipients. Indeed, not only the features of Recipients could influence the amount 
given away, as many studies convincingly documented (Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Van Der Merwe 
and Burns, 2008; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Ben-Ner and Kramer, 2011; Aguiar et al., 2008; Bohnet 
and Frey, 1999; Cason and Mui, 1998), but also different kind of information about Dictators 
and, in particular, about their being perceived as similar or dissimilar along some potentially 
relevant dimensions. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review on motivations and preferences for belief consonance. In Section 3 we present the 
design of the experiment while Section 4 describes data we collected. Section 5 contains the 
main findings of our analysis and Section 6 concludes. Appendices provide details on 
instructions and questionnaires, show some allocations’ distribution graphs, describe the 
construction of some key variables and report data on Recipients.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Non-Selfish Behavior in Dictator Game Experiments 
The DG has been widely studied in behavioral economics and, in contrast to the 
traditional economic theory for which human being acts selfishly and then would keep the 
entire endowment, the majority of experiments shows that dictators give a positive amount, on 
average about the 20% of the sum (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Engel, 2011). 
Recent researches investigate what motivates this seemingly altruistic behavior. The most 
common interpretation is that this generosity reflects intrinsic motivations. Recent works, on 
the other hand, suggest the existence of extrinsic motivations: dictators could act in an 
apparently generous way because their choices are observed by an anonymous recipient. 
Therefore, the spontaneous question is the following: do people give up part of their resources 
because they want or because they feel obliged to do so in certain contexts? Cappelen et al. 
(2017) examining the relative importance of intrinsic moral motivation and extrinsic social 
motivation, find that without obvious moral argument for sharing most participants do not give 
anything to recipient while they give away a substantial share when a moral argument is 
111 
 
introduced. Moreover, they show that extrinsic social motivation matters: dictators are 
uncertain on whether to give information or not to recipients, which is consistent with some 
participants being motivated by guilt and shame and others by social esteem and pride. Also 
Koch and Normann (2008) study whether fair behavior is inspired by regard for others or by 
regard by others. They compare two treatments: one in which recipients know the dictator 
game instructions and one in which no information about the source of dictator offers is 
provided to recipients. They find that half of dictators is internally motivated and the other half 
is driven by external factors, such as experimenter observability or regard by recipients.  
Other papers have shown that the results of the DG change considerably depending on 
the type of information provided to dictators. For instance, when dictators make the decision 
in absolute privacy and anonymity, without receiving information on recipients, nearly no one 
gives anything. Donations tend to be very low, around 10% of the amount on average (Hoffman 
et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1996). However, when reliable information about recipient is given 
to dictators, donations increase. Burnham (2003) finds that, when shown pictures of recipients, 
25% of dictators give as much as half of the total amount; Eckel and Grossman (1996) studying 
the behavior of dictators who are told that their donations would be given to the Red Cross, 
discover that 31% of the dictators give part of the money, 17% give half of the amount and 10% 
give the full amount. Aguiar et al. (2008) investigating the decisions of dictators who have to 
choose to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World, find that 
the majority gives money for reasons of consequentialist nature. Offers also increase when the 
recipient is a fellow classmate (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 2001) or when the dictators are told 
the recipient’s surname (Charness and Gneezy, 2003). The study of Van Der Merwe and Burns 
(2008) reveals that racial identity has a significant and positive impact on the amount shared. 
In particular, while Black participants do not vary their offers knowing the racial identity of 
their recipients, White participants are more generous towards White partners than Black 
partners. Therefore, as previous results make clear, dictators’ behavior, deviating 
systematically from the selfishness assumption in economic models, can be interpreted in 
terms of moral distance, defined as the emotional closeness between dictator and recipient 
(Abelson, 2005) or social distance, defined as the degree of reciprocity that subjects believe 





2.2.  The Preference for Belief Consonance 
It has been widely noted that individuals engage in more favorable behaviors towards 
people who share with them some relevant identity attributes than towards people who are 
different from them. Homophily is the principle for which a relation between similar people 
occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people. As Aristotle states in Rhetoric and 
Nichomachean Ethics, “people love those who are like themselves”. The earliest studies show 
considerable homophily by demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race and 
education (Bott, 1928; Loomis, 1946) and by psychological characteristics such as intelligence, 
attitudes and aspirations (Almack, 1922; Richardson, 1940). For instance, social scientists who 
have begun to observe group formation, note that school children make friends and play with 
people who have similar demographic features (Bott, 1928; Wellman, 1929). Other researchers 
find strongly homophilous associations among adolescents: teenagers tend to relate with 
others who share their behavior patterns, either of achievement or delinquency (Cohen, 1977; 
Kandel, 1978). Currarini et al. (2009), examining friendship patterns in some high schools, build 
a model of friendship formation and show that the model can generate the observed patterns 
of homophily. They note that larger groups form a greater fraction of their friendships with 
individuals of their same type, that larger groups form significantly more ties per capita and 
that the inbreeding is very strong for groups coming from middle-sized fraction of their schools. 
Behavior homophily has been studied also among adults; for example, Verbrugge (1977) 
observe a mover-stayer pattern in German friendships, with residential stability predicting 
friendship formation about as strongly as do gender, nationality or religion.  
One strand of experimental literature identifies preference for belief consonance: people 
should be attracted and should interact with others who share their beliefs. Lazarsfeld and 
Merton (1954) provide evidence for clustering based on political affinity: studying the behavior 
in two small towns, they find that liberals disproportionately select other liberals as close 
friends, and conservatives do the same. The Pew Research Center (2014) report documented 
that we observe a similar pattern in social media space: 52% of consistent liberals and 66% of 
consistent conservatives on Facebook declare that most of their close friends share their own 
political view. Other researches have shown that the desire for beliefs consonance influence 
people choose to date and marry with. Alford et al. (2011) find that political attitudes display 
extremely strong interspousal correlations while physical and personality characteristics do 
not result significantly positive correlated. In addition, analysing 28 individual items they 
discover high correlations concerning school prayer, abortion, homosexual rights and party 
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affiliation. Huber and Malhotra (2013), studying a group of individuals registered in a national 
online dating community, show that subjects prefer those who have similar political views 
among potential relationship partners. There is also significant evidence that the desire for 
belief consonance affects where people choose to locate geographically (Bishop, 2008; Molloy 
et al., 2011) beyond the economic associations that workers enter into (Bhuyan, 2007; Craig et 
al., 1995).  
A large empirical literature has shown that beliefs drive also intra-group favouritism and 
out-group hostility. In one study, Kranton et al. (2013) divide undergraduate students into 
groups which are based either on preferences for poetry and art or on political affiliation. They 
find that more than half of the subjects are neither fair nor social welfare maximizing when 
allocating to out-group individuals. In particular, about 21% are dominance-seeking and 35% 
are selfish. These results reveal systematic heterogeneity in social preferences, which depends 
on the social context. In another experiment studying redistribution, Klor and Shayo (2010) 
divide subjects into two groups according to their university fields of study and ask them to 
vote on different redistributive schemes. They observe that individuals vote more often for the 
tax rate that favors in-group members. Ben-Ner et al. (2009) instead, investigate the existence 
of preferences for in-group versus out-group along different identity categories (body type, 
political views, nationality, religion and more) in various contexts, including the DG. They find 
that those that belong to the in-group are treated more favourably than those who belong to 
the out-group in nearly all identity attributes considered. In particular, they observe that family 
and kinship are the most powerful source of differentiation, followed by political views, 
religion, sport-team and music preferences.  
In addition, people may change their behavior upon observing how others behave in 
similar situations, as the classic study of conformism conducted by Asch (1951) shows. In his 
experiment subjects are first shown a straight line and then three for comparison. Subjects are 
asked to indicate which line is the closest to the first one in length and an incorrect answer is 
provided to them. A significant number of individuals conforms to the wrong answer, probably 
because they want to be accepted by the majority or to avoid the discomfort for disagreeing 
with the majority. Fatas (2018) makes an experiment to test whether people’s preferences 
change to become more alike considering different type of decisions (choices over objects, 
allocation decisions, lottery decisions). In their treatments people are informed about another 
person’s choice from own or other group. They find evidence of a peer effect on behavior: 
individuals are more likely to choose an object when they know a member of their own group 
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has done so in the past. Subjects also are more likely to follow own signals than other group 
signals even though do not avoid other group signals. Moreover, this experiment shows that 
following own signal is more likely in decisions where the options can be ranked. Egebark and 
Ekström (2017) show that both group size and social proximity matter in explaining the level 
of conformity. Using the social network Facebook, they set up a natural field experiment to test 
whether users are more prone to support content if someone else has done so before. Their 
results show that one Like from a single stranger has no impact. However, increasing the size 
of the influencing group double the probability that subjects express positive support. 
Friendship ties are also crucial. People are, on average, four times more likely to press the Like 
button if a friend, rather than a stranger, has done so before them. They discuss the different 
reasons of this behavior: one strand of literature supports the “rational herding” hypothesis, 
i.e., individuals imitate those who are believed to be better informed (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 
1998); another line of research assumes that people are motivated by social factors, such as the 
desire for prestige, esteem, popularity, or acceptance (Akerlof, 1980; Jones, 1984; Bernheim, 
1994); finally, the psychological literature suggests that larger groups and in-group members 
could put more pressure on individuals (Asch, 1952; Tajfel, 1981). Also Cason and Mui (1998) 
running the sequential DG, examine how social influence may affect subjects’ choices. In their 
experiment Dictators decide how to share their amount before and after learning the allocation 
decision made by another Dictator in the Relevant Information treatment or the birthday of 
another Dictator in the Irrelevant Information treatment. They find that subjects on average 
become more self-regarding in the Irrelevant Information treatment, but not in the Relevant 
one. Therefore, it is evident that people often follow the behavior of others and the motivations 
could be various depending on the kind of information dictators received. With this research 
we aim to test whether the levels of conformism and giving could be affected by providing 
information related to similar and dissimilar Dictators, concerning demographic 
characteristics, hobbies and beliefs. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure  
The participants in the experiment are recruited among students enrolled at the 
University of Verona, attending bachelor and master degrees in different majors. Half of them 
are randomly assigned the role of Dictator and half to the role of Recipient. For each decision 
one Recipient is randomly paired with one Dictator, and nobody plays more than once together. 
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The following experiment is a variant of the standard DG with a finite number of 
allocation decisions. Dictators maintain this role throughout the entire experiment; indeed, this 
work aims to study whether the amount shared changes after learning the allocation of other 
dictators with specific characteristics and whether the choice made by more dictators versus 
one dictator could influence in a different way the behavior of the decider. Moreover, the 
Recipient changes in correspondence with each Dictator’s choice; this permits Dictator to feel 
more free and not conditioned by previous choices. Then, she could choose to change her choice 
both increasing and decreasing the given amount without worrying about what the Recipient 
might believe. We run separate sessions for Dictators and Recipients. 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are informed about the rules of the 
game and are given a description of how the experiment would proceed. The experiment 
consists of three phases; it starts with an Initial Phase and it proceeds with a Dictator 
Information Phase and a Group Information Phase. In the Initial Phase each Dictator is informed 
about the allocation chosen by an individual participating in a DG played in an online 
questionnaire, and then decides her allocation. In the other two phases, instead, Dictator 
chooses whether to receive additional information; in the case she receives information she 
plays another time the DG, otherwise she proceeds to the next phase. 
We use a between-subjects design and introduce three treatments that differ in the way 
information about allocations and characteristics of other dictators is provided. In particular, 
in the Random Treatment this information is given to Dictators for free and randomly; in the 
First Choice Treatment information is costless and Dictators can choose which kind of 
information to receive: they rank the different types of information on the basis of the relevance 
they attach to them and they receive the one they considered the most important; finally, the 
Cost Treatment differs from the others due to the presence of a cost for obtaining this 
information. In particular, if Dictators accept to incur the cost, they are asked how much they 
are willing to pay for each kind of information and then, based on the BDM method (Becker et 
al., 1964) they receive or not the information. By comparing Random Treatment to First Choice 
Treatment, we can study whether any information could influence the Dictator’s allocation or 
whether the possibility to choose the category has a stronger effect on the Dictator’s decision. 
Moreover, the First Choice Treatment permits to understand which kind of information is 
considered more important by Dictators. By comparing these two treatments to Cost 
Treatment, we can analyse whether the introduction of a cost reduces the number of 
individuals who get information.  
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The information given to Dictators is collected through an incentivized questionnaire 
submitted online to other individuals, before the experiment to be run in the lab. The 
questionnaire consists of 9 closed questions and in the standard Dictator Game. Each Dictator 
participating in the experiment was paired with different individuals who previously filled in 
the online questionnaire; one for the Initial Phase, one for the Dictator Phase and more for the 
Group Phase7. Moreover, at the beginning of the experiment, each Dictator answers the same 
questions in order to allow us to create a measure of similarity between individuals and 
Dictators. 
This piece of information belongs to three specific categories: socio-demographic 
information (gender, age, nationality); hobbies’ information (music, sports, movies); beliefs’ 
information (politics, religion, morality). In the two Information Phases, each Dictator, if wants 
information, receives the same kind of information, belonging to one of the previous categories. 
Therefore, through a between-subject design, this study wants to discover whether and which 
category of information has more influence in the Dictators’ allocation choice. 
Each of the three treatments consists of three phases; each phase is played by all 
Dictators. In the Initial Phase, equal for everyone, each Dictator plays the DG knowing the 
allocation of an individual who filled in the questionnaire. We consider this phase our control 
phase because it permits to isolate the effect of learning information about the characteristics 
of the individual in the second phase. A growing number of studies sheds light on the influence 
of others’ allocation choices on dictators’ allocation decisions (Cason and Mui, 1998; Weimann, 
1994). We aim to understand whether information about individuals’ characteristics other than 
allocations could affect the decision in the DG. Then, in the Dictator Information Phase Dictators 
are asked if they want to receive information about how another individual with three 
particular characteristics, related to one of the previous categories, shared her earning. In the 
Group Information Phase, instead, Dictators can decide whether to receive information over the 
allocations’ distribution of a group of individuals, that shares the same characteristics as the 
individual in the Dictator Information Phase. Dictators play the DG, not only in the Initial Phase, 
but also every time they receive information about allocation and characteristics of other 
individuals. Therefore, they could play the DG once, twice or three times. In particular, in all 
treatments, whenever the Dictator plays the DG, she has to decide how much, out of 20 ECU 
(Experimental Currency Unit) to transfer to the Recipient.  
                                                          
7 The number of individuals considered for the Group Phase depends on the category of information that 




In the final part of the experiment, the Dictators were asked background questions about 
their education, volunteering experiences, social behaviors and the motivations about some 
choices made during the experiment. For more details about treatments, instructions and 
questionnaires see Appendix C.1 – C.7. 
At the end of the experiment only one, randomly chosen phase is paid. All participants 
received a show-up fee of 2,50€ and the total payment for each pair Dictator-Recipient was 
15,50€. The duration of the sessions was about 75 minutes for Dictators and 30 minutes for 
Recipients.  
 
4. Data on Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Online Questionnaire 
In order to collect pre-experimental data, transmitted as information to Dictators 
participating in the experiment, we submitted an incentivized questionnaire using Prolific 
(https://prolific.ac), an online platform for the recruitment of participants for researches, in 
which it is possible to upload a questionnaire and choose the characteristics of the respondents. 
For the aim of our analysis and in order to rely on a sample that is as heterogenous and balanced 
as possible, we exogenously imposed some demographic restrictions: half sample female, half 
sample Italian and all individuals aged between 18 and 60 years old. In addition, using this 
platform, we avoid an experimenter selection bias since individuals from all over the world are 
registered choosing to answer freely. Table 1 shows summary statistics on the characteristics 
of individuals who filled in the questionnaire, divided in three groups corresponding to the 
three categories of information given to Dictators. In Appendix C.8 we report all allocations’ 
distribution graphs that we showed during the Group Information Phase to the participants in 
the lab experiment; they are divided based on all possible combinations of characteristics of 





Table 1. Summary statistics online questionnaire (210 observations) 
Online Questionnaire Data Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
     
     
Demographic Information 
    
     
Female 0.512 0.501 0 1 
Age 34.174 11.341 18 60 
Italian 0.456 0.499 0 1 
     
Hobbies’ Information     
     
Classic Music (vs Country Music) 0.619 0.487 0 1 
Action Movie (vs Romance/Comedy Movie) 0.667 0.472 0 1 
Preference for Swimming 2.778 1.048 1 4 
     
Beliefs’ Information     
     
Political Preference 0.793 0.786 0 2 
Religious Person / Believer  0.401 0.491 0 1 
In favour of Civil Union 0.817 0.287 0 1 
     
Note: Preference for Swimming takes value 1 when the answer is not at all and 4 when the answer is a lot;  
in Political Preference 0 means extreme left, 1 moderate, 2 extreme right. 
 
In addition to these characteristics, we also collect the individuals’ choice in the standard 
DG, converting in pounds the chosen amount. Figure 1 displays how individuals who filled in 
the questionnaire allocate the 20 ECU available. We can see that the majority of them (55.56%) 
chooses to equally share the amount with the Recipient. It is not common that such a large 
number of individuals allocates a high amount. In addition to the hypothesis that people care 
about fairness, we could consider an alternative explanation: as Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) 
observed, people like to be perceived as fair. In this experiment social image could play an 
important role: individuals participating in the online questionnaire, indeed, knew that their 
choices would be transmitted to others. Supporting this idea, also other studies suggest that 
image concerns based on the desire not to appear unfair, either to oneself or to others, drive an 




Figure 1. Allocations’ distribution (online questionnaire respondents)
 
 
4.2. Lab Experiment  
We run nine sessions, three for each treatment, involving 252 Dictators; each session 
lasted about 75 minutes for dictators and 30 minutes for recipients and took place at the VELE 
lab of the University of Verona in March 2018. Individuals were randomly allocated to 
treatments and each subject participated in only one session. The average amount for recipients 
was 5,50€ and for dictators was 9,50€. Our sample is, on average, 21 years old, 75% are 
females, 95% are Italian, 32% have a scientific education (Engineering, Economics, Medicine, 
Dentistry, Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science) and 51% are attending foreign 
languages and literatures. In the following we describe the data collected from the lab 

















4.2.1. Allocation choices 
Table 2 shows an overall picture of Dictators’ giving, reporting mean and modal value 
for each phase, for all treatments. 
 
Table 2. Dictators’ Giving 
 Cost Treatment  First Choice Treatment Random Treatment 
 Mean Mode Mean  Mode Mean Mode 
Initial Phase 5.77 10 6.19 10 6.37 10 
Dictator Information Phase 5.52 10 5.32 0 5.75 0 
Group Information Phase 3.93 0 5.09 0 4.62 0 
 
With regard to the Initial Phase, on average, Dictators give Recipients 6.11 ECU 
(30.55% of endowment). Figure 2 illustrates the allocations’ distribution knowing how another 
individual, randomly selected from those who filled in the questionnaire, shared her amount. 
We can note that the distribution is different from Figure 1: although the majority of them 
received information about a fair sharing, they behaved more selfishly. The motivations 
Dictators report justifying their choice are heterogeneous and can be summarized as follows: 
they believe their allocation the most fair (33.56%); they chose thinking about how they would 
like others to behave with them (31.57%); they are interested only in earning as much as 
possible (19.27%); they are not interested in appearing generous because the recipient would 
not choose, in turn, how sharing the amount of ECU (12.30%); they are not interested in 




Figure 2. Allocations’ distribution Initial Phase 
 
Considering the Dictator Information Phase, Figure 3 shows the allocations’ 
distribution analysing the three treatments separately. Although the average amount is about 
5.53 ECU in each treatment, we can immediately note the variability of the frequency at each 
possible allocation and a high number of Dictators who choose the fair allocation. In order to 
interpret these results, we must remember that the majority of participants in the online 
questionnaire chooses the fair division: this information could influence the behavior of 
Dictators. In particular, we can observe that participants in the Cost Treatment choose to a 
greater extent a fair sharing; in this treatment we collect the smallest number of allocations 
equal to zero. These observations could be explained considering that Dictators who are willing 
to pay a cost to receive information are very interested in knowing the behavior of others, 
probably because of their lower self-confidence and higher influenceability. Therefore, they 
tend to conform to the other individual, choosing a similar or equal allocation. Another possible 
explanation for this behavior could be linked to the idea that since the dictator pays for a piece 
of information, that information can be supposed to be relevant for himself/herself, even if, in 
fact, it is not. Although the three distributions seem different, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
analysing the equality of distributions does not reject the hypothesis of similarity of 
distributions (K-S = 0.1066 with p-value = 0.378 comparing Random and First Choice 
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0.0832 with p-value = 0.958 comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). Moreover, also 
considering the ANOVA test comparing the variances of the three distributions, the means of 
allocations do not differ significantly among treatments (F = 0.20 with p-value = 0.8229 
comparing the three treatments together; F = 0.75 with p-value = 0.3863 comparing Random 
and First Choice Treatments; F = 0.11 with p-value = 0.7451 comparing Random and Cost 
Treatments; F = 0.10 with p-value = 0.7494 comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). 
Finally, running the Chi-square test we find that the expected frequencies are significantly 
different from the observed frequencies comparing the Random treatment with the other two 
(X2 = 33.7259 with p-value = 0.004 comparing Random and First Choice Treatments; X2 = 
21.8066 with p-value = 0.058 comparing Random and Cost Treatments; X2 = 12.4311 with p-
value = 0.412 comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). With regard to the last results we 
could suppose that the possibility to choose which kind of information to receive is relevant for 
the decision of the allocation. 
 
Figure 3. Allocations’ distribution in the Dictator Information Phase 
 
 
In the last phase, the Group Information Phase, Dictators can decide whether receive 
information about the allocations’ choices of a group of individuals, that shares the same 
characteristics of individual in the Dictator Information Phase. Figure 4 illustrates the 
allocations’ distribution of Dictators after this information. We note clearly the higher 
frequency of choices equal to zero for the Random treatment with respect the other two 
treatments; also in this case, probably, it is due to the lower importance attached to the received 
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information. The trend of distributions appears similar comparing the First Choice and the 
Random Treatments while it seems different considering the Cost Treatment and the other two. 
The average amounts are 3.93, 4.62 and 5.09 ECU for Cost, Random and First Choice treatments, 
respectively. In order to study the equality of distributions, we run the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. We find a significant difference between the distributions of First Choice treatment and 
that of Cost treatment, due to the presence of the cost (K-S = 0.1087 with p-value = 0.339 
comparing Random and First Choice Treatments; K-S = 0.2104 with p-value = 0.249 comparing 
Random and Cost Treatments; K-S = 0.2532 with p-value = 0.096 comparing First Choice and 
Cost Treatments). Running the ANOVA test, we do not find a difference in means among 
treatments (F = 1.23 with p-value = 0.2951 comparing the three treatments together; F = 1.05 
with p-value = 0.3067 comparing Random and First Choice Treatments; F = 0.69 with p-value 
= 0.4078 comparing Random and Cost Treatments; F = 0.2.06 with p-value = 0.1531 comparing 
First Choice and Cost Treatments). Running the Chi-square test, instead, we find a significant 
difference between the expected and the observed frequencies comparing Random and Cost 
treatments (X2 = 15.0179 with p-value = 0.240 comparing Random and First Choice 
Treatments; X2 = 22.4732 with p-value = 0.033 comparing Random and Cost Treatments; X2 = 
13.0143 with p-value = 0.368 comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). 
 





4.2.2. Importance of Information 
Focusing our attention on information that each Dictator chooses whether to receive, 
we note clearly a difference among treatments. As Figure 5 illustrates, when incurring a cost is 
necessary to get the information, only 50% of individuals choose to receive information and 
accept to incur the cost. When information is costless, in First Choice and Random treatments, 
instead, the percentage of those who wish to receive information increases considerably: in 
both Dictator and Group Information Phases about 90% of individuals decide to receive 
information. This treatment effect is confirmed also running the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: the 
distribution of those who desire information in the Cost treatment is significantly different from 
that in the First Choice and Random treatments (Dictator Information Phase: K-S = 0.3452 with 
p-value = 0.00 comparing Random and Cost Treatments; K-S = 0.3690 with p-value = 0.00 
comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments. Group Information Phase: K-S = 0.3571 with p-
value = 0.00 comparing Random and Cost Treatments; K-S = 0.4048 with p-value = 0.00 
comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). Analysing the questionnaire and in particular the 
reported reason why most of the Dictators did not accept the cost even if they were interested 
in receiving information, it turned out that the interest was not so high as to lead them to spend 
money to know others’ behavior. 
 
Figure 5. Dictator Information and Group Information 
  Dictator Information                    Group Information 
                  
 
Table 3 and Figure 6 show which kind of information Dictators receive in each 
treatment. Observing the Cost and First Choice Treatments’ graphs, it is evident that there exists 
a cost of information effect: when individuals can decide the type of information and are willing 
to pay for it, they have a marked preference for belief information. Moreover, from these graphs, 
it is clear that hobbies’ information is considered the least important; we could suppose that 
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this domain, related to a more personal sphere, does not capture much attention because it is 
usually accepted that individuals have different and various preferences for leisure activities, 
i.e. they are known to be person-specific. Therefore, although this kind of information could be 
an important aspect to measure the level of similarity with other people, it could not be 
considered a relevant factor that influence the allocation choice, unlike demographic or beliefs’ 
differences, linked more tightly to status and value homophily, respectively. 
 
Figure 6. Information by Treatment 
 
 
Table 3. Information by Treatment 
 Cost Treatment  First Choice Treatment Random Treatment 
Demographic Information 7.50% 43.04% 35.06% 
Hobbies’ Information 7.50% 11.39% 24.68% 
Beliefs’ Information 85.00% 45.57% 40.26% 
 
In our analysis we also wonder whether the type of information chosen by Dictators 
changes with gender. As we can observe in Figure 7, both females and males prefer to receive 
beliefs’ information, as previous results underline. We can note a little difference in the 
preferences for demographic and hobbies’ information: the 41.46% of males versus the 30.52% 
of females chooses to receive demographic information while the 9.76% of males versus the 
17.53% of females chooses to receive hobbies’ information. Overall, the distributions appear 
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quite similar: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that there are not significant differences 
between males and females (K-S = 0.1094 with p-value = 0.420). 
 
Figure 7. Information by Gender 
 
 
Table 4 provides more details related to the kind of information Dictators decide to 
receive.  As we can see, 15.08% of Dictators choose to receive no information, neither in the 
Dictator Information Phase nor in the Group Information Phase. Participants explained their 
choices declaring various reasons: they are sure in their decisions (36.90%), they are not 
interested in the behavior of others (32.14%), they are aware that this information would 
influence their choice (19.04%), they are interested only in earning (9.54%), they do not 
consider relevant these kind of information for choosing the allocation (2.38%). Moreover, data 
suggests that most of these individuals choose to keep all the amount for themselves. This 
behavior could be explained considering that selfish individuals do not want to know how other 
people decided. Some studies suggest that sharing declines by about 40 to 50 percent when 
dictators can choose to opt out of the DG compared to the standard treatment (Dana et al., 2006; 
Lazear et al., 2012). Similarly, Dana et al. (2007) introduce in their experiment various kind of 
pretexts for selfish behavior, removing transparency, and find that half of dictators engage in 
strategic ignorance avoiding situations in which pro-social behavior is expected. Dictators may 
prefer not to know the consequences of their decisions in order to not feel compelled to give. 
The experiment designed by Larson and Capra (2009) provides support for this hypothesis: 
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modifying the possibility to reveal or not information about others’ payoffs they create a “moral 
wiggle room” for dictators to behave self-interestedly and find that, when the consequences of 
the actions of dictators are not completely transparent, fair decisions diminish.  
From Table 4, we can note also that the percentage of individuals who desire 
information is similar in both phases (75% in the Dictator Information Phase and 76.59% in 
the Group Information Phase). Dictators who actually received information represent the 
77.38% of those who would like to receive information. The difference in the percentage 
between those who desire and those who actually receive information is due to the different 
willingness to pay for obtaining information in the Cost Treatment. Analysing the data we 
observe that who participates in Cost treatment receives information either in the Dictator 
Phase or in the Group Phase. Moreover, as we see graphically, information related to political, 
religious and moral beliefs is chosen more frequently. As a chi-square test confirms, the choice 
of receiving information is strongly related to treatment: the presence of the cost decreases the 
number of individuals who want to receive information. The decision of receiving information 
seems to be linked also to gender and to a small extent to the kind of education received. 
Analysing the questionnaires, various motivations lead Dictators to choose to receive 
information: curiosity (66.20%), the interest for some specific characteristics of other dictators 
(20.18%), the attempt to be reassured about the decision made in the Initial Phase (9.39%), the 
willingness to stand out themselves from others, in particular if others’ preferences are 
different from theirs (2.82%), the desire to make the same decisions as other similar people 
(1.41%).  
Considering only individuals who received information (195 individuals out of 252), 
we analyse whether the category of information chosen could depend on some demographic 
characteristics: running the chi-square test it does not seem that gender and age influence the 
kind of information received while the type of education affects to some extent the choice of 
category. Moreover, the results of chi-square test confirm a treatment effect, as previous graphs 
illustrated. This effect is a consequence of the presence of the cost: 85% of Dictators 
participating in Cost Treatment choose beliefs’ information and, therefore, the difference with 
the other two information categories becomes relevant comparing the three treatments. We 
can observe, also, that the effect of treatment in hobbies’ information is weaker than other 
information categories, probably because in all treatments few individuals choose to receive 
this kind of information. Moreover, whether we compare First Choice and Random treatments, 
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we can note the effect of the possibility to choose: Dictators who can choose which kind of 
information to receive avoid hobbies’ information.  
Finally, considering the absolute value of the difference between the allocation choice 
of Dictators participating in the experiment and that of individuals participating in the online 
questionnaire, it seems that the distance between allocation choices, in both information 
phases, are to a small extent influenced by receiving demographic or beliefs’ information. 
 
Table 4. Information Test 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: “Dictator Information” indicates the group of dictators who desire to receive information in the second phase; 
“Group Information” indicates the group of dictators who desire information in the third phase; 
“Actually Received Information” indicates the group of dictators who actually receive information during the experiment (dictators who 
desire information in Random and in First Choice Treatments joint to dictators who desire information and are willing to pay a prize higher 
than the number randomly generated by computer in Cost Treatment). 
 
 
In Table 5 we report the importance level of each sub-category of information. For all 
kinds of information most individuals consider all sub-categories with the same importance. 
Regarding demographic information Dictators give more relevance to age; considering hobbies’ 
information, instead, the musical genre is believed the most significant information; finally, 



















No information 15.08%  24.98*** 3.35* 13.10 2.05   
Dictator Information 75.00% 38.22*** 0.01 4.73 0.07   
Group Information  76.59% 45.85*** 4.61** 6.27 1.69   
Actually Received 
Information 
77.38% 67.10*** 7.26*** 15.32 3.39*   
 
195 observations 
       
Demographic 
Information 
32.82% 15.09*** 1.76 8.74 3.39* 27.06* 19.97** 
Hobbies’ Information  15.90% 7.60** 1.47 7.14 3.78* 8.92 8.94 
Beliefs’ Information 51.28% 22.12*** 0.13 14.31 0.13 26.21* 9.83 
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Table 5. Information Importance 





All sub-categories with same importance  37.70% 
Hobbies’ Information 
Kind of movie 0.00% 
Preference for swimming 14.29% 
Musical genre 35.71% 
All sub-categories with same importance  50.00% 
Beliefs’ Information 
Religious Belief 13.43% 
Civil Union preference 20.90% 
Political preference 29.85% 
All sub-categories with same importance  35.82% 
 
4.2.3. Main variables for the analysis 
In order to study the influence of similar and dissimilar dictators we create two 
variables related to the level of similarity between individuals who filled in the questionnaire 
and Dictators who participated in the lab experiment. The objective measure is built counting 
the number of common characteristics between individual and Dictator, analysing the answers 
in the online and pre-experiment questionnaires. Since the considered questions are three for 
each category of information, the range of similarity is between 0 and 3. The subjective measure, 
instead, arises from the following question, submitted in the post-experiment questionnaire:  
The information you received was related to a particular individual: (here appears the three 
characteristics given to Dictator, belonging to one category of information). How much did you 
feel like this individual? 
We rescaled both measures to have the range between 0 and 1, where the greatest value 
corresponds to a larger level of similarity between individuals and Dictators. In Table 6 we 
report summary statistics on both objective and subjective measures, divided into the three 
categories of information. In addition, we run the chi-square test in order to study whether the 




Table 6. Measure of Similarity 
Measure of Similarity Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Test X2 
      
      
      
Demographic Information 
     
      
Objective Similarity 0.448 0.246 0 1  
Subjective Similarity 0.313 0.251 0 1  
     59.639*** 
      
Hobbies’ Information      
      
Objective Similarity 0.398 0.278 0 1  
Subjective Similarity 0.439 0.270 0 1  
     28.666 
      
Beliefs’ Information      
      
Objective Similarity 0.583 0.282 0 1  
Subjective Similarity 0.503 0.299 0 1  
     97.326*** 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 7, the subjective measure is lower than the objective one 
for demographic and beliefs’ information and their difference is statistically significant, as the 
chi-square test proved. The measures of similarity of hobbies’ information, instead, are similar; 
this consideration is confirmed also running the test X2 that does not reject the hypothesis of 
equality distribution between objective and subjective measures. These results underline that 
the subjective perception is different from the objective reality when information is related to 
demographic and beliefs characteristics, respectively more tightly linked to status and value 
homophily. Moreover, analysing our data, we find that the correlation between the two 
measures of similarity are highly positively correlated (0.610). In particular, the correlation 
between objective and subjective similarity for demographic, hobbies and beliefs information 
is 0.662, 0.474 and 0.558 respectively.  
Other relevant variables for our aim are those related to social influence and personality 
traits. The first one regard some social attitudes and arise from the following statements: 
- It is difficult to make choices if I am not sure that my friends will approve them; 
- My results are worth more if others notice what I have done; 
- When I have to choose among various alternatives for which I am uncertain, I try to 
understand how my friends would behave, they could give me good ideas. 
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The three variables created from the previous attitudes are Others’ Approval, Others’ 
Appreciation and Others’ Influence; they take four values, from 1 to 4, where the greatest 
corresponds to a larger conformity with the attitudes described. 
The other main variables are related to the Big Five personality traits, built as five 
indexes (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) from the 
answers to a question asking to report how well each of 26 adjectives fits the respondent. This 
procedure is taken from Smith et al. (2013). For more details about variables see Appendix C.9. 
 
All dependent variables are related to the allocation choices made in the three phases. 
In particular, in the first analysis we consider the distance, in absolute value, between the 
Dictators’ choice and the individual allocations’ decision. This variable, called |Y|, aims to 
measure whether Dictators conform to individuals’ behavior and the analysis aims to study the 
factors that influence the extent of this distance. In a second analysis we consider the same 
distance without calculating the absolute value. This variable, called Y, wants to study the level 
of pro-sociality of Dictators with respect to that of other individuals and the factors that 
influence it.  
In Figures 8, 9, 10 we show the distribution of the first distance, representing a 
conformism measure. In particular, in the Initial Phase, we observe that the 17% of Dictators 
behave as individuals and that more than 50% of Dictators keep a small distance from the 
individual’s choice. In the Dictator Information Phase, it seems to exist a treatment effect: the 
distributions in the Random and Cost Treatments are more concentrated on small distances 
while the allocation’ choices in the First Choice Treatment are more equally distributed. This 
tendency could be explained taking into account that, probably, who is willing to pay a cost to 
receive information is also an individual more easily influenced and who receive random 
information could be not interested in it and therefore could conform to others easily. The 
hypothesis that the kind of information could affect the distance is supported by the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; indeed, the distribution between Random and First Choice 
Treatment looks statistically different (K-S = 0.102 with p-value = 0.83 comparing Random and 
Cost Treatments; K-S = 0.189 with p-value = 0.011 comparing Random and First Choice 
Treatments; K-S = 0.177 with p-value = 0.191 comparing First Choice and Cost Treatments). 
Figure 10 shows the absolute value of the distance between the Dictators’ choice and the 
median of the distribution observed in the Group Information Phase. We can note that the 
distribution of the First Choice treatment is quite uniform while the distributions of the 
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Random and the Cost treatments are different from the ones in the Dictator Information Phase: 
we observe the maximum frequency in correspondence with the maximum distance. 
 
Figure 8. Conformism measure in the Initial Phase  
 
 


























Table 7 reports summary statistics on the variables used in this analysis while Table 8 
shows the polychoric correlation of each variable with the absolute distance between Dictators’ 
choice and individuals’ allocation. We can observe that the three variables related to the 
conformism measure are positively correlated among them and negatively correlated with the 





Table 7. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
      
      
Control variables       
      
Random Treatment 0.333 0.472 0 1 252 
First Choice Treatment 0.333 0.472 0 1 252 
Cost Treatment  0.333 0.472 0 1 252 
Demographic Information 0.328 0.470 0 1 195 
Hobbies’ Information 0.159 0.366 0 1 195 
Beliefs’ Information 0.513 0.500 0 1 195 
Age 20.989 1.991 18 32 252 
Female 0.750 0.433 0 1 252 
Scientific Education 0.321 0.468 0 1 252 
Volunteering Importance 2.040 1.189 0 3 252 
Brothers 0.849 0.358 0 1 252 
      
Similarity variables      
      
Objective Similarity 0.509 0.279 0 1 195 
Subjective Similarity 0.430 0.291 0 1 195 
Similar Sub-Category  0.595 0.492 0 1 195 
      
Social variables      
      
Others’ Approval 1.730 0.757 1 4 252 
Others’ Appreciation 2.238 0.923 1 4 252 
Others’ Influence 2.381 0.807 1 4 252 
      
Personality variables      
      
Openness 0.675 0.142 0 1 252 
Conscientiousness 0.720 0.148 0 1 252 
Extraversion 0.673 0.173 0 1 252 
Agreeableness 0.794 0.156 0 1 252 
Neuroticism 0.562 0.210 0 1 252 
      
Dependent variables      
      
|Y1| 4.651 3.920 0 18 252 
|Y2| 4.860 4.115 0 19 171 
|Y3| 5.256 3.615 0 10 164 
Y1 -3.135 5.215 -18 10 252 
Y2 -3.620 5.241 -19 13 171 
Y3 -5.012 3.948 -10 5 164 
      
Note: Volunteering Importance takes value 0 if subject has never volunteered, 1 if answered to question 5 of post-experiment questionnaire 
“A lot” or “Some” for one aspect, 2 for two aspects, 3 for three aspects. 
Similar Sub-Category takes value 0 if subject gives more importance to a sub-category which represents an opposite characteristic to the 
subject, 1 if the characteristic is similar.  
The subscript in dependent variables indicates the corresponding phase of the experiment. 
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Table 8. Correlations with conformism measures 
Variable Correlation with 
 |Y1| |Y2| |Y3| 
    
Control variables     
    
Random Treatment - -0.120 0.014 
First Choice Treatment - 0.199 -0.088 
Cost Treatment  - -0.154 0.199 
Demographic Information - 0.188 0.098 
Hobbies’ Information - -0.061 -0.073 
Beliefs’ Information - -0.139 -0.044 
Age 0.231 0.063 0.138 
Female -0.247 0.002 -0.159 
Scientific Education 0.277 0.135 0.195 
Volunteering Importance -0.082 -0.254 -0.150 
Brothers 0.099 -0.005 -0.181 
    
Similarity variables    
    
Objective Similarity - -0.234 -0.093 
Subjective Similarity - -0.280 -0.230 
Similar Sub-Category  - -0.156 -0.001 
    
Social variables    
    
Others’ Approval 0.059 -0.146 -0.171 
Others’ Appreciation 0.179 0.100 0.160 
Others’ Influence -0.028 -0.131 -0.267 
    
Personality variables    
    
Openness 0.047 -0.067 -0.084 
Conscientiousness 0.059 0.073 -0.058 
Extraversion -0.067 -0.039 0.087 
Agreeableness -0.085 -0.129 -0.102 
Neuroticism -0.016 -0.054 -0.005 
    
Dependent variables    
    
|Y1| 1 0.246 0.361 
|Y2| 0.246 1 0.366 
|Y3| 0.361 0.366 1 
Y1 -0.661 -0.214 -0.353 
Y2 -0.175 -0.657 -0.325 
Y3 -0.378 -0.376 -0.946 




Analysing data on Recipients, we find a further evidence on the importance of making 
the situation actual, incentivizing it. Recipients, paired with Dictators randomly, are asked to 
answer some questions about hypothetical choices in DG. We observe that the allocations’ 
distribution and some information decisions are significantly different comparing choices 
made in the lab experiment and those made considering hypothetical circumstances. Some 
graphs related to Recipients’ choices are reported in Appendix C.10. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The aim of the following analyses is to study the factors which influence two different 
behaviors in DG: one related to the level of others’ influence, in particular considering similar 
and dissimilar dictators, and therefore the degree of conformism to others’ allocation choices; 
the other one related to the level of pro-sociality. For these purposes we consider two different 
kind of dependent variable: the first represents the distance, in absolute value, between the 
Dictator’s choice and the individual allocations’ decision; the second, instead, represents the 
same distance without calculating the absolute value. In Section 5.1 we study the conformism 
measure in the three experimental phases, considering first only control variables and adding 
then social and personality variables. In Section 5.2 we keep the same structure changing the 
dependent variable in order to study the pro-sociality measure.  
Because of the design, in particular of the treatment and the order of the three phases, 
we observe self-selection in the sample. For this reason, we try to estimate a Heckman model 
analysing in the first step the factors which lead to choose to receive individual or group 
information and in the second step, considering only Dictators who received information, the 
factors which influence conformism and pro-sociality measures. We find that the effect of the 
lambda of Heckman is not significant and, therefore, carrying out an OLS regression we obtain 
similar results. Then, in the following analyses we consider and report the OLS estimations. 
 
5.1.  Analysis of the Conformism Measure 
In Table 9 we report results related to the factors that affect the conformism measure 
in the Initial Phase. The smaller relevance given to others’ behavior by Dictators should 
correspond to a greater distance between the allocation choices. 
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Table 9. Conformism measure in the Initial Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable |Y1| |Y1| |Y1| 
    
Age 0.099 0.086 0.065 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Female -1.466*** -1.131** -1.322*** 
 (0.431) (0.440) (0.461) 
Scientific Education 0.657 0.747* 0.582 
 (0.415) (0.415) (0.420) 
Volunteering Importance 0.060 0.050 0.036 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.150) 
Brothers 0.804* 0.967** 0.917* 
 (0.484) (0.484) (0.490) 
Others’ Approval  0.186 0.170 
  (0.256) (0.277) 
Others’ Appreciation  0.571*** 0.589*** 
  (0.201) (0.205) 
Others’ Influence  -0.258 -0.201 
  (0.228) (0.235) 
Openness   -0.981 
   (1.254) 
Conscientiousness   2.721** 
   (1.215) 
Extraversion   -0.484 
   (1.106) 
Agreeableness   -2.029* 
   (1.188) 
Neuroticism   0.211 
   (0.850) 
Constant 2.651 1.542 2.618 
 (2.151) (2.269) (2.625) 
    
Observations 252 252 252 
R-squared 0.052 0.072 0.088 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We first consider only the control variables. As we can observe from Column 1, Table 
9, females choose allocations similar to other individuals while males tend to distance their 
decisions from the others. Moreover, it results that having brothers induces to a minor level of 
conformism; this behavior could be explained thinking that living with other people help to 
develop more exchange of views and to accept different ideas, and this could lead to more 
conscious choices and to less adaption to standards. In Column 2, Table 9, we add the social 
variables and we find that others’ appreciation has a strong and positive effect on the 
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conformism measure. The appreciation research translates into an allocation choice more 
different and distant from others’ decision. In addition to the previous variables that have 
similar influence to the prior specification, we observe a small positive effect of the variable 
related to the education: individuals with a scientific background tend to distance themselves 
from others choosing more selfish allocations. Finally, in Column 3, Table 9, we add personality 
variables; as we can observe, most of the previous results are confirmed. Moreover, we find that 
individuals who are more conscientious distance their allocation from the others while those 
who are more agreeable tend to align their choices with others.   
 
Table 10 reports the results on the conformism measure related to the Dictator 
Information Phase. Also in this analysis, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
difference between the Dictator’s choice and the individual’s allocation, both related to the 
second phase. Because of the design we consider only Dictators who choose to receive 
information and we add variables regarding treatment, kind of information and similarity 
measures. Moreover, we consider among explanatory variables the dependent variable of the 
Initial Phase because we think the past individual and Dictator choices could influence the 
present decision.  
 
Table 10. Conformism measure in the Dictator Information Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable |Y2| |Y2| |Y2| 
Method OLS OLS  OLS 
    
|Y1| 0.247*** 0.227*** 0.225*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
Cost Treatment -0.957 -1.077 -1.263* 
 (0.662) (0.675) (0.678) 
Random Treatment -1.218*** -1.242*** -1.055** 
 (0.454) (0.455) (0.457) 
Demographic Information 0.211 0.016 0.070 
 (0.649) (0.648) (0.657) 
Beliefs’ Information -0.260 -0.267 -0.231 
 (0.618) (0.616) (0.615) 
Similar Sub-Category 0.172 0.202 0.390 
 (0.490) (0.488) (0.494) 
Subjective Similarity -1.971** -1.667* -1.693* 
 (0.983) (0.983) (0.979) 
Objective Similarity -0.976 -1.423 -1.410 
 (1.085) (1.091) (1.084) 
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Age -0.225* -0.236** -0.276** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) 
Female 0.682 0.736 0.968 
 (0.529) (0.543) (0.575) 
Scientific Education 0.496 0.471 0.466 
 (0.509) (0.507) (0.510) 
Volunteering Importance -0.822*** -0.789*** -0.857*** 
 (0.182) (0.181) (0.182) 
Brothers -0.234 -0.044 -0.120 
 (0.598) (0.603) (0.611) 
Others’ Approval  -0.645** -0.743** 
  (0.306) (0.326) 
Others’ Appreciation  0.272 0.358 
  (0.244) (0.250) 
Others’ Influence  -0.325 -0.208 
  (0.281) (0.287) 
Openness   0.718 
   (1.539) 
Conscientiousness   2.146 
   (1.383) 
Extraversion   -2.143 
   (1.335) 
Agreeableness   -2.847** 
   (1.432) 
Neuroticism   -1.277 
   (1.003) 
Constant 11.631*** 13.183*** 15.966*** 
 (2.740) (2.865) (3.240) 
    
Observations 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.189 0.210 0.237 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe in Column 1 of Table 10, the distance between individual allocation 
and Dictator’s choice strongly depends on the decision made in the Initial Phase. Dictators are 
coherent with the previous behavior: the level of conformism is greater the larger it was in the 
prior phase. We also find that there exists a treatment effect: Dictators who participate in the 
Random treatment tend to align with the individual allocation while those who participate in 
the First Choice treatment tend to distance their choices from others. This result could reflect 
the importance given to the received information: it seems that who received random 
information and therefore could not choose the kind of information and give value to it, decide 
to opt for a similar allocation to others. Moreover, we can note that the kind of information does 
not influence the level of conformism: Dictators are not affected by the category of information 
but by the importance level of it, captured, as we have seen, by the effect of the Random 
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treatment. Another relevant result is related to similarity measures: feeling similar to the other 
individual leads to behave in line with her. The effect of the objective measure, instead, does 
not result significant: the subjective component dominates on the objective one. In addition, 
this analysis shows that the measure of conformism increases for older Dictators and those who 
consider the volunteering very important. As we can see from Column 2, Table 10, these results 
are confirmed adding to the previous specification the social variables. Moreover, we find that 
searching for approvals increases the level of conformism: if in real situations individuals tend 
to research for others’ approval, in this context of allocation decisions, tend to adapt to the 
choice of another individual. Finally, in Column 3, Table 10, we consider also personality 
variables. We note that both the sign and the significance of the effects of previous variables are 
similar also in this specification. We find that individuals who are more agreeable tend to align 
their choices with others, as we observed in the Initial Phase. Furthermore, we note a small 
effect of the presence of the cost: Dictators participating in Cost treatment show a greater level 
of conformism. In both First Choice and Cost treatments, individuals choose which information 
to receive; therefore, this information has a high level of importance for them. The difference is 
that individuals who receive information in Cost treatment are those who are willing to pay 
and, consequently, who strongly desire to know others’ behavior and, seen the results, who 
probably are more easily influenced. Finally, we wonder whether the interaction between 
treatment and information could be relevant for our analysis; the same information, indeed, 
could have different effects on dictators depending on whether it is specifically chosen by them 
or not. These variables have no significant effects on the conformism measure: our results 
confirm the greater importance given to the possibility to choose whether to receive 
information than to the type of information. 
 
Table 11 shows the results about the conformism measure related to the Group 
Information Phase. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between the 
Dictator’s choice related to the third phase and the median value of the group allocations’ 
distribution that each Dictator sees. Among the explanatory variables we consider also the 
dependent variable of the second phase for taking into account the past choice. In addition, we 
consider the absolute value of the difference between the median value of the group allocations’ 
distribution and the individual allocation seen in the second phase for taking into account the 
position of it in the group distribution.  
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In order to study the effect of receiving information about the group versus the single 
individual, beyond to give the same kind of previous information, we consider only Dictators 
that participated in the Dictator Information Phase and choose to receive also the group 
information. Because of this restriction, we have no observations for Cost Treatment. Indeed, 
individuals who accept the cost in the second phase do not accept it also in the third, and vice 
versa.  
Table 11. Conformism measure in the Group Information Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable |Y3| |Y3| |Y3| 
Method OLS OLS OLS 
    
|Y2| 0.283*** 0.256*** 0.260*** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) 
|Median – Allocation2| -0.050 -0.076 -0.074 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) 
Random Treatment 0.935** 0.985** 1.019** 
 (0.412) (0.396) (0.398) 
Demographic Information 0.153 -0.480 -0.481 
 (0.597) (0.574) (0.588) 
Beliefs’ Information 0.442 0.221 0.253 
 (0.575) (0.548) (0.555) 
Similar Sub-Category 0.568 0.594 0.577 
 (0.460) (0.436) (0.448) 
Subjective Similarity -2.908*** -2.572*** -2.372** 
 (0.982) (0.931) (0.936) 
Objective Similarity 0.489 -0.305 -0.161 
 (1.104) (1.055) (1.055) 
Age 0.184 0.084 0.123 
 (0.125) (0.121) (0.123) 
Female -0.871* -0.352 -0.575 
 (0.483) (0.483) (0.521) 
Scientific Education 0.740 0.876* 0.757* 
 (0.477) (0.453) (0.458) 
Volunteering Importance -0.073 -0.045 -0.040 
 (0.182) (0.172) (0.174) 
Brothers -0.676 -0.004 -0.081 
 (0.602) (0.587) (0.594) 
Others’ Approval  -0.536* -0.530* 
  (0.275) (0.302) 
Others’ Appreciation  0.588*** 0.653*** 
  (0.224) (0.232) 
Others’ Influence  -1.200*** -1.174*** 
  (0.272) (0.279) 
Openness   -2.317 
   (1.421) 
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Conscientiousness   -1.652 
   (1.260) 
Extraversion   1.455 
   (1.303) 
Agreeableness   -0.751 
   (1.307) 
Neuroticism   0.451 
   (0.920) 
Constant 1.277 5.554* 6.650** 
 (2.888) (2.890) (3.293) 
    
Observations 140 140 140 
R_squared 0.232 0.321 0.339 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 11, Column 1, the Dictators’ choice strongly and 
positively depends on the decision made in the Dictator Information Phase. The distance 
between their choice and the median, indeed, is affected by the previous distance between their 
choice and individual’s allocation. Instead, it seems that the distance between the median of the 
group distribution and the prior individual allocation has not a significant effect. Moreover, we 
can observe that the influence of random information is opposite to that in the Dictator 
Information Phase: when Dictators see as a group of individuals behaves and receive random 
information about it tend to distance their decisions from those of the others while Dictators 
who receive the information they desire tend to conform with others’ choices. Probably the 
random information is not of interest to Dictators and, consequently, they do not give relevance 
to the allocations’ distribution and behave in a more personal way distancing their choices from 
those of the group. The point of view, instead, changes for Dictators who choose which 
information to receive: they are interested in that information and, consequently, giving 
importance to the group, they focus their attention on the allocations’ distribution, conforming 
their choices to allocations near the median. Then, it seems that dictators in Random treatment 
do not give importance to the kind of information conforming their choices to that of individual 
in the first phase, even if it seems they feel the effect of the numerosity in the Group Information 
Phase distancing their choices from those of the group. In this regard we must remember that 
the majority of participants in the online questionnaire chooses the fair division and then, we 
cannot rule out the hypothesis that their greater distance is due to perceiving those allocations 
too high. On the other hand, we could suppose that dictators participating in First Choice 
treatment show greater sensitivity to the specific kind of information provided and, based on 
their own expectations, they could feel more or less similar to the individual or the group and 
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react giving more importance to information rather than the numerosity of individuals. Indeed, 
in Figure 9 and 10 we observe a similar behavior in the two phases.  
Furthermore, we find that the measure of subjective similarity has a stronger effect 
than the previous phase highlighting the group effect: Dictators who feel similar to group’s 
characteristics align their choices with those of others. Finally, we find a small effect of gender: 
females choose allocation similar to the group while males tend to distance from others.  
Adding social variables, we find that all these variables are strongly correlated with the 
level of conformism with the allocations’ distribution of the group. As we can see from Column 
2, Table 11, the research for approval and the influence that others have on an individual lead 
to choose similar allocation to the individuals’ group, near the median of the distribution. The 
research for others’ appreciation, instead, has an opposite effect, as we observe in the Initial 
Phase: individuals who desire receive appreciations choose different allocation from the group. 
Moreover, the effects of the other variables are similar to the previous specification with two 
exceptions: the gender is no longer significant while the kind of education has a small influence. 
The previous results are confirmed also when we add personality variables, as we can 
note from Column 3, Table 11. We observe no significant effects of personality variables, 
probably because of the stronger influence of social variables when we consider the allocations’ 
distribution of a group of individuals rather than the allocation choice of a single individual.  
 
5.2. Analysis of the Pro-sociality Measure 
In Table 12 we report results related to the factors that affect the pro-sociality measure 
in the Initial Phase. The larger and positive is the distance between the Dictator’s choice and 
the individual’s allocation, the greater is the level of pro-sociality. 
 
Table 12. Pro-sociality measure in the Initial Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Y1 Y1 Y1 
    
Age 0.051 0.073 0.050 
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) 
Female 1.569*** 1.087* 1.171* 
 (0.570) (0.578) (0.602) 
Scientific Education -2.030*** -2.077*** -1.760*** 
 (0.548) (0.545) (0.548) 
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Volunteering Importance -0.113 -0.111 -0.141 
 (0.199) (0.196) (0.197) 
Brothers -0.592 -0.768 -0.571 
 (0.640) (0.637) (0.640) 
Others’ Approval  0.188 0.328 
  (0.337) (0.362) 
Others’ Appreciation  -1.053*** -1.162*** 
  (0.264) (0.268) 
Others’ Influence  0.103 0.000 
  (0.300) (0.307) 
Openness   4.672*** 
   (1.639) 
Conscientiousness   0.285 
   (1.587) 
Extraversion   0.403 
   (1.446) 
Agreeableness   2.679* 
   (1.552) 
Neuroticism   0.533 
   (1.110) 
Constant -4.000 -2.150 -7.761** 
 (2.843) (2.984) (3.431) 
    
Observations 252 252 252 
R-squared 0.063 0.093 0.120 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can see from Column 1, Table 12, females and individuals who have a humanistic 
education give to Recipient a greater amount than the allocation chosen by another Dictator. 
Adding the social variables, these results are confirmed. Moreover, as Column 2, Table 12 
reports, we find that the research for others’ appreciation is negatively linked with the level of 
pro-sociality. This negative correlation could be explained thinking that whether an individual 
desires her results to be appreciated by others, might be ready to do anything in order to 
emerge, even actions that put aside pro-sociality. As we note from Column 3, Table 12, both the 
sign and the significance of all variables are similar also when we consider personality traits in 
the specification. We find that Dictators who are more open and agreeable are more pro-social. 
 
Table 13 reports the results on the pro-sociality measure related to the Dictator 
Information Phase. The dependent variable is the difference between the Dictator’s choice and 
the individual’s allocation, both related to the second phase. As before, because of the design 
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we consider only Dictators who choose to receive individual information and we add variables 
regarding treatment, kind of information and similarity measures. Moreover, we consider 
among explanatory variables the dependent variable of the Initial Phase.  
 
Table 13. Pro-sociality measure in the Dictator Information Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Y2 Y2 Y2 
Method OLS OLS OLS 
    
Y1 0.266*** 0.236*** 0.279*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Cost Treatment -0.349 -0.522 -0.517 
 (0.836) (0.848) (0.849) 
Random Treatment 1.555*** 1.487** 1.610*** 
 (0.574) (0.575) (0.574) 
Demographic Information -0.735 -0.419 -0.411 
 (0.806) (0.802) (0.812) 
Beliefs’ Information -0.681 -0.534 -0.357 
 (0.767) (0.762) (0.760) 
Similar Sub-Category -1.534** -1.599*** -1.490** 
 (0.608) (0.604) (0.611) 
Subjective Similarity 2.401** 1.909 1.896 
 (1.215) (1.210) (1.204) 
Objective Similarity 1.597 2.113 2.235* 
 (1.353) (1.355) (1.344) 
Age 0.349** 0.399*** 0.442*** 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) 
Female -0.533 -0.928 -0.986 
 (0.662) (0.677) (0.718) 
Scientific Education -1.110* -1.225* -1.320** 
 (0.641) (0.636) (0.636) 
Volunteering Importance 1.159*** 1.114*** 1.173*** 
 (0.227) (0.225) (0.227) 
Brothers 0.838 0.414 -0.003 
 (0.743) (0.746) (0.753) 
Others’ Approval  0.381 0.026 
  (0.386) (0.413) 
Others’ Appreciation  -0.733* -0.440 
  (0.307) (0.318) 
Others’ Influence  0.760** 0.849** 
  (0.349) (0.356) 
Openness   -4.072 
   (1.934) 
Conscientiousness   -4.190* 
   (1.731) 
Extraversion   -1.563 
   (1.652) 
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Agreeableness   0.759 
   (1.776) 
Neuroticism   -0.903 
   (1.243) 
Constant -13.502*** -14.802*** -9.134** 
 (3.425) (3.560) (4.048) 
    
Observations 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.223 0.249 0.277 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can note from Column 1, Table 13, the distance between the level of pro-sociality 
of Dictators and that of other individuals is strongly linked with the choices made in the Initial 
Phase. Also analysing the pro-sociality measure, we find a treatment effect: Dictators who 
participate in Random treatment rather than in First Choice give a greater amount than the 
allocation chosen by individuals paired with them. This larger level of pro-sociality could arise 
from a little importance given to information and, consequently, a greater attention on the 
individual allocation. Dictators participating in First Choice treatment, instead, consider 
relevant the information they receive and, on the basis of these, they compare the individual 
allocation and choose the amount to give to Recipient. We also observe that Dictators are not 
affected by the kind of information but by the level of similarity of the specific category of 
information: Dictators who give more relevance to information opposed to their characteristics 
show a greater level of pro-sociality than who give more importance to similar characteristics. 
With regard to the objective and subjective similarity measures, we find, as in the previous 
analyses, that feeling similar to the other individual leads to increase the level of pro-sociality. 
In addition, we observe that the measure of pro-sociality increases for older Dictators and those 
who have an humanistic education and consider the volunteering very important. 
In Column 2, Table 13, we also consider social variables in the specification. As we can 
see, previous results are confirmed with the exception of the subjective similarity measure that 
loses significance. The effect of this variable is in part captured by the social variables related 
to others’ appreciation and others’ influence. Dictators who search for appreciations and are 
more easily influenced tend to be more pro-social than the others.  
Column 3, Table 13, reports the results adding in the regression also personality 
variables. We can observe, beyond the previous variables’ effects, a small influence of the 
objective similarity measure: Dictators who have a greater number of characteristics in 
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common with other individuals tend to be more pro-social than Dictators with smaller objective 
similarity measure. Moreover, we find that the level of pro-sociality is negatively correlated 
with the personality trait of conscientiousness: rational, thorough and careless individuals tend 
to be more selfish than others. 
 
Table 14 shows the results about the pro-sociality measure related to the Group 
Information Phase. The dependent variable is the difference between the Dictator’s choice 
related to the third phase and the median value of the group allocations’ distribution that each 
Dictator sees. Among the explanatory variables we consider also the dependent variable of the 
second phase for taking into account the past choice. In addition, as before, we consider the 
difference between the median value of the group allocations’ distribution and the individual 
allocation seen in the second phase for taking into account the position of it in the group 
distribution. As in the conformism analysis, we have no observations for Cost Treatment 
because we consider only Dictators that participated in the Dictator Information Phase and 
choose to receive also the group information. 
 
Table 14. Pro-sociality measure in the Group Information Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Y3 Y3 Y3 
Method:  OLS OLS OLS 
    
Y2 0.544*** 0.475*** 0.519*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Median – Allocation2 -0.576*** -0.510*** -0.550*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) 
Random Treatment -0.720* -0.780** -1.003*** 
 (0.395) (0.383) (0.379) 
Demographic Information -1.185** -0.546 -0.717 
 (0.580) (0.568) (0.571) 
Beliefs’ Information -0.475 -0.261 -0.515 
 (0.550) (0.531) (0.527) 
Similar Sub-Category -0.203 -0.285 -0.297 
 (0.442) (0.426) (0.427) 
Subjective Similarity 1.443 1.311 0.907 
 (0.946) (0.906) (0.894) 
Objective Similarity 0.282 0.978 0.717 
 (1.041) (1.011) (0.990) 
Age 0.037 0.107 0.102 
 (0.121) (0.118) (0.118) 
Female -0.373 -0.684 -0.713 
 (0.481) (0.485) (0.510) 
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Scientific Education -0.741 -0.888** -0.720* 
 (0.457) (0.439) (0.435) 
Voluntary Importance 0.229 0.214 0.219 
 (0.178) (0.170) (0.169) 
Brothers 0.628 0.032 0.114 
 (0.572) (0.563) (0.556) 
Others’ Approval  0.451* 0.382 
  (0.272) (0.293) 
Others’ Appreciation  -0.546* -0.711** 
  (0.217) (0.218) 
Others’ Influence  1.065*** 1.036*** 
  (0.261) (0.263) 
Openness   3.872*** 
   (1.348) 
Conscientiousness   -0.314 
   (1.197) 
Extraversion   -1.112 
   (1.232) 
Agreeableness   2.488** 
   (1.232) 
Neuroticism   1.493 
   (0.875) 
Constant -3.528 -7.122** -10.235*** 
 (2.750) (2.773) (3.034) 
Observations 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.404 0.460 0.496 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Table 14, Column 1, the Dictators’ choice strongly and 
positively depends on the decision made in the Dictator Information Phase. The pro-sociality 
level distance between their choice and the median, indeed, is affected by the previous distance 
between their choice and individual’s allocation. Moreover, the importance attached to the 
allocation seen in the second phase is emphasized by the strong and negative correlation with 
the variable that measure the difference between the median allocation of the group and the 
individual allocation seen in the Dictator Information Phase. Dictators seem to remember the 
individual allocation and, positioning it in the allocations’ distribution of the group, consider it 
as a reference point and choose an amount coherent with prior individual allocation without 
giving more relevance to the median value.  Moreover, we can observe a treatment effect. In 
particular, the influence of random information is opposite to that in the Dictator Information 
Phase: as we said before, probably the random information is not of interest to Dictators and, 
consequently, they focus their attention on the allocations’ distribution of the group choosing 
amounts near to the prior individual allocation. The point of view, instead, changes for Dictators 
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who choose which information to receive: they are interested in that information and, 
consequently, they interpret the allocations’ distribution focusing on the kind of information 
and this association leads to choose an amount greater than the median allocation. Therefore, 
they give more attention to received information rather than the frequency of each allocation. 
Finally, we note a further difference with previous results: considering characteristics and 
allocations of a group of individuals, the similarity measures are no longer significant while it 
seems the kind of information to have an influence on the level of pro-sociality. Dictators who 
receive demographic information rather than hobbies’ information show a smaller level of pro-
sociality.  
Adding social variables to the specification, we find that all these variables have a 
relevant effect on the allocation choice. As we can observe from Column 2, Table 14, individuals 
who search for appreciations are more selfish while who search for others’ approval and are 
more easily influenced are more pro-social, choosing an amount greater than the median value. 
Moreover, we note that beyond the similarity measures also the kind of information has no 
longer a significant influence. With regard to control variables, we observe that individuals who 
have a scientific education decide an allocation smaller than the median choice. 
In Column 3, Table 14, we report the results adding personality variables to the 
specification. Previous effects are confirmed; moreover, we find that individuals more open and 
agreeable show a greater level of pro-sociality choosing an allocation bigger than the median 
choice. 
 
The individual paired with the Dictator, of which are known allocation and 
characteristics, changes between the Initial and the Dictator Information phases. This could 
represent a limitation of this design because there is the possibility that in the second phase 
two different effects add up. Indeed, both allocation and characteristic information could affect 
the Dictator’s choice decision. In order to go beyond this limitation and isolate the information 
effect, in the following regressions we consider only those Dictators who see the same allocation 
in both the first and the second phases. Considering only this subgroup of Dictators we can 
examine whether previous results are consistent despite the change of individual in the two 





Table 15. Subgroup Dictator Information Phase 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable |Y2| Y2 
Method OLS OLS 
   
|Y1| 0.634***  
 (0.099)  
Y1  0.601*** 
  (0.094) 
Cost Treatment -0.559 -1.127 
 (0.765) (0.824) 
Random Treatment -0.123 -0.313 
 (0.576) (0.606) 
Demographic Information -1.547* 1.561 
 (0.898) (0.946) 
Beliefs’ Information -0.624 0.411 
 (0.775) (0.805) 
Similar Sub-Category -0.191 -0.437 
 (0.571) (0.592) 
Subjective Similarity -1.655** 2.368* 
 (1.369) (1.448) 
Objective Similarity -0.491 1.460 
 (1.446) (1.494) 
Age -0.037 0.171 
 (0.158) (0.172) 
Female -1.439** 0.950 
 (0.711) (0.769) 
Scientific Education 0.006 -0.452 
 (0.582) (0.599) 
Volunteering Importance -0.390* 0.307 
 (0.217) (0.228) 
Brothers 0.365 -0.916 
 (0.829) (0.840) 
Others’ Approval -0.750* 0.826* 
 (0.379) (0.421) 
Others’ Appreciation -0.126 -0.238 
 (0.324) (0.339) 
Others’ Influence -0.678* 0.971** 
 (0.375) (0.393) 
Openness 0.484 -1.493 
 (1.697) (1.769) 
Conscientiousness -1.693 0.494 
 (1.867) (1.981) 
Extraversion -2.039 0.887 
 (1.788) (1.897) 
Agreeableness 3.362 -6.333* 
 (2.188) (2.303) 
Neuroticism 1.486 -2.111 
 (1.404) (1.455) 
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Constant 8.918** -5.484 
 (4.258) (4.483) 
   
Observations 63 63 
R-squared 0.582 0.604 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can observe from Column 1, Table 15, the effect of the decision made in the Initial 
Phase is stronger than the effect we find considering all Dictators participating in the Dictator 
Information Phase, probably due to seeing the same individual allocation. Another interest 
result is that it seems not to exist a treatment effect, linked to the level of importance of 
information, but we find a small influence of the kind of information. We observe, indeed, that 
receiving demographic information rather than hobbies’ information leads to choose an 
allocation similar to the other individual. Furthermore, these results confirm the importance of 
the subjective similarity measure: individuals who feel more similar to the other individual tend 
to align their choice with her decision. With regard to the control variables, we note a significant 
effect of the gender rather than the age, and an influence, as in the whole group, of the 
volunteering importance. Finally, we find that others’ influence and the research for others’ 
approval affect the Dictators’ decision conforming their choices with those of the others. 
Therefore, in order to explain the level of conformism with others’ allocations decision, these 
results evidence the importance of the social variables and the marginal effect of those related 
to the personality traits. 
In Column 2, Table 15, we report the effects of all variables on the level of pro-sociality 
considering the subgroup of individuals who see the same allocation choice in both Initial and 
Dictator Information Phases. As in the conformism phase, we note a stronger influence of the 
decision made in the Initial Phase. Relevant is also that the subjective similarity measure still 
affects the choice decision, leading to increase the level of pro-sociality the greater the level of 
similarity. Moreover, we find a significant effect of social variables: individuals who search for 
others’ approval and are more easily influenced tend to give more than others. In this case, 
unlike what observed in the whole group, the research for others’ appreciation is not 
significant. Finally, as we observe in the analysis of the conformism measure, we note a 




These results provide important evidences related to the relevance of social variables 
and similarity measures on conformism and pro-sociality levels. These observations are also 
confirmed by answers to some questions submitted in the post-experiment questionnaire. 
Dictators, indeed, declare they changed allocation decision after receiving information about 
the behavior of another individual because this individual with similar characteristics gave 
Recipient an amount greater than theirs (21.37%) or smaller than theirs (14.53%) or equal to 
theirs (5.13%); or because this individual with opposite characteristics gave Recipient an 
amount greater than theirs (12.82%) or smaller than theirs (11.11%%) or equal to theirs 
(5.13%). Moreover, Dictators state they changed allocation decision after receiving information 
about the allocations’ distribution of a group of individuals because these individuals with 
similar characteristics gave Recipient an amount greater than theirs (16.67%) or smaller than 
theirs (14.44%) or equal to theirs (8.89%); or because these individuals with opposite 
characteristics gave Recipient an amount greater than theirs (13.33%) or smaller than theirs 
(11.11%%) or equal to theirs (4.44%). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This experiment intended to test the broad conjecture that receiving information in 
Dictator Game could affect and lead to revise the amount given away. More specifically, since a 
large interdisciplinary literature focuses on different kinds of homophily, we aimed to 
investigate whether subjects’ giving choices are affected by information over the allocation of 
a similar Dictator in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, hobbies and beliefs. In 
particular, we were interested in testing the broad conjecture that individuals are sensitive to 
belief consonance when they have to decide over giving, in a DG context. Moreover, we 
wondered whether being informed about the allocation of a group of Dictators has the same, 
less or more importance compared to being informed about the decision of one single Dictator 
only. For these purposes, we used a between-subjects design and introduced three treatments 
that differ in the way information about allocations and characteristics of other Dictators is 
provided. 
Collecting data among students enrolled at the University of Verona, we found 
significant variability in allocation’s choices among treatments and experimental phases. In 
particular, in Dictator Information Phase we observed that participants in Cost treatment 
choose with a greater extend a fair sharing while in Group Information we noted the highest 
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number of selfish allocations among the participants in Random treatment. Moreover, our data 
evidenced clearly a difference in the decision of receiving information: when a cost is needed 
only 50% of Dictators choose to receive information while when information is costless about 
90% of individuals decide to receive it. More importantly, our results make clear that subjects 
tend not to be sensitive to hobbies’ information, whereas, in the Cost treatment, they are clearly 
interested in receiving information over beliefs, in line with our conjecture that the beliefs’ 
dimension is a key one, with regard to individuals’ similarity and dissimilarity.  
For our analysis we considered two kinds of dependent variables, represented by the 
distance, in and without absolute value, between the Dictator’s choice and the individual or 
group allocation’s decision. Carrying out an OLS regression we found that social variables (such 
as others’ approval and others’ appreciation) have a stronger effect in explaining the 
conformism measure rather than the pro-sociality measure, while personality variables have a 
more relevant impact on pro-sociality rather than on conformity. In particular, Dictators who 
search for approval and who are more agreeable tend to align their choices with others in 
Dictator Information Phase. The results are similar also in Group Information phase: the search 
for approval and the others’ influence lead to choose allocations near the median of the group 
while the search for others’ appreciation has an opposite effect, as we observe in the Initial 
Phase. Another relevant result we found is that feeling similar to other individuals leads to 
behave in line with them. With regard to pro-sociality measure, instead, we found that Dictators 
who are more open and agreeable are more pro-social while those who are more conscious are 
more egoist, as previous studies evidenced. Unlike the conformism measure, in this case we did 
not observe a strong significant effect of the subjective similarity measure. However, we found 
that Dictators who give more relevance to information opposed to their characteristics show a 
greater level of pro-sociality than those who give more importance to similar features.  
Moreover, for both measures we observed a treatment effect confirming that choosing 
the kind of information to receive matters. The results reveal that Dictators who receive 
information in Cost treatment show a greater level of conformism than those who participate 
in First Choice treatment. These individuals strongly desire to know others’ behavior, probably 
because they are more easily influenced. In addition, it seems that Dictators who participate in 
Random treatment focus on the allocations, choosing amounts similar to those of individual 
paired with them or near the median value of the group distribution while those who 
participate in First Choice treatment give more importance to information and, consequently, 




The analysis could be improved going beyond some design limitations: in the second 
phase, indeed, both different individual allocation and characteristic information could affect 
the Dictator’s choice decision. We ran an OLS regression considering a subgroup of Dictators 
who see the same allocation in both first and second phases. We found a strong effect of the 
decision made in the Initial Phase and a small influence of demographic information. Moreover, 
the results confirmed that subjective similarity and social variables have a relevant impact on 
both conformism and pro-sociality measures. By increasing the number of these Dictators, we 
could verify whether the kind of information actually influence significantly the level of 
conformism and pro-sociality.  
Furthermore, more accurate results could be reached taking into account the learning 
effect. We hypothesized that Dictators who did not want the information, would have chosen 
the same allocation in all three phases. However, asking them again to decide how sharing the 
amount, we could isolate the information influence, eliminating the possible learning effect, 
comparing their allocations with those of Dictators who participate in Information phases. 
 
The classic approach for studying social influence in economics has been to conduct 
experiments on students in lab. The focus on students should not be seen as a weakness of this 
research approach: as Gächter (2010) argues, students often are the perfect starting point for 
this kind of researches. Students are typically cognitively sophisticated; therefore, they rather 
easily understand the mechanism of distributive decision problems, which reduces noise and 
enables the researchers to identify the underlying preference structure generating the 
observed choice patterns. However, it could be interesting to expand this research involving 
older individuals. Indeed, there are moments in life, marked by some events or personal 
experiences, that lead to change perspective over reality and could modify behaviors and 
choices in ones’ life. Pro-sociality could be part of these behaviors that change over time, as 
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Appendix A.1. Trauma Variables 
The Life trauma score originates from the following question: 
‘‘For each of the following events, please indicate whether the event occurred at any point in your 
life. If the event did happen, please indicate the year in which it happened most recently. 
[a] Has a child of yours ever died? 
[b] Have you ever been in a major fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural disaster? 
[c] Have you ever fired a weapon in combat or been fired upon in combat? 
[d] Has your spouse, partner, or child ever been addicted to drugs or alcohol? 
[e] Were you victim of a serious physical attack or assault in your life? 
[f] Did you ever have a life-threatening illness or accident? 
[g] Did your spouse or a child of yours ever have a life-threatening illness or accident?” 
Possible answers to each item are: ‘‘Yes” and ‘‘No”. Following Smith et al. (2013), the score is 
the sum of the events arisen divided by 7, the total number of events. The score is missing when 
more than half of the underlying items are missing. 
 
The Early life trauma score originates from the following question: 
‘‘For the next set of events, please think about your childhood growing up, before you were 18 
years old. 
[a] Before you were 18 years old, did you have to do a year of school over again? 
[b] Before you were 18 years old, did either of your parents drink or use drugs so often that it 
caused problems in the family? 
[c] Before you were 18 years old, were you ever physically abused by either of your parents?” 
Possible answers to each item are: ‘‘Yes” and ‘‘No”. Following Smith et al. (2013), the score is 
the sum of the events arisen divided by 3, the total number of events. The score is missing when 
more than half of the underlying items are missing. 
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Appendix A.2. Personality Variables 
Personality scores are constructed from the following question: 




























Possible answers to each item are: “A lot”, “Some”, “A little” and “Not at all”, to which we assign 
the value 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We assign the reverse code to all items apart from [p] and [t]. 
Following Smith et al. (2013), scores are built as the average of the following items: 
Openness: [l], [n], [q], [r], [u], [x], [y]. 
Conscientiousness: [d], [h], [m], [t], [z]. 
Extraversion: [a], [e], [i], [s], [w]. 
Agreeableness: [b], [f], [j], [o], [v]. 
Neuroticism: [c], [g], [k], [p]. 




Appendix A.3. Approach of Lewbel for IV Regression 
Let us define X a vector of observed exogenous explanatory variables and 𝜀 = (𝜀𝑠, 𝜀𝑜) two 
unobserved error processes, possibly correlated with each other. Consider a triangular 
structural model of the form: 
(1)     𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝑊𝛾 + 𝜀𝑠 
(2)                                        𝑊 = 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑜 . 
 
Estimation of Eq. (1) may give rise to biased OLS results because W is an endogenous variable. 
The approach of Lewbel (2012) suggests to run the first stage regression of the endogenous 
variable on all exogenous variables, that is to estimate Eq. (2), and then generate instruments Z 
as the residuals 𝑒0 from Eq. (2) multiplied by each exogenous regressor in mean-centered form,  
(3)     𝑍 = (𝑋 − ?̅?) 𝑒0.  
Identification is achieved by imposing that 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋, 𝜀𝑜
2)  ≠ 0  and  𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋, 𝜀𝑠𝜀𝑜) = 0. In the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in the error process, Z is correlated with W; the correlation is 
higher the greater the degree of heteroskedasticity. The estimator works well in simulations 
and empirical applications (Lewbel, 2012), although it is less precise than an IV estimator 











Appendix B.1. Instructions for the “Self” Treatment 
Today we will do an activity that is divided in three parts. During this activity you can win 
tokens and at the end you can exchange them with small prizes. Now we will explain everything 
with precision. In this activity we will ask you to make some decisions. There is no right or 
wrong answer; we ask you to choose the answer thinking about how you would behave in 
reality. It is important that you think well about the answer to provide because the prizes you 
will win depend on what you choose. 
We are interested in the behavior of groups of boys and girls. For this reason, we will not ask 
your name, but only some information that will never allow us to come back to you. We will 
give you a number that you will find on each paper sheet we will deliver to you; this number is 
necessary at the end of the activity in order to receive the prizes. 
It is very important that you correctly understand the rules of this activity; we ask you to be 
careful and not to talk to your classmates because no one has to influence the choices of others. 
If you have any questions, just raise your hand and we will help you. If you do not respect the 
rules, you will not receive any prize. 
If you behave correctly and if you stay in silence we will have time to carry out all three parts 
of the activity. Each part will be done once; at the end of the activity you can win tokens that 
will allow you to get some prizes. 
In this activity you will have to make decisions alone. 
On your desk there is a small bag with 10 tokens. Taking part in this activity you can win or lose 
other tokens. With the tokens you will have at the end of the activity you will choose the prizes 
among those available. (Examples follow). 
During the three parts of this activity you will make some decisions. At the end of the activity, 
one of the decisions you have made will be drawn. Each decision you will make is written in a 
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slip of paper like this. In this box I have included all the slips of paper with the decisions that 
you will soon have to make. At the end of the activity, we draw a slip of paper and we read the 
decision we will use to count the total number of tokens you have.  
The final number of tokens depends on the choice you made in the decision that is drawn; the 
tokens won or lost will be added or subtracted from the initial 10 tokens. With the tokens you 
have accumulated after this operation you will choose your prizes. 
Before making each decision, you have to think that every time you have 10 tokens and that 
each of these decisions could be drawn for the win of the final prizes. 
Now we explain to you which kind of decisions you have to take in every part and how you win 
the tokens by making some examples. At the end of the explanation of each part, we will provide 
you with these paper sheets in which you will make similar decisions. Each decision has two 
options; you will have to choose one. Think well about the decision you want to take because at 
the end it could be drawn and if it is drawn, we will give you the tokens corresponding to your 
choice. 
Is that clear? 




Now I explain which decisions you make in the first part of the activity. You will take 4 decisions 
and then other 4 very similar ones; therefore you have to make 8 decisions overall.  
In the first part we will give you the possibility to have more tokens (in addition to the 10 we 
have just given you). You must choose WHEN you prefer to receive tokens. You must mark with 
a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, remembering that there is no right or wrong 
answer. Now let's see an example. 
 
 I prefer to receive 2 tokens  
                     in 1 week 
 I prefer to receive 5 tokens  
                    in 3 weeks 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity: 
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• If you chose to receive 2 tokens in 1 week, you can choose your prizes that have a value 
corresponding to 2 tokens, but your teacher will deliver them to you in 1 week. With the 10 
initial tokens, instead, you will choose other awards you can hold immediately. 
• If you chose to receive 5 tokens in 3 weeks, you can choose your prizes which have a value 
of 5 tokens, but your teacher will deliver them to you in 3 weeks. With the 10 initial tokens, 
instead, you will choose other awards you can obtain immediately. 
If in the day the teacher has to give you the prizes you will be absent, do not worry, you will 
receive them when you will be back. 
Is that clear? Do you have any questions? 
 
Let’s make another example: 
 I prefer to receive 1 token now 
 
 I prefer to receive 3 tokens 
                   in 2 days 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity: 
• If you chose to receive 1 token now, at the end of the activity what happens? You will have 
11 tokens (10 initial tokens + 1 winning token). With these tokens you can choose your prizes 
and you can hold them immediately.  
• If you chose to receive 3 tokens in 2 days, at the end of activity, what happens? You can 
choose your prizes which correspond to a value of 3 tokens, but your teacher will deliver them 
in 2 days. With the 10 initial tokens, instead, you can choose other prizes you can hold 
immediately.  
Is everything clear? Do you have any questions? 
 
The decisions you have to take now are similar to the examples we have just seen. In your case 
you have to choose between NOW and 2 WEEKS. Be careful that the number of tokens will 
change from one decision to another. Do you have any questions? 
If you do not have questions, I deliver to you this paper sheet. You have to make 4 decisions.  
 
Now you have to take 4 further decisions. The difference is that you will choose between “I 
prefer to receive the tokens in ONE MONTH” and “I prefer to receive the tokens in ONE MONTH 
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and TWO WEEKS”. Therefore, compared to the previous decisions, WHEN you want to receive 




We start now the second part of the activity. In this part you will make 5 decisions and then 
other 5 very similar ones. 
As you see from this example, in the next decisions you can choose, as before, between two 
options. In one option (first rectangle) the number of tokens you can win depends on the roll of 
a die. In the other option (second rectangle) the number of tokens you can win is fixed. 
Regarding the first option, read carefully in how many cases you can win 10 tokens and in how 
many cases you can win 0 tokens. The image can help you; the faces of the die point out with 
which numbers you win 10 or 0 tokens while the yellow area of the circle represents visibly 
how many possibilities you have to win 10 tokens (first circle) and how many possibilities you 
have to win 0 tokens (second circle). 
Also in this case, you will have to mark with a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, 




If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you throw the die and see the result. 
• If you chose the first option, according to the number obtained by rolling the die you will 
win 10 tokens or 0 tokens. You will use these tokens, added to the initial 10, to choose your 
prizes that you will receive at the end of the activity. Then you can have 20 tokens (10 tokens 
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won + 10 initial tokens) or 10 tokens (0 tokens won + 10 starting tokens). [Throw 2/3 times 
the die] 
• If you chose to receive 5 tokens with certainty, your 5 tokens will be delivered to you. You 
will then have 15 tokens (5 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens you can choose 
your prizes you will receive at the end of the activity. 
 
As before, now we deliver to you the paper sheets where you will make similar decisions to the 
example just seen. Be careful: the number of cases you can win changes.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
Let’s make another example very similar to the previous one. The difference is that you lose 
tokens instead of winning them. In one option (first rectangle) the number of tokens you can 
lose depends on the roll of a die. In the other option (second rectangle) the number of tokens 
you can lose is fixed. 
 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you throw the die and you see the result. 
• If you chose the first option, according to the number obtained by rolling the die you will 
lose 10 tokens or 0 tokens. With the tokens that remain (10 initial tokens – lost tokens) you 
choose your prizes that you will receive at the end of the activity. [Throw 2/3 times the die] 
• If you chose to lose 5 tokens with certainty, 5 tokens will be subtracted. Then, you will have 
5 tokens (10 initial tokens - 5 lost tokens); with these tokens you can choose your prizes you 




As before, we deliver to you the paper sheets where you will make similar decisions to the 
example just seen. Be aware: the number of cases you can lose changes. 




In the third part we propose you some decisions that are different from the previous ones. Now 
we present you a choice and you have to decide if accept or refuse it. Let’s make an example. 
 
In this case, 
• If you accept it, you can lose 2 tokens or earn 6 tokens depending on the outcome of a coin 
roll. Your decision must be made before you know whether the outcome is head or cross. Keep 
in mind that the probability that head comes out is equal to the probability that cross comes 
out. As the circle figure suggests under the column accept, you have the possibility in one case 
to lose 2 tokens and in the other case to earn 6 tokens. 
• If you refuse it, you win 0 tokens as suggested by the circle image below the rejection 
column. 
Also in this case, you will have to mark with a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, 
remembering that there is no right or wrong decision. 
 
Now we imagine that this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity. 
• If you choose to accept it, you still do not know the outcome of the coin. Then you will toss 
a coin and see if it comes out head or cross. Considering our example, if it comes out head you 
lose 2 tokens in 3 days. With your initial 10 tokens you can choose your prizes you will receive 
at the end of the activity, but in 3 days you will have to give your teacher a prize corresponding 
to the value of 2 tokens. 
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• If you choose to accept it and it comes out cross, you earn 6 tokens with which you can 
choose your prizes that the teacher will deliver to you in 3 days. With the 10 initial tokens, 
instead, you will choose other awards you can hold immediately. 
• If you choose to reject it, you will receive 0 tokens. Then, you will have 10 tokens (0 tokens 
won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens you can choose your prizes you will receive at the 
end of the activity. 
 
Let’s make another example. 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you toss the coin: 
• If you chose to accept it and it comes out head, you lose 4 tokens. Then you will have 6 
tokens (10 initial tokens - 4 lost tokens); with these tokens you can choose your prizes you will 
receive at the end of the activity. 
• If you chose to accept it and it comes out cross, you earn 6 tokens. What happens? You will 
have 16 tokens (6 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens you can choose your prizes 
you will receive at the end of the activity. 
• If you chose to reject it, what happens? You will receive 0 tokens. Then you will have 10 
tokens (0 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens you can choose your prizes you 
will receive at the end of the activity. 
Do you have any questions? 
 
In the paper sheets that now we deliver to you, you lose or earn tokens NOW – IN A WEEK – IN 





Appendix B.2. Instructions for the “Other” Treatment 
Today we will do an activity that is divided in three parts. During this activity you can win 
tokens and at the end you can exchange them with small prizes. Now we will explain everything 
with precision. In this activity we will ask you to make some decisions. There is no right or 
wrong answer; we ask you to choose the answer thinking about how you would behave in 
reality.  
We are interested in the behavior of groups of boys and girls. For this reason, we will not ask 
your name, but only some information that will never allow us to come back to you.  
It is very important that you correctly understand the rules of this activity; we ask you to be 
careful and not to talk to your classmates because no one has to influence the choices of others. 
If you have any questions, just raise your hand and we will help you. If you do not respect the 
rules, you will not receive any prize. 
If you behave correctly and if you stay in silence we will have time to carry out all three parts 
of the activity. Each part will be done once; at the end of the activity you can win tokens that 
will allow you to get some prizes. 
We make this activity in your class and in the other classes of your school. You are paired with 
a child attending another class and aged as you. You will make some decisions for this child and 
this child will make some decisions for you. You never know who is this child and she or he 
never knows who are you. We assign you a number that you will find on each paper sheet we 
will deliver to you; this number it is necessary to create the pairs and to give you the prizes at 
the end of the activity. 
On your desk there is a small bag with 10 tokens that you will use to take decisions for the child 
paired with you. Taking part in this activity you will be able to win or lose other tokens to your 
partner. With the tokens that your partner will have at the end of the activity she/he will choose 
the prizes among those available. (Examples follow). 
During the three parts of this activity you will make some decisions for the child paired with 
you. At the end of the activity, one of the decisions you have made will be drawn. Each decision 
you will make is written in a slip of paper like this. In this box I have included all the slips of 
paper with the decisions that you will soon have to make. At the end of the activity, we draw a 
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slip of paper and we read the decision we will use to count the total number of tokens that your 
partner will receive.  
The final number of tokens of your partner depends on the choice you made in the decision that 
is drawn; the tokens won or lost will be added or subtracted from the initial 10 tokens. With 
the tokens your partner has accumulated after this operation she/he will choose her/his prizes. 
Before making each decision, you have to think that every time your partner has 10 tokens and 
that each of these decisions could be drawn for the win of her/his final prizes. 
Now we explain to you which kind of decisions you have to take in every part and how your 
partner wins the tokens by making some examples. At the end of explanation of each part, we 
will provide you with these paper sheets in which you will make similar decisions. Each 
decision has two options; you will have to choose ones. You will make the decisions thinking 
that you are choosing for a child of another class and aged as you. Think well about the decision 
you want to take because at the end it could be drawn and if it is drawn, we will give your 
partner the tokens corresponding to your choice. 
Is that clear? 




Now I explain which decisions you make in the first part of the activity. You will take 4 decisions 
and then other 4 very similar ones, therefore you have to make 8 decisions overall.  
In the first part we will give your partner the possibility to have more tokens (in addition to the 
10 we have just given her/him). You must choose WHEN you prefer your partner receives 
tokens. You must mark with a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, remembering that 
there is no right or wrong answer. Now let's see an example. 
 
 I prefer my partner receives 2 tokens  
                     in 1 week 
 I prefer my partner receives 5 tokens  
                    in 3 weeks 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity: 
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• If you chose your partner receives 2 tokens in 1 week, she/he can choose her/his prizes 
that have a value corresponding to 2 tokens, but the teacher will deliver them to her/him in 1 
week. With the 10 initial tokens, instead, your partner will choose other awards that can hold 
immediately. 
• If you chose your partner receives 5 tokens in 3 weeks, she/he can choose her/his prizes 
which have a value of 5 tokens, but the teacher will deliver them to her/him in 3 weeks. With 
the 10 initial tokens, instead, your partner will choose other awards that can hold immediately. 
If in the day the teacher has to give you the prizes you will be absent, do not worry, you will 
receive them when you will be back. 
Is that clear? Do you have any questions? 
 
Let’s make another example: 
 I prefer my partner receives 1 token  
                     now 
 I prefer my partner receives 3 tokens  
                    in 2 days 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity: 
• If you chose your partner receives 1 token now, at the end of the activity what happens? 
She/he will have 11 tokens (10 initial tokens + 1 winning token). With these tokens she/he can 
choose her/his prizes that can hold immediately.  
• If you chose your partner receives 3 tokens in 2 days, at the end of activity what happens? 
Your partner can choose her/his prizes which correspond to a value of 3 tokens, but the teacher 
will deliver them in 2 days. With the 10 initial tokens, instead, your partner can choose other 
prizes that can hold them immediately.  
Is everything clear? Do you have any questions? 
 
The decisions you have to take now are similar to the examples we have just seen. In your case 
you have to choose between NOW and 2 WEEKS. Be careful that the number of tokens will 
change from one decision to another. Do you have any questions? 
If you do not have questions, I deliver to you this paper sheet. You have to make 4 decisions for 




Now you have to take 4 further decisions. The difference is that you will choose between “I 
prefer my partner receives the tokens in ONE MONTH” and “I prefer my partner receives the 
tokens in ONE MONTH and TWO WEEKS”. Therefore, compared to the previous decisions, 
WHEN you want your partner receives the tokens changes. Now you can read the first decision 




We start now the second part of the activity. In this part you will make 5 decisions and then 
other 5 very similar ones. 
As you see from this example, in the next decisions you can choose, as before, between two 
options. In one option (first rectangle) the number of tokens your partner can win depends on 
the roll of a die. In the other option (second rectangle) the number of tokens your partner can 
win is fixed. 
Regarding the first option, read carefully in how many cases your partner can win 10 tokens 
and in how many cases she/he can win 0 tokens. The image can help you; the faces of the die 
point out with which numbers she/he wins 10 or 0 tokens while the yellow area of the circle 
represents visibly how many possibilities your partner has to win 10 tokens (first circle) and 
how many possibilities she/he has to win 0 tokens (second circle). 
Also in this case, you will have to mark with a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, 




If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you throw the die and you see the result. 
176 
 
• If you chose the first option, according to the number obtained by rolling the die your 
partner will win 10 tokens or 0 tokens. Your partner will use these tokens, added to the initial 
10, to choose her/his prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. Then your partner can 
have 20 tokens (10 tokens won + 10 initial tokens) or 10 tokens (0 tokens won + 10 starting 
tokens). [Throw 2/3 times the die] 
• If you chose that your partner receives 5 tokens with certainty, these tokens will be 
delivered to her/him. Your partner will then have 15 tokens (5 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); 
with these tokens she/he can choose the prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. 
 
As before, now we deliver to you the paper sheets where you will make similar decisions to the 
example just seen. Be careful: the number of cases your partner can win changes.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
Let’s make another example very similar to the previous one. The difference is that your partner 
loses tokens instead of winning them. In one option (first rectangle) the number of tokens 
she/he can lose depends on the roll of a die. In the other option (second rectangle) the number 
of tokens your partner can lose is fixed. 
 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you throw the die and you see the result. 
• If you chose the first option, according to the number obtained by rolling the die your 
partner will lose 10 tokens or 0 tokens. With the tokens that remain (10 initial tokens – lost 
tokens) your partner chooses the prizes that she/he will receive at the end of the activity. 
[Throw 2/3 times the die] 
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• If you chose that your partner loses 5 tokens with certainty, 5 tokens will be subtracted. 
Then, she/he will have 5 tokens (10 initial tokens - 5 lost tokens); with these tokens your 
partner can choose the prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. 
 
As before, we deliver to you the paper sheets where you will make similar decisions to the 
example just seen. Be aware: the number of cases your partner can lose changes. 




In the third part we propose you some decisions that are different from the previous ones. Now 
we present you a choice and you have to decide if accept or refuse it. Let’s make an example. 
 
In this case, 
• If you accept it, your partner can lose 2 tokens or earn 6 tokens depending on the outcome 
of a coin roll. Your decision must be made before you know whether the outcome is head or 
cross. Keep in mind that the probability that head comes out is equal to the probability that 
cross comes out. As the circle figure suggests under the column accept, your partner has the 
possibility in one case to lose 2 tokens and in the other case to earn 6 tokens. 
• If you refuse it, your partner wins 0 tokens as suggested by the circle image below the 
rejection column. 
Also in this case, you will have to mark with a X the rectangle corresponding to your answer, 
remembering that there is no right or wrong decision. 
 
Now we imagine that this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity. 
• If you chose to accept it, you still do not know the outcome of the coin. Then you will toss a 
coin and see if it comes out head or cross. Considering our example, if it comes out head your 
partner loses 2 tokens in 3 days. With your initial 10 tokens your partner can choose the prizes 
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that will receive at the end of the activity, but in 3 days she/he will have to give the teacher a 
prize corresponding to the value of 2 tokens. 
• If you chose to accept it and it comes out cross, your partner earns 6 tokens with which 
she/he can choose the prizes that the teacher will deliver to her/him in 3 days. With the 10 
initial tokens, instead, your partner will choose other awards that can hold immediately. 
• If you chose to reject it, your partner will receive 0 tokens. Then, she/he will have 10 tokens 
(0 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens your partner can choose the prizes that 
will receive at the end of the activity. 
 
Let’s make another example. 
 
If this decision will be drawn at the end of the activity, you toss the coin: 
• If you chose to accept it and it comes out head, your partner loses 4 tokens. Then she/he 
will have 6 tokens (10 initial tokens - 4 lost tokens); with these tokens your partner can choose 
the prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. 
• If you chose to accept it and it comes out cross, your partner earns 6 tokens. What happens? 
She/he will have 16 tokens (6 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens your partner 
can choose the prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. 
• If you chose to reject it, what happens? Your partner will receive 0 tokens. Then she/he will 
have 10 tokens (0 tokens won + 10 initial tokens); with these tokens your partner can choose 
the prizes that will receive at the end of the activity. 
Do you have any questions? 
 
In the paper sheets that now we deliver to you, your partner loses or earns tokens NOW – IN A 




Appendix B.3. Final Questionnaire 
1) Gender:          
 Male               
 Female 
2) Month and year of birth: ………………………………………………………………… 
3) From how many years are you in Italy? ………………………………………………………………. 
4) From how many years are your parents in Italy? ………………………………………………… 
5) What kind of work does your mother do? ...…………………………………………………………. 
6) What kind of work does your father do? ……………………………………………………………... 
7) How many brothers do you have? ………………………………………………………………………. 
8) How long do you stay without parents at home? 
a) One of my parents is almost always or always at home with me 
b) During the day it happens few times that both parents are not at home 
c) In the afternoon both parents are not at home, but in the evening at least one of 
them is with me 
d) Most of the time both parents are not at home 
9) During the recreation time you prefer:  
 Play alone 
 Play with your friends 
10) In general, you prefer:  
 Do homework alone 
 Do homework with your friends 
11) What grade do you take most often at school? ……………………………………………. 
12) What was your math grade in report card this year? ……………………………………………….. 
13) Do you do sports or recreational activities outside the school?  
 Yes 
 No 
14) Do you have your personal mobile phone? 
 Yes 
 No 





16) Do you like working in a group?  
 A lot 
 Little 
 Not at all 
17) Do you receive a pocket money from your parents? A pocket money means a fixed 




18) Do you play cards or board games? 
 Often 
 Few times 
 Never 
19) If you see a game you like: 
 I want it immediately; I ask my parents to buy it 
 My birthday is near; I ask for it as a present 
20) If one of your classmates has not material (colors, book, pen ...) do you lend it gladly? 
 Yes, always 
 Sometimes 
 No 




Appendix B.4. Variables 
- Italian Parents takes values 1 if parents are born in Italy, 2 if parents are in Italy from 
more than 15 years, 3 if parents are in Italy from less than 15 years. 
- Time with Parents takes values 1 if in Question 8 the answers are a or b, 0 otherwise. 
- Work in group takes values 3 if children like working in group a lot, 2 a little and 1 not at 
all. 
- Math Mark and Mean Mark take values 1 if mark is greater than 8, 0 otherwise. 
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- Play cards takes value 3 if children often play cards or board games, 2 if they play cards 
or board games few times, 1 if they never play cards or board games. 
- Pocket Money takes value 3 if children receive pocket money, 2 if children receive pocket 
money sometimes, 1 if children do not receive pocket money.  
Other variables are dummy variables referred to the remaining questions of post-
experiment questionnaire. 
 
Appendix B.5. Risk Attitude Ranges 
We consider the utility function CRRA to calculate the indexes of attitude risk r:  𝑈 =
𝑇1−𝑟
1−𝑟
  where 
T, in our case, indicates the number of tokens won or lost. 
Here we report all inequalities set up for each switch point in the decision tasks. Their solutions 
were calculated by means of a mathematical software because they are transcendental 
inequalities. 







     r ≤ -2.322 
• If child accepts to risk since the probability of winning 10 tokens is equal to 30% or if 










   -2.322 ≤ r ≤ -0.737 
• If child accepts to risk since the probability of winning 10 tokens is equal to 50% or if 










   -0.737 ≤ r ≤ 0 
• If child accepts to risk since the probability of winning 10 tokens is equal to 70% or if 










   0 ≤ r ≤ 0.485 
• If child accepts to risk since the probability of winning 10 tokens is equal to 90% or if 





















     r ≥ 0.848 
 
Appendix B.6. Pictures of the experiment 
 











Appendix C.1. Online Questionnaire 
Welcome! 
Thank you for showing interest in this study and for taking the time to complete this survey. 
Please read the following before starting: 
 
Consent form 
I consent to participate in this session which will involve nine questions on demographic 
characteristics, leisure interests and beliefs over value-related issues and one question in which 
I will make a decision. 
I understand that all data will be kept entirely confidential and will be absolutely anonymous. 
My personal information will not be stored with the data. 
I consent to the publication of study results as long as the information is anonymous so that no 
identification of participants can be made. 
 
o I have read and understood the explanations and I voluntarily consent to participate in 
this study. 
 




 Female  
 
2) Age: ______________________ 
 
3) Nationality: ______________ 
 
4) Which musical genre do you prefer? 
 Classic music 




5) Which kind of movie do you prefer? 
 Action movie 
 Romance / Comedy movie 
 
6) How much do you like swimming? Consider a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 means not at all and 
4 means a lot. 
1         2         3         4          
     Not at all                            A lot 
 
7) In politics we usually identify "the right wing" and "the left wing". Considering a scale from 
1 to 9 (1=far left, 5=center/moderate, 9=far right), where would you place yourself? 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9                                  
 
 
8) Do you consider yourself a religious person / believer? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
9) Which of the following statements best reflects your opinion? 
 In general, I am in favour of homosexual marriage. 
 In general, I am not in favour of homosexual marriage. 
 
10) In order to answer the next question, you are paired with another individual chosen 
randomly for this specific question among those who will participate in another phase of the 
research that will take place at the University of Verona (Italy).  
The role assigned to you is that of Giver; the participant paired with you plays the role of 
Recipient. You will never know the identity of the Recipient and she will never know yours.  
To answer this question, we introduce the ECU, the currency used in the experimental field.  
1 ECU corresponds to € 0.30 and to £ 0.27.  
You are asked to allocate 20 ECU. In particular, you will have to choose the amount x to keep 
for yourself and the amount y to give to the Recipient paired with you. Therefore, you will have 
to choose one of the allocations (x, y) showed in the table.  
  




Your amount x 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
The amount y  
for the Recipient 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
The Recipient paired with you accepts your choice, and makes no decision.  
The amount x you choose for yourself, converted in pound, will be added to the participation 
fee you will receive for completing the questionnaire; the amount y, converted into euros, will 
be given to the Recipient at the end of the activity in which she will participate at the University 
of Verona. 
At the end of the questionnaire you find a certificate that confirms the actual payment made to 
the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative secretary of the Department of 
Economics of the University of Verona. 
 
Appendix C.2. Instruction for Dictator – Random Treatment – 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this experiment. Each of you will receive € 2.50 for 
having shown up on time. From now on any kind of communication with other participants is 
forbidden. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand; we will answer your 
questions individually. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are identical for all 
participants. This experiment allows you to earn a sum of money. How much you will earn is in 
part a fixed amount and in part depends on the decisions you will make. Your decisions will 
remain absolutely anonymous. There is no right or wrong answer. The show-up fee (€ 2.50) 
and any additional amount of money that you will earn during the experiment will be paid out 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment consists of 3 phases and a final questionnaire. In each phase you will be 
required to make some decisions. At the end of the experiment the computer will generate a 
random number between 1 and 3, equal for all participants. You can imagine the choice of this 
number as drawing a ball from an urn containing 3 balls numbered from 1 to 3, remembering 
that any number between 1 and 3 is equally likely. 
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- If the number 1 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 1; 
- If the number 2 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 2; 
- If the number 3 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 3. 
Then you will receive the sum earned in phase 1 or the sum earned in phase 2 or the sum earned 
in phase 3, and each phase has the same probability of being selected for the payment. 
In each phase the unit of experimental money will be the ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), 
where 1 ECU = 0.30 €. 
Before explaining to you which decisions you need to make at each phase, we ask you to answer 
some questions. By filling out the following questionnaire you will earn € 0.50 that you will 
receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the show-up fee and the sum earned in one 




Now we start the first phase of the experiment. 
In each phase you are paired with another individual who will participate in this experiment 
during another session. The role assigned to you is that of Giver; the participant paired with you 
plays the role of Recipient. The individual paired with you will be randomly chosen by the 
computer. 
You are paired with this participant only in this phase and you interact with her only once. You 
will never know her identity and she will never know yours. 
Now we'll explain what you have to do. You are asked to allocate 20 ECU. In particular, you will 
have to choose the amount x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the Recipient 
paired with you. Therefore, you will have to choose one of the following allocations (x,y) showed 






Your amount x 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
The amount y  
for the Recipient 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
The Recipient paired with you accepts your choice and makes no decision.  
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 1, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular, you will receive the 
amount x converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y converted into euros + the show-up fee + 
the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be informed about the allocation (x,y) 
chosen by a Giver participating in another experiment. You will see the allocation (x,y) of a Giver 
chosen randomly among the participants in that experiment. Your decisions will be transmitted 
neither to individuals participating in this experiment, nor to individuals participating in other 
experiments. 
On the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the actual payment made 
to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative secretary of the Department 
of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the experiment, if you want, you can 




Now we start the second phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous one. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
As in the previous phase you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
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Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
the allocation (x,y) chosen by another Giver, different from the previous one and who has 
particular characteristics or preferences. 
• If you answer Yes to this question, you will be given 3 information, selected randomly, 
about some characteristics or preferences of the Giver and you will be informed about 
the allocation (x,y) chosen by this Giver. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 
• If you answer No to this question, you will proceed to the next phase. 
 
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 2, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you answered Yes to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 2 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 2 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you answered No to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 1 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 1 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 




Now we start the third phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous ones. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
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As in the previous phases you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
how a group of Givers with particular characteristics or preferences decided to allocate the 
amount of money available. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and in the phase 2 you answered No moving directly 
to the phase 3, you will be given 3 information, selected randomly, about some 
characteristics or preferences of a group of Givers and you will be informed, by 
displaying a histogram, about the distribution of the amount y that each Giver gave to 
her Recipient.  
Then you have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your new Recipient. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and you answered Yes also in the phase 2, you will be 
given the same type of information as the phase 2, in this case related to the group of 
Givers. You will be revealed, by displaying a histogram, the distribution of the amount y 
that each Giver gave to her Recipient. 
Then you have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your new Recipient. 
• If you answer No to this question, you will proceed filling in a final questionnaire. 
 
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 3, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you answered Yes to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 3 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 3 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you answered No to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 1 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 1 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
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secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 
experiment, if you want, you can read this certificate. 
 
[Read aloud after the third phase] 
Finally, we ask you to answer other questions. By filling in this second questionnaire you will 
earn € 3.50 that you will receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the amount you 
have already earned previously. 
 
Appendix C.3. Instruction for Dictator – First Choice Treatment – 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this experiment. Each of you will receive € 2.50 for 
having shown up on time. From now on any kind of communication with other participants is 
forbidden. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand; we will answer your 
questions individually. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are identical for all 
participants. This experiment allows you to earn a sum of money. How much you will earn is in 
part a fixed amount and in part depends on the decisions you will make. Your decisions will 
remain absolutely anonymous. There is no right or wrong answer. The show-up fee (€ 2.50) 
and any additional amount of money that you will earn during the experiment will be paid out 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment consists of 3 phases and a final questionnaire. In each phase you will be 
required to make some decisions. At the end of the experiment the computer will generate a 
random number between 1 and 3, equal for all participants. You can imagine the choice of this 
number as drawing a ball from an urn containing 3 balls numbered from 1 to 3, remembering 
that any number between 1 and 3 is equally likely. 
- If the number 1 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 1; 
- If the number 2 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 2; 
- If the number 3 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 3. 
Then you will receive the sum earned in phase 1 or the sum earned in phase 2 or the sum earned 
in phase 3, and each phase has the same probability of being selected for the payment. 
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In each phase the unit of experimental money will be the ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), 
where 1 ECU = 0.30 €. 
Before explaining to you which decisions you need to make at each phase, we ask you to answer 
some questions. By filling out the following questionnaire you will earn € 0.50 that you will 
receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the show-up fee and the sum earned in one 




Now we start the first phase of the experiment. 
In each phase you are paired with another individual who will participate in this experiment 
during another session. The role assigned to you is that of Giver; the participant paired with you 
plays the role of Recipient. The individual paired with you will be randomly chosen by the 
computer. 
You are paired with this participant only in this phase and you interact with her only once. You 
will never know her identity and she will never know yours. 
Now we'll explain what you have to do. You are asked to allocate 20 ECU. In particular, you will 
have to choose the amount x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the Recipient 
paired with you. Therefore, you will have to choose one of the following allocations (x,y) showed 
in the table. 
 
 
Your amount x 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
The amount y  
for the Recipient 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
The Recipient paired with you accepts your choice and makes no decision.  
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 1, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular, you will receive the 
amount x converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
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questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y converted into euros + the show-up fee + 
the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be informed about the allocation (x,y) 
chosen by a Giver participating in another experiment. You will see the allocation (x,y) of a Giver 
chosen randomly among the participants in that experiment. Your decisions will be transmitted 
neither to individuals participating in this experiment, nor to individuals participating in other 
experiments. 
On the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the actual payment made 
to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative secretary of the Department 
of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the experiment, if you want, you can 




Now we start the second phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous one. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
As in the previous phase you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
the allocation (x,y) chosen by another Giver, different from the previous one and who has 
particular characteristics or preferences. 
• If you answer Yes to this question, you will be given 3 information about some 
characteristics or preferences of the Giver and you will be informed about the allocation 
(x,y) chosen by this Giver. You will be asked to sort, according to your preferences, the 
type of information you would like to receive and you will be provided with the one you 
consider the most important. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 




At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 2, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you answered Yes to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 2 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 2 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you answered No to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 1 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 1 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 




Now we start the third phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous ones. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
As in the previous phases you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
how a group of Givers with particular characteristics or preferences decided to allocate the 
amount of money available. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and in the phase 2 you answered No moving directly 
to the phase 3, you will be given 3 information about some characteristics or preferences 
of a group of Givers and you will be informed, by displaying a histogram, about the 
distribution of the amount y that each Giver gave to her Recipient. You will be asked to 
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sort, according to your preferences, the type of information you would like to receive 
and you will be provided with the one you consider the most important. 
Then you have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your new Recipient. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and you answered Yes also in the phase 2, you will be 
given the same type of information as the phase 2, in this case related to the group of 
Givers. You will be revealed, by displaying a histogram, the distribution of the amount y 
that each Giver gave to her Recipient. 
Then you have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your new Recipient. 
• If you answer No to this question, you will proceed filling in a final questionnaire. 
 
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 3, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you answered Yes to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 3 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 3 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you answered No to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 1 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 1 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 
experiment, if you want, you can read this certificate. 
 
 
[Read aloud after the third phase] 
Finally, we ask you to answer other questions. By filling in this second questionnaire you will 
earn € 3.50 that you will receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the amount you 





Appendix C.4. Instruction for Dictator – Cost Treatment – 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this experiment. Each of you will receive € 2.50 for 
having shown up on time. From now on any kind of communication with other participants is 
forbidden. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand; we will answer your 
questions individually. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are identical for all 
participants. This experiment allows you to earn a sum of money. How much you will earn is in 
part a fixed amount and in part depends on the decisions you will make. Your decisions will 
remain absolutely anonymous. There is no right or wrong answer. The show-up fee (€ 2.50) 
and any additional amount of money that you will earn during the experiment will be paid out 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment consists of 3 phases and a final questionnaire. In each phase you will be 
required to make some decisions. At the end of the experiment the computer will generate a 
random number between 1 and 3, equal for all participants. You can imagine the choice of this 
number as drawing a ball from an urn containing 3 balls numbered from 1 to 3, remembering 
that any number between 1 and 3 is equally likely. 
- If the number 1 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 1; 
- If the number 2 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 2; 
- If the number 3 comes out, you will receive the sum of money you have earned in phase 3. 
Then you will receive the sum earned in phase 1 or the sum earned in phase 2 or the sum earned 
in phase 3, and each phase has the same probability of being selected for the payment. 
In each phase the unit of experimental money will be the ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), 
where 1 ECU = 0.30 €. 
Before explaining to you which decisions you need to make at each phase, we ask you to answer 
some questions. By filling out the following questionnaire you will earn € 0.50 that you will 
receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the show-up fee and the sum earned in one 







Now we start the first phase of the experiment. 
In each phase you are paired with another individual who will participate in this experiment 
during another session. The role assigned to you is that of Giver; the participant paired with you 
plays the role of Recipient. The individual paired with you will be randomly chosen by the 
computer. 
You are paired with this participant only in this phase and you interact with her only once. You 
will never know her identity and she will never know yours. 
Now we'll explain what you have to do. You are asked to allocate 20 ECU. In particular, you will 
have to choose the amount x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the Recipient 
paired with you. Therefore, you will have to choose one of the following allocations (x,y) showed 
in the table. 
 
 
Your amount x 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
The amount y  
for the Recipient 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
The Recipient paired with you accepts your choice and makes no decision.  
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 1, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular, you will receive the 
amount x converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y converted into euros + the show-up fee + 
the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be informed about the allocation (x,y) 
chosen by a Giver participating in another experiment. You will see the allocation (x,y) of a Giver 
chosen randomly among the participants in that experiment. Your decisions will be transmitted 
neither to individuals participating in this experiment, nor to individuals participating in other 
experiments. 
On the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the actual payment made 
to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative secretary of the Department 
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of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the experiment, if you want, you can 




Now we start the second phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous one. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
As in the previous phase you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
the allocation (x,y) chosen by another Giver, different from the previous one and who has 
particular characteristics or preferences. 
• If you answer No to this question, you will proceed to the next phase. 
• If you answer Yes to this question, you will be asked if you are willing to pay for this 
information. 
o If you answer No to this question, you will proceed to the next phase. 
o If you answer Yes to this question, you will be asked the maximum price you are 
willing to pay to know how another Giver with particular characteristics or 
preferences allocated the amount of money. You will have to declare 3 maximum 
buying prices corresponding to different characteristics and preferences of the 
Giver. 
 
Each price must be not smaller than 1 ECU and not greater than 4 ECU. Furthermore, it must be 
an integer number. Therefore, you will have to choose between 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
The buying price is not yet determined. After having revealed your 3 maximum prices, the 
computer will randomly choose an integer between 1 and 4, the same for all participants. You 
can imagine the choice of this number as drawing a ball from an urn containing 4 balls 
numbered from 1 to 4, remembering that each number between 1 and 4 is equally likely.  
▪ If the drawn number c is greater than all three prices that you declared (c > 
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3) you will not receive any information, neither concerning the 
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amount y nor concerning the characteristics or preferences of the Giver. You 
will proceed to the next phase. 
▪ If the drawn number c is greater than two prices and equal to or smaller than 
a price you declared (p1 ≥ c > p2 ≥ p3) you will receive information on the 
amount y and the characteristics or preferences of the Giver, corresponding 
to the price p1. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 
▪ If the drawn number c is smaller than or equal to more than one price you 
declared (p1 > p2 ≥ c > p3 or p1 > p2 ≥ p3 ≥ c) you will receive information on 
the amount y and the characteristics or preferences of the Giver, 
corresponding to the higher price p1. 
In the case that more prices are equal to and greater than the drawn number 
c (p1 = p2 > p3 ≥ c or p1 = p2 = p3 ≥ c) the computer will choose randomly which 
characteristics or preferences you will receive among those corresponding to 
the highest price. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 
 
This procedure ensures that the maximum price you are revealing is actually the price you are 
willing to pay. If you declare a price that is higher than what you are willing to pay, you may 
find yourself having to pay a higher price than you would like. If you declare a price that is lower 
than what you are willing to pay, you may not be able to buy the information because the price 
drawn is higher than what you declare but lower than what you are willing to pay. Note that 
you cannot influence the buying price with the price you declare. In fact, the buying price is a 
number generated by the computer, completely random and independent of whatever you 
declare. 
 
The cost c, paid to obtain the information concerning the amount y and the characteristics or 
preferences of the Giver, will be subtracted from the final payoff.  
 
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 2, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you received information related to another Giver, you will receive the amount x 
chosen in the phase 2 converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by 
completing the questionnaire – the cost c paid to obtain information, converted into 
199 
 
euros. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 2 converted into euros 
+ the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you did not receive information related to another Giver, you will receive the amount 
x chosen in the phase 1 converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by 
completing the questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 
1 converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 




Now we start the third phase of the experiment. 
In this phase you are paired with another Recipient, different from the previous ones. Your role 
is still that of Giver. 
As in the previous phases you are asked to allocate 20 ECU. You will have to choose the amount 
x to keep for yourself and the amount y to give to the new Recipient paired with you. 
Before choosing how to allocate the 20 ECU you will be asked if you are interested in knowing 
how a group of Givers with particular characteristics or preferences decided to allocate the 
amount of money available. 
• If you answer No to this question, you will proceed filling in a final questionnaire. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and in the phase 2 you received information about the 
Giver (at least one price you declared was higher than the number c generated by the 
computer), you will be given the same type of information as the previous phase, in this 
case related to the group of Givers. You will be revealed, by displaying a histogram, the 
distribution of the amount y that each Giver gave to her Recipient. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your new Recipient. 
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• If you answer Yes to this question and in the phase 2 you did not receive information 
about the Giver because all the prices you declared were smaller than the number c 
generated by the computer (c > p1 > p2 > p3), then you will not receive any information 
and will proceed filling in a final questionnaire. 
• If you answer Yes to this question and in the phase 2 you answered No to at least one of 
the two questions, you will be asked the maximum price you are willing to pay to know 
how another Giver with particular characteristics or preferences allocated the amount 
of money. You will have to declare 3 maximum buying prices corresponding to different 
characteristics and preferences of the Giver. 
 
Each price must be not smaller than 1 ECU and not greater than 4 ECU. Furthermore, it must be 
an integer number. Therefore, you will have to choose between 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
As in the previous phase, the buying price is not yet determined. After having revealed your 3 
maximum prices, the computer will randomly choose an integer between 1 and 4, the same for 
all participants. You can imagine the choice of this number as drawing a ball from an urn 
containing 4 balls numbered from 1 to 4, remembering that each number between 1 and 4 is 
equally likely. 
  
▪ If the drawn number c is greater than all three prices that you declared (c > p1 ≥ 
p2 ≥ p3) you will not receive any information, neither concerning the distribution 
of the amount y that each Giver gave to her Recipient nor concerning the 
characteristics or preferences of the group of Givers. You will proceed filling in a 
final questionnaire. 
▪ If the drawn number c is greater than two prices and equal to or smaller than a 
price you declared (p1 ≥ c > p2 ≥ p3) you will receive information on the 
distribution of the amount y that each Giver gave to her Recipient and on the 
characteristics or the preferences of the group of Givers, corresponding to the 
price p1. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 
▪ If the drawn number c is smaller than or equal to more than one price you 
declared (p1 > p2 ≥ c > p3 or p1 > p2 ≥ p3 ≥ c) you will receive information on the 
distribution of the amount y that each Giver gave to her Recipient and the 
characteristics or the preferences of the group of Givers, corresponding to the 
higher price p1. 
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In the case that more prices are equal to and greater than the drawn number c (p1 
= p2 > p3 ≥ c or p1 = p2 = p3 ≥ c) the computer will choose randomly which 
characteristics or preferences you will receive among those corresponding to the 
highest price. 
Then you will have to choose how to allocate the 20 ECU with your Recipient. 
 
This procedure ensures that the maximum price you are revealing is actually the price you are 
willing to pay. If you declare a price that is higher than what you are willing to pay, you may 
find yourself having to pay a higher price than you would like. If you declare a price that is lower 
than what you are willing to pay, you may not be able to buy the information because the price 
drawn is higher than what you declare but lower than what you are willing to pay. Note that 
you cannot influence the buying price with the price you declare. In fact, the buying price is a 
number generated by the computer, completely random and independent of whatever you 
declare. 
 
The cost c, paid to obtain the information concerning the amount y and the characteristics or 
preferences of the Giver, will be subtracted from the final payoff.  
 
At the end of the experiment if the number generated randomly by the computer will be the 
number 3, then you will receive the sum earned in this phase. In particular: 
- If you answered Yes to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 3 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire – the cost c paid to obtain information, converted into euros. The 
Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 3 converted into euros + the show-
up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire; 
- If you answered No to the question, you will receive the amount x chosen in the phase 1 
converted into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the 
questionnaire. The Recipient will earn the amount y chosen in the phase 1 converted 
into euros + the show-up fee + the amount earned by completing the questionnaire. 
 
We remind you that on the desk of the researchers you can find a certificate that confirms the 
actual payment made to the Recipient. This certificate was signed by the administrative 
secretary of the Department of Economics of the University of Verona. At the end of the 
experiment, if you want, you can read this certificate. 
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[Read aloud after the third phase] 
Finally, we ask you to answer other questions. By filling in this second questionnaire you will 
earn € 3.50 that you will receive at the end of the experiment in addition to the amount you 
have already earned previously. 
 
Appendix C.5. Post-Experiment Questionnaire for Dictator 
1) Which degree program are you attending? 
 Chemistry, Biology, Pharmacy 
 Engineering 
 Economics 
 Juridical Sciences 
 Letters, Philosophy, History, Human 
Sciences 
 Medicine and Dentistry 
 Physics, Mathematics, Computer 
Science 
 Communication Science 
 Psychology 
 Foreign languages and literatures 
 Physical Education 
 Other 
 
2) During your studies did you attend a course in Behavioral Economics and / or Game Theory 









 More than 3 
 
4) Have you volunteered in one or more groups or associations in your life?  
(For example, red cross, clown therapy, scout, missionary group, entertainment, services or 
assignments at school, in parish, etc.) 
 Yes, even now 




5) How much does this type of activity involve you? The possible answers for each aspect are 
"A lot", "Some", "A little", "Not at all". 
- In terms of time you dedicate or have dedicated to it; 
- In terms of importance for the activity and for the values it transmits; 
- In terms of enrichment and personal growth. 
 
6) How accurately do the following statements describe you? The possible answers are "A lot", 
"Some", "A little", "Not at all". 
- I can have my friends easily make up their minds; 
- When I face an important choice, I take into consideration the advice of others; 
- If my friends propose different alternatives to spend the evening, everything is always good 
for me, the important is staying together; 
- I state without difficulty a contrary opinion to that of the interlocutor/speaker; 
- I am sure of the choices I make and I do not give importance to what others think about my 
decisions; 
- When I have to choose among various alternatives for which I am uncertain, I try to 
understand how my friends would behave, they could give me good ideas; 
- My results are worth more if others notice what I have done; 
- When I am in a group, I prefer to listen; 
- It is difficult to make choices if I am not sure that my friends will approve them. 
 
7) Please indicate how well each of the following describes you. Possible answers to each item 





























8) (Dictators who participate in Random Treatment)  
What information about the other Deciders would you have preferred to receive? Order the 
following categories of information with numbers from 1 to 3 according to your preferences, 
keeping in mind that 1 means more important and 3 means less important.  
 Hobbies’ information (musical preference, favourite sport, kind of movie)  
 Beliefs’ information (political, religious and moral values) 
 Socio-demographic information (gender, age, nationality) 
 
9) (Dictators who receive information)  




 All sub-categories with same importance  
 
 Kind of movie 
 Sport  
 Musical genre 
 All sub-categories with same importance 
 
 Religious beliefs 
 Civil union preference 
 Political preference  
 All sub-categories with same importance 
 
10) Why did you give the Recipient an amount equal to y = * in the first phase of the experiment? 
 I am interested only in earning as much as possible 
 I am not interested in appearing generous because the recipient would not choose, in 
turn, how sharing the amount of ECU 
 I believe my allocation the fairest 
 I chose thinking about how I would like others to behave with me 





11) (Dictators who choose to receive information)  
Why were you interested in knowing how one or more people with particular characteristics 
had divided their amount of money? 
 The curiosity 
 The interest for some specific characteristics of other Dictators 
 I wanted to be sure about the decision made in the Initial Phase 
 I like to distinguish myself from others, in particular if others’ preferences are different 
from mine 
 I like to do what other similar people do 
 Other 
 
12) (Dictators who choose not to receive information) 
Why were you not interested in knowing how one or more people with particular 
characteristics had divided their amount of money? 
 I am interested only in earning  
 I was sure in my decision 
 I am not interested in the behavior of others 
 I wanted to avoid feeling guilty if other individuals gave a greater amount than mine 
 I am aware of this information would influence my choice 
 I do not consider relevant these kind of information for choosing the allocation 
 Other 
 
13) (Dictators who receive information) 
The information you received was related to a particular individual: (here appears the three 
characteristics given Dictator, belonging to one category of information). How much did you feel 
like this individual?  
Consider a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means no similar and 10 means very similar. 
 
14) (Dictators who change allocation after receiving individual information) 
Why did you change the amount y to give the recipient after receiving information about some 
characteristics of another decider? 




 Because this individual with similar characteristics gave recipient an amount smaller 
than mine 
 Because this individual with similar characteristics gave recipient an amount equal to 
mine 
 Because this individual with opposite characteristics gave recipient an amount greater 
than mine 
 Because this individual with opposite characteristics gave recipient an amount smaller 
than mine 




15) (Dictators who change allocation after receiving group information) 
Why did you change the amount y to give the recipient after receiving information about some 
characteristics of a group of deciders? 
 Because these individuals with similar characteristics gave recipient an amount greater 
than mine 
 Because these individuals with similar characteristics gave recipient an amount smaller 
than mine 
 Because these individuals with similar characteristics gave recipient an amount equal to 
mine 
 Because these individuals with opposite characteristics gave recipient an amount 
greater than mine 
 Because these individuals with opposite characteristics gave recipient an amount 
smaller than mine 






Appendix C.6. Instruction for Recipient 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this experiment. Each of you will receive € 2.50 for 
having shown up on time. From now on any kind of communication with other participants is 
forbidden. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand; we will answer your 
questions individually. 
Throughout this experiment you are paired with another individual who participated in this 
experiment during another session. The role assigned to you is that of Recipient; the participant 
paired with you plays the role of Giver. The individual paired with you was randomly chosen by 
the computer. You will never know her identity and she will never know yours. 
In order to make the experiment, we introduce the ECU, the unit of experimental money where 
1 ECU = 0.30 €. 
During the experiment it was asked Giver to allocate 20 ECU. In particular, the Giver chose the 
amount x to keep for herself and the amount y to give to the Recipient paired with her. 
Therefore, she chose one of the following allocations (x,y) showed in the table. 
 
 
The amount x 
for the Giver 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
The amount y  
for the Recipient 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
You will not have to make any decisions, you will accept her choice. 
Before choosing how to allocate 20 ECU the Giver paired with you was informed about the 
allocation (x, y) chosen by another Giver, with particular characteristics or preferences, 
participating in another experiment. 
At the end of the experiment the Giver paired with you received the amount x converted into 
euros; you will earn the amount y converted into euros, in addition to the show-up fee. 
Now you will see the amount that the Giver paired with you chose to give you. 
Finally, before continuing/proceeding with the payment, we ask you to answer some questions. 
By filling in this questionnaire you will earn € 0.50 that you will receive at the end of the 
experiment in addition to the show-up fee and the amount y. 
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Appendix C.8. Allocations’ distribution Graphs – Group Information Phase – 







   
   
   




























Appendix C.9. Big Five variables 
Personality scores are constructed from question 7 of post-experiment questionnaire. 




























Possible answers to each item related to personality are: “A lot”, “Some”, “A little” and “Not at 
all”, to which we assign the value 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We assign the reverse code to all items 
apart from [p] and [t]. Following Smith et al. (2013), scores are built as the average of the 
following items: 
Openness: [l], [n], [q], [r], [u], [x], [y]. 
Conscientiousness: [d], [h], [m], [t], [z]. 
Extraversion: [a], [e], [i], [s], [w]. 
Agreeableness: [b], [f], [j], [o], [v]. 




Appendix C.10. Questionnaire and Graph on Recipients Choices 




2) Would you have liked to know how another giver with specific socio-demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, nationality) or with specific hobbies (related to music, 
sports, movies) or with specific beliefs (related to religion, politics, ethics) allocated 

































3) Would you have liked to know how a group of givers with specific socio-demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, nationality) or with specific hobbies (related to music, 



































5) If the information had a cost between 1 and 4 ECU, would you have been willing to pay 
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